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West Europe Report

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POLITICAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DUMAS VIEWS EUROPEAN UNION, INFLATION, TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French No 27 Spring 1985 pp 309-315

[Speech by French Minister of External Relations Roland Dumas at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris 20 February 1985: "Towards an End to Europessimism"]

[Text] If I have chosen to talk on the subject of Europessimism, it is because I consider this topic, which has now taken on sizable magnitude in the media, to be laden with so many ambiguities as to make it indispensable to introduce at least a minimum of clarifications.

It has become customary to support a critical judgment of the Europeans by bringing into play higgledy-piggledy a number of anomalous arguments: Our technological lag; our demographic decline; the bottlenecks in the decision-making process of the European Communities and their farm surpluses; the comparative economic performances of Europe, the United States and even of Pacific countries, be it in regard to employment, to growth or to evolution of the exchange rates; the rise of pacifism; Europe's inability to provide for its own defense unaided; etc.

Such an amalgam leads, of course, to superficial analyses, that is to say, erroneous, in many respects, but above all, pernicious ones. In fact, the impression is tending to become widespread in certain circles that Europe is in the throes of a fatal decline that leaves the Europeans no choice but to cope as best they can with the inescapable. This tendency calls for a reaction: Not to conceal from ourselves our shortcomings, but to reduce the problem to its true dimensions, which are not "theological"--I mean by this that they are not tied to a view of history that would have its moving forces displaced from the Atlantic to the Pacific--but practical, in that they are amenable to exact diagnosis permitting the application of adaptive policies.

With this in mind, permit me to center my remarks on three precise points, dwelling on that which seems to me to characterize the present situation and the future outlook in Europe, namely:

--The progressive steps being taken by the European Governments towards greater solidarity;

--The prospects for European growth rendered possible by the successes of the adjustments currently in progress;

--The strengths and weaknesses of European technology.

The first reason for my relative confidence in the European reality stems from the progressive--in my view, considerable--steps that have been taken towards a more close-knit solidarity of the European Governments. The years 1983 and 1984 saw the resolving of two problem areas which, until then, had been literally poisoning the European climate.

I have in mind first of all the resolving of the Euromissiles crisis. You will recall the tensions, the agonies, the anxieties that marked the first 4 years of the decade as regards the security of Europe; the impression of vulnerability conveyed here and there by opinions, indeed by governments. In the end, the Europeans stuck to the course they had laid out for themselves through the NATO dual decision of 1979. The deployment of the Pershings and cruise missiles--in the absence of an agreement with the Soviets regarding FNI's [Medium-range Nuclear Forces]--was carried out without the dire consequences predicted by some, in fact, without initiating the new glacial era in East-West relations that the Soviets had been preindicating to us.

The Euromissiles crisis also helped strengthen the solidarity between France and her European partners. France, in fact, took a strong position in this debate, as far back as 1981. The president of the Republic himself made his views clear on this subject in Paris and in the European capitals concerned, to the head of state in Bonn through his speech to the Bundestag. But I have in mind also all the forward strides made in the politico-military domain concurrently with this Euromissiles crisis: The revitalization of the "defense" section of the 1963 Franco-German pact; the more profound study and matching of views on this same subject between France and Great Britain since the Franco-British summit last December; and more broadly, the revitalization of the WEU [Western European Union]. All of these steps have, slowly but surely, greatly strengthened the working bonds, in fact the bonds of intimacy, among European Governments and Administrations in a pivotal domain that governs all the others. I believe we are in the presence today of a greatly improved coordination of positions among the principal European countries with regard to the major East-West problems.

Thus, Europe appears to me rather to have emerged strengthened by the Euromissiles crisis.

Secondly, in the domain of Community matters, under the French presidency during the first half of 1984, a settlement was finally achieved with respect to the other major dispute that for many years had been adversely affecting the climate of intra-European relations. I refer in particular to the June 1984 agreements on budgetary discipline, and on the introduction of a limitation on farm guarantees with the decision relative to milk quotas, as well

as to the durable and equitable settlement of the British budgetary problem and the implementation of a process of studies and proposals on the institutional reform of the Communities, with the creation of the group of personal representatives known as the Dooge Committee.

It is important to measure the significance of these results and their bearing on the prospects that are being opened to Europe. First of all, they signify a change for the better in the political climate among the Common Market partners, an accomplishment the more remarkable in that the agro-budgetary quarrel had been going on almost continuously for 10 years. Secondly, they signify that the problems stemming from the Community decision-making process and from relations among the institutions--oh! how harassing they too have been these many years--have at last been come to grips with bodily. And thirdly, they signify that decisive progress has been made towards the redeployment of Community means of intervention--a problem the existence of which dates back to the end of the 1960's.

True, all the problems of the EEC have not been resolved, but at least the worst of them are now behind us. In this regard as well, the European Governments have thus progressed towards a greater solidarity.

The second reason why I consider it unjustified to lapse into moroseness is based--paradoxical as it may seem at first glance--on an analysis of the comparative economic performances of Europe and the United States.

It is far from being a matter of closing our eyes to the obvious: The economic results of the Europeans and the Americans in 1984 are well known. Their significance, however, must still be analyzed, as much from the standpoint of the years just past as from that of the years ahead.

A comparison of the growth rates in the United States and in Europe, if made to encompass a longer period of time, shows minimal differences in terms of trend, and, on the contrary, very substantial differences in terms of transient fluctuations. Generally speaking, growth rates in Europe fluctuate only slightly, whereas in the United States their swings are very wide.

This difference of style requires that we relativize all comparisons that are to be limited to the year 1984. Actually, the spectacular results obtained in the United States in that year in effect compensate the deep slumps of 1982. If we go back a little farther and compare the average rate per growth cycle, we obtain a figure (for the current cycle) of between 2.1 and 2.6 percent, depending on the choice of reference year--a performance of the American economy that shows much less of a differential with respect to the European economies than a comparison limited to the year 1984 alone would imply.

This difference of style between Europeans and Americans is in reality a very profound fact in which many commentators do not hesitate to see the sign "of the resiliency and flexibility" of United States as opposed to the "inertia

and sclerosis of Europe." Actually, interpretation is largely a matter of viewpoint; and one could just as easily see unpredictability and brusqueness in American performances versus a concern for resilient adaptiveness on the part of Europeans.

The same thing applies in all respects to the domain of defense, where the United States have dramatically increased their rearmament outlay, but in particular because they had undoubtedly too greatly underestimated the Soviet effort in this regard during the illusory era of detente. The Europeans, not having committed the same mistake, have not had to deploy a comparable corrective effort. Similarly, the rise of the dollar during the 1980's follows an equally spectacular fall during the 1970's. The strengthening of the trend at this point is notable only because the lack of restraint--specifically inflationist--was all the greater during the preceding period. To cite another striking example: The statements of the American director of the budget, explaining to the ruined farmers that they should not look to the state for aid but rather that they should change their field of activity.

All of this translates into reality a difference in philosophy. It is clear that, faced as we are with the need to modernize that is pressing upon us, we must also give thought to the formidable social challenge that besets us through our employment crisis and that of our social security systems, as well as to the need to encourage a greater capability of adaptation of our productive apparatus. But surely it would be excessive to take for ourselves the United States as an absolute model, the more so since our manner of reacting mildly undoubtedly has its virtues as well, as compared with American unpredictability and brusqueness.

The coming years will see a change taking place in the trends on both sides of the Atlantic.

Insofar as concerns the European countries, the remarkable results obtained in the effort to reduce inflation rates are worthy of note. The average European rate is today only barely higher than the American rate (of the order of 5 percent versus 4 percent), and this notwithstanding the fact that the rise of the dollar impeded on this side of the Atlantic--through rise in cost of raw materials--what it aided on the other side.

With the process of European stabilization now well on its way to realization, various signs indicate that the recovery is taking shape in Europe: The rise in profit margins of business enterprises, the rise in investments, and the sharply more favorable prospects for growth in 1985 than they have been in recent years.

In view of this recovery of "margins for maneuver"--at the very moment when those of the United States have been used up--in view of the reduction of economic divergences among the European countries, the necessary conditions for a rebalancing of roles between the United States and Europe in the pursuit of world growth are now coming into being. Compared with the

situation as of last year, for example (6.7 percent in the United States and 2.2 percent in Europe), the outlook for 1985 provides reason to believe that the responsibilities of the two big regions will undoubtedly be highly comparable (around 3 or 3.5 percent).

We come now to the alleged European technological lag.

Some industries command particular attention either because of the extent of their difficulties (shipbuilding, textiles) as against the prosperity of their competitors, or because of the strategic nature of the products concerned. This is the case of the entire electronics sector, where the rate of penetration of the European market by imports from outside the EEC is rarely less than 50 percent.

All of this preponderantly unfavorable evolution is generally synthesized and explained by Europe's "technological lag." An abundant journalistic literature, notably Anglo-Saxon, seeks to bolster this diagnosis to show that the Europeans are lagging in a technological revolution.

In reality--and I have no hesitation in saying it loudly and clearly--this generalized explanation has neither meaning nor foundation whatever. Industrial Europe's problem today is rarely technological; it is essentially cultural.

There are actually very few domains in which European science is lagging. With respect to the fundamental disciplines, Europe occupies a preeminent position in very many sectors, either with a real lead, as in theoretical physics and mathematics, or neck-and-neck with the United States, as in biology and chemistry. As regards industrial disciplines, generally speaking, the same is true. German fine chemistry and French and German pharmaceutical chemistry suffer no technological lag whatever behind the United States and a certain lead over Japan. In producer electronics, energy equipment, fine metallurgy, aerospace, terrestrial transportation means, but also software, telecommunications, fiber optics, armaments, etc, European industrialists' know-how is at least equal to, and in some cases superior to that of their competitors. There is no mystery about this. The human and financial resources being committed by the Ten to the development of these sectors are, more often than not, greater than Japan's and from time to time very nearly equal to those being mobilized in the United States. The system of training in research--which is the background of the basic sciences--being moreover equal in quality, it is logical that the results be comparable.

These observations hold as regards enterprises and products. Over the past 10 years, European industrialists have produced the first time-division-switching telephone exchanges, the basic third-generation softwares (PROLOG and ADA) used throughout the world, the first ultra-fast-technology (gallium arsenide) IC's [integrated circuits], etc.

There is therefore no technological disaster in Europe. There are, however, two real problems. The first is that of the European lag in the domain of information processing technologies, which boils down to the overwhelming predominance of Japan and the United States in the realm of components, production of computers, and consumer electronics. The second problem--which to a considerable extent explains the first--is first of all of a cultural order. It consists of our insufficient ability to adapt to the marketplace, our repugnance towards inserting ourselves in the very strong current of specialization that presently characterizes international trade; and it consists of our insufficient ability to sustain competitiveness through the investments essential to the research and development of new products.

Naturally, in this domain, the basic effort must be made by the enterprises themselves. It devolves upon the Governments, however, to develop the applicative value of Europe's principal asset--that of being the world's largest domestic market--on which we must base the efforts we must continue to pursue in three domains:

--First of all, we must foster cooperation among enterprises. Often cited in this regard, even though it has been in existence no more than a year, is the ESPRIT program, and it is indeed an extremely important program, not so much because of the funding it mobilizes--which in fact remains modest--but above all because it provides an opportunity for enterprises that had never before had any contact with each other to meet and learn to cooperate. My hope in this regard is that this program can be extended as rapidly as possible to the domain of biotechnologies, in which European capabilities are considerable--possibly even superior to those of the United States--but remain as of this date still compartmentalized.

--We must also achieve greater homogeneity of the European market. You are aware of the determined efforts we are making in this regard by every means possible: Fostering accords among enterprises based on common standards; working towards improving the Community decision-making process (action by the European Communities Court of Justice; the Dooge Committee proposal to ease the procedure under Article 100 of the Rome Treaty relative to the harmonization of national laws and regulations...); and gradually opening up public-sector markets that, in the domains of the new technologies, often make up a larger proportion of the Community market as a whole than in the other sectors of the economy.

--And thirdly, we must, to the fullest extent possible, render easier than in the past the Community industrial apparatus's shift to specialization as required to meet the evolution of demand and the advent of competition from the newly industrialized countries. Restructurings, as you know, are currently under way in the steel, refining and automotive industries. This modernization is painful but indispensable if our industrial policy is to progress from the stage of management of assets, to which it has had a tendency to confine itself in the past, to a stage of competitive specialization.

Not more than 5 years ago, journalistic literature was demonstrating to us, with often very convincing arguments, that the United States had entered a phase of irremediable decline. Today, the same respected authors are applying the same theory to the fate of Europe. My purpose is not to deny the existence of Europe's problems, which are very real and very significant. I simply think that if indeed such a sense of defeatism is seeming to grow, its basis is first and foremost in the minds of the Europeans themselves. It is up to them, hence to us, to take the true measure of this challenge, to not make of it a catastrophic matter, and to organize ourselves, with our own resources, which are considerable, to get past this phase of adaptation to which we are being compelled to devote our efforts by the current restructuring of international relations.

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

BLECHA ON STATE OF SPOE, POSSIBLE COALITIONS

Vienna PROFIL in German 8 Jul 85 pp 16-18

[Interview with Karl Blecha, SPOe [Austrian Socialist Party] deputy sun king in retirement, by Walter Schwarz: "'I Am No Sinowatz Successor'"]

[Text] PROFIL: Does it bother you that you have not been named SPOe chairman in Lower Austria?

Blecha: No. I am one of the national deputy party chairmen, am in charge of education in the SPOe and am one of Dr Sinowatz's deputies who has been assigned a number of tasks. You can see from this enumeration that assuming another post would have been possible only by reducing other duties. In Lower Austria it was not a question of personalities but one of organization. That provincial party organization has had a separation of the two posts of party chairman and deputy province president as well as both posts held by one and the same person. An overwhelming majority did not want a separation of the two posts. So I was no longer under consideration. I wanted to stay in national politics. And Fred Sinowatz too, quite contrary to rumors reported in the newspapers, always wanted to keep me in the government and never wanted to shunt me off to Lower Austria. The Lower Austrians expressly confirmed my being their man in national affairs.

PROFIL: Is your relationship with Sinowatz really all that free of differences? After all, under Bruno Kreisky you were something like deputy sun king and managing party chairman, whereas now you are one of the last ministers left from the Kreisky era. To put it bluntly, did Sinowatz not want to get rid of you after all?

Blecha: Some newspapers have claimed that to be so. It does not correspond to the facts in any way.

PROFIL: Do you continue to consider yourself to be in the running, for the post of party chairman or even Federal chancellor?

Blecha: No. I am not a standby. I am content with my tasks and am not striving for anything.

PROFIL: Not even if Sinowatz departs in the event that he loses the next elections by a landslide?

Blecha: You may be quite sure that I will not appear as a candidate either on the side of Fred Sinowatz or after him.

PROFIL: You head the advisory board of the socialist publishing house which puts out the AZ [ARBEITER-ZEITUNG]. To what extent do you feel you share in the responsibility for the catastrophic development of the central organ, and why did you not sound the alarm? Why was it necessary for the central secretary to take action and suddenly go before the public?

Blecha: As owner-representative I have the task of informing the party Presidium, not the public. But I welcomed Schieder's statement, for it led to a final mobilization of the shop stewards, particularly in Vienna.

PROFIL: Exactly what is going to happen?

Blecha: I will not comment on that now. One does not broadcast something like that at a time when definite action and decisions have not been taken.

PROFIL: Specifically, are any changes being contemplated as far as the publisher, the chief editor or the format are concerned?

Blecha: It is definitely not customary to announce details of a future newspaper policy in an interview.

PROFIL: Nevertheless let us return once more to you personally. While you were heading the AZ Advisory Board, the deficit increased no end, and there is a publisher who miscalculated by as much as 9 million schillings. Could that not have been checked?

Blecha: Yes, that is right: he miscalculated. But it certainly could not have been checked. The AZ was about to shut down as early as 1979. Konecny, who was made the new publisher at that time, led the paper out of its low in 1980. As of 1982, circulation and advertisement revenue began to drop again. We reacted by taking measures to reduce production costs and with plans for combining newspapers.

PROFIL: Does it really make any sense these days to have party newspapers? Can the SPOe afford the luxury of putting out four dailies in Austria?

Blecha: I think that is a luxury. Of course one has to pay tribute to local color...

PROFIL: ...In other words, the road being taken is in the direction of a uniform central organ with provincial variations?

Blecha: I think it would be a good idea to have a paper which centrally comes up with political information through a crew of journalists which also enjoys great respect in the trade--very liberally, that is not in a dull way...

PROFIL: Not like an official gazette.

Blecha: Not like a gazette. Rather, events at home and abroad should be published and discussed from a socialist point of view, suitable at any time for quotation also by the competition, a voice in the media which is to be taken seriously.

PROFIL: A newspaper which takes chances.

Blecha: Obviously. That requires strong editorial leadership, which is expensive.

PROFIL: But then there will be revolts in the provincial organizations.

Blecha: I am not talking about an ideal state of affairs. There is no getting around local editorial offices. But this idea is still not on the agenda.

PROFIL: But it should get on the agenda...

Blecha: ...I worked it out as early as 1981-1982. It was submitted to the party Presidium but could not be implemented. If you ask me for specifics, I figure the time will come very soon for provincial papers to go ahead and join a pool while preserving a certain independence.

PROFIL: There are proposals for introducing a kind of compulsory subscription for SPOe shop stewards.

Blecha: I think that is a very bad idea. A paper which one buys because one has to is condemned to death.

PROFIL: Let us go from the state of the party paper to the state of the party and ask you as an old pro: How are things in the SPOe--from A, for AX and Androsch, to Nenning, the case of Matysek...

Blecha: It is quite true that there exists a phase of resignation in a situation of change--a change which we are only now becoming aware. But this phase can be overcome very quickly if one is convinced that one is better qualified than the competition to give the appropriate answers to the burning questions of the future.

PROFIL: In which fields does the SPOe have to be more articulate?

Blecha: People have to become more aware of the questions connected with the environment and the changes in labor. New needs exist the Greens too have realized that, but they are reacting aggressively. The SPOe must offer solutions that are socially just. The technological progress which the stone-age Greens want to check can bring a great deal that is positive to mankind. Surely it makes no sense to get jobs that rob the worker of his dignity, no matter what the cost. Therefore, as a socialist, I am for speeding technological change wherever it does not run counter to ecological conditions. This will turn technology increasingly into a source of social wealth, putting a completely new face on its distribution.

PROFIL: But are these fundamental discussions not pushed out of sight by conspicuous affairs a la Nenning and Matysek and all the way to Androsch. On the one hand, intellectuals are being sent off in a huff, and on the other hand upstarts are smashing the party.

Blecha: Since the seventies, the prescription for success by a social democratic party has been that of an open party.

PROFIL: And now it is closed.

Blecha: No, no, it is not closed. Shutting it off would be a wrong reaction to untoward phenomena. In an open, very liberal party untoward things will happen. Revealing centrifugal trends and phenomena of degeneration strengthens counterforces and immunization.

PROFIL: Why, for example, could someone like Guenther Nenning not stay in the party? As is well known, a clown cannot be killed anyway...

Blecha: He wittingly caused a number of provocations to bring about his expulsion.

PROFIL: Incidentally, what was the mischief done by Mrs Matysek, who was then removed as head of the Burgenland SPOe, with Fred Sinowatz giving a big push?

Blecha: I don't know. But one thing I do know: the decision by the provincial party to relieve her as cheif was unanimous.

PROFIL: I see. But what had she done?

Blecha: You have to find out about that in Burgenland.

PROFIL: Another question: Is it possible for the general manager of a big domestic bank to hold any office or remain in the SPOe if he is convicted of tax fraud?

Blecha: That can be discussed once the results are in. So far the presumption of innocence prevails.

PROFIL: Nevertheless, putting the question once more quite apart from any names, quite academically...

Blecha: That won't work. Any remark would lead to a whole chain of misinterpretations.

PROFIL: Period?

Blecha: Period.

PROFIL: If one is to believe the opinion polls, the SPOe at present is the strongest party but nowhere near an absolute majority. What does that mean in

regard to the 1987 elections? Is the Red-Blue [Socialist-Liberal] to be continued?

Blecha: I hope that the SPOe will manage to achieve an absolute majority.

PROFIL: Really?

Blecha: Yes, I hope so because the OeVP [Austrian People's Party] very awkwardly has wasted any opportunity to become stronger by acting quite wrong tactically and strategically. So all polls indicate a negative assessment of leading candidate Mock.

PROFIL: Mock--the weakest OeVP chairman ever?

Blecha: He is that. Halfway into the legislative period--a time which is always important--it turns out that with its vacillating politics the OeVP has not accomplished anything. The SPOe, which has had to hold still for punishment because of a number of unpopular measures, has absorbed this punishment. The Austrian economic data are very positive. The ground has been laid for people whom the SPOe has lost to be retrieved. Moreover the high point for the Greens has been passed.

PROFIL: What do you wish for in the way of a coalition?

Blecha: In the event that the SPOe does not obtain an absolute majority, I do not rule out any coalition. I mean, I rule out the existence of an SPOe coalition with the Greens or Alternatives.

PROFIL: That does not amount to a very staunch defense of the small coalition.

Blecha: To make sure of a clear answer here too: The way the OeVP looks now, in the summer of 1985, it is certainly no coalition partner for the SPOe. One cannot say, of course, what things will look like in a couple of years. It is imaginable that those who deplore the fact that the opposition politics practiced so far have not yielded anything will continue to increase in number in the OeVP. That could lead to a rethinking.

PROFIL: In connection with the departure of the minister of health, is there a major government reshuffle in the making?

Blecha: I can only say what is constantly being emphasized by the Federal chancellor. He sees no reason for a major government reshuffle at present. The replacement of the minister of health therefore will not entail a more extensive government reshuffle.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

GOL ON UPCOMING ELECTION, ECONOMIC ISSUES

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 14 Jun 85 p 2

[Interview with Jean Gol, leader of the Walloon Liberal Reform Party, by A.M. and V.d.W.: "Jean Gol: 'Francois Perin Is Wrong'"; date and place not given]

[Text] Following is the text of the interview which Mr Gol granted us.

[Question] At the time of the previous budgetary review you drew up a financial memorandum "correcting" the one Mr Maystadt had presented. Are you going to do this again at the time when the 1986 budget is drawn up?

[Answer] I have no idea. As vice prime minister I am associated with the general policy of the government and with its overall choices. It is normal for the ministers of the budget and of finance to prepare the budget. But when you have the feeling that some methodological or technical points could be controversial, then it is absolutely normal for all those who are associated with the decision to give their opinion. Having said this, I think that the government should draw up a budget for 1986.

[Question] Completely?

[Answer] At least in its broad outline. Whether we want it or not, part of the 1986 budget will not be the budget we developed in July.

What Savings?

[Question] Will the government define precisely the savings measures intended to counterbalance the tax reduction plan estimated at 20 billion francs per year?

[Answer] You have to at least define the broad sectors in which savings will have to be achieved. It will not be possible to avoid reorganization of the transfers to public and private enterprises, to social security. Nobody has been able to prove to me so far that significant savings are possible anywhere else but in the large budgetary areas. I also believe that the third index jump in 1986 will have to be implemented. The promises made by opposition parties to eliminate it are totally unrealistic.

[Question] The minister of finance added education to the areas in which savings will have to be made...

[Answer] Yes. But this involves a sector in which it would be dangerous to make a commitment in July 1985 when it is known that education will be the object of an open debate at the time of the negotiations for a new government. We are not ready to get involved in a new school war, even though this would undoubtedly please the socialists and the social Christians.

[Question] The date chosen for the legislative elections (8 December 1985) is not favorable to the budget. If it could be redone...

[Answer] If history were to be redone, I would remind you that I was in favor of combining the legislative elections with the European elections in June 1984.

[Question] Because the PRL [Liberal Reform Party (Walloon)] was stronger a year ago?

[Answer] No. I think that the majority was stronger. We would have spared the Belgians having to vote twice. And I am convinced that the current majority would have been renewed for a full legislative term.

[Question] Have all the savings decided on at the time of the budgetary review of March 1985 really been implemented?

[Answer] There is a series of savings provided for at the time of the budgetary review, not of March 1985 but of March 1984, which have not been implemented yet because of the resistance of the ministers in charge of the social departments. The savings decided on in March 1985 were not adequate: I have said that this would become obvious when the 1986 budget is drawn up.

[Question] Whatever happened to the liberal bill instituting the taxpayer charter?

[Answer] The two chambers will no longer have an opportunity to consider it because of the opposition of the Christian democratic family. Nevertheless, it will be an important element in the negotiations for the next government. The fact remains that the multiyear tax reduction plan is extremely important. If the liberals are not in the next government, this tax reduction plan will be dismantled, the same way the social Christian-socialist coalition (Martens IV) wiped out the tax reductions decided on by the 1980 three party administration.

[Question] Is the audiovisual bill still a priority for the liberals?

[Answer] It should be voted on before vacation. It is part of the majority agreement.

Elections

[Question] Prime Minister Martens told the newspaper LE SOIR that the next elections had to be held on 8 December, and not before.

[Answer] I am also radically opposed to any change in the planned timetable.

[Question] What will happen if the current majority is not reelected?

[Answer] We have to do everything to maintain the current coalition and possibly to decide jointly to broaden it to include others.

[Question] Who are you thinking of?

[Answer] Whoever can be found. What is vital is for the current majority to form the framework of the new coalition.

[Question] Socialists perhaps?

[Answer] I have never made any statements against a three-party government as such, even though such a formula is usually short-lived and synonymous with immobilism.

[Question] Could you be tempted by a socialist-liberal government?

[Answer] There is little convergence between the program of the PRL and that of the PS-FGTB [Socialist Party (Walloon)-General Federation of Labor of Belgium].

Responsibilities for Heysel Incident

[Question] After the Heysel incident, were you among those who demanded the resignation of Mr Nothomb?

[Answer] Oh! No...

[Question] There is a rumor to that effect going around...

[Answer] I never heard that such a rumor was going around. I want to draw conclusions from the Heysel incident for the future. We have to be clear: the strengthening and coordination of the police forces are necessary. My plan provides that, in cases of huge gatherings, a part of the police force be assigned to question, identify and possibly arrest certain troublemakers and that our legal capacities be supplemented. It would also seem essential to me that we strengthen the gendarmerie corps, whose strength is very much below what the law allows.

As far as the responsibilities for the Heysel incident are concerned, my advice is that the parliamentary investigation committee should be allowed to do its work.

[Question] If, as a result of that investigation, there are political responsibilities, will it be necessary then to draw the conclusions from it?

[Answer] Obviously.

Gendebien and Perin

As former member of the RW [Walloon Rally], Mr Gol knew Messrs Gendebien and Perin, both of whom are in the news, well.

[Question] What do you think of Mr Gendebien's joining with the PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)] via the Walloon Democratic Alliance?

[Answer] It is a rallying of the PSC with part of the remains of the RW. There will be no big personalities on the lists.

Let me tell you first that I am glad to have seen Mr Gendebien allowing himself to be photographed next to Mr Tindemans at the New Year's PSC-CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] reception. It will be nice to see how that will go over!

This development shows that on the French speaking side at least, the economic and social problems are supplanting the community element. Realism ends up touching everyone. However, it is necessary for the traditional parties to take care of the interests of the French speakers and the Walloons.

The operation must benefit the majority in the sense that it should bring in voters who might have been tempted to vote for SeP [Solidarity and Participation], ECOLO [Ecology Party] or the self-management RW. The PSC is a perfect receptacle for those voters.

[Question] What is your reaction to Mr Perin's resignation?

[Answer] It is unpleasant for me to enter into conflict with a man whose colleague and companion I have been and whose friend I still am. I have a kind of filial devotion to him. However, nobody is infallible and, in this case, Francois Perin is wrong.

Note the suddenness of his decision, which will surprise only those who don't know him. Regardless of his overall view of things, he sometimes becomes obsessed by an *idée fixe* and becomes unreceptive to a certain number of arguments, and in any case to arguments of timeliness or arguments implying a dialogue. There are other means to express one's disagreement than turning in one's resignation.

Let us get to the bottom of it now. We will, in any case, remain members of the FLDE [Federation of European Liberal Democrats]. As a matter of fact, I am a candidate for the vice presidency of the organization. Francois Perin reacted to rumors and press clippings. In Groningen we disagreed with the English who are often more leftist than the Belgian socialists. But the French and Italian republicans, the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress

(Flemish)], and the Dutch VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] followed us in that opposition. On the other hand, is it unreasonable to consider a possible status of observer within the UDI [expansion unknown] and to find oneself next to conservatives who, in Great Britain, are the most European?

Mr Perin also accuses us of not marching to the same passionate rhythm he does for a supranational Europe with an elected executive. He has forgotten the contingencies of politics a little.

As far as the state is concerned, I hold that it interferes too much in certain sectors and that it is not always effective enough to guarantee the security of the citizens and to ensure aid for the most divided. There is no Friedman-like reference in that analysis.

[Question] Will Francois Perin's resignation harm the PRL?

[Answer] One should not exaggerate the phenomenon. I don't think that there will be a malaise within the party and I don't think that the demonstration Francois Perin wanted to make will be convincing to the voters either.

PS and FGTB

[Question] Another rally, that of the PS and the FGTB...

[Answer] The structure of the Socialist Party is such that they are bound hand and feet to the FGTB. In the document, we see the reemergence of the boggy of structural reform, state control, the rejection of putting a certain number of activities into private hands. From the economic point of view, that which is good (a certain selective revival) is not original, and that which is original is not good. That is the case for example with the new regionalization plan which dismembers the state. The document doesn't say anything clearly with regard to the distribution of resources between the two communities.

Schaerbeek and Mr Nols

[Question] What do you think of the manner in which Mr Nols tries to solve the financial problems of his municipality? Does his attitude embarrass you?

[Answer] The problem of Schaerbeek is the problem of all municipalities which are virtually bankrupt. We have experienced incidents which are at least equally serious as those we have just seen in Schaerbeek. Of course, you need to avoid the politicization of the issue. I am saying that in both directions: first of all to Mr Nols. He cannot take his people hostage in order to avoid essential reforms. But I am also saying this to the CVP, which has requested the sending of a district commissioner. I challenge that formula. They didn't send a government commissioner to Liege or to Antwerp even though that could perhaps have been useful.

[Question] On what list would you prefer to see Mr Nols present himself at the upcoming legislative elections?

[Answer] That is his business...

28 August 1985

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

DANGERS FROM ARRIVAL OF TURKISH SETTLERS NOTED

Government Faulted

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 14 Jun 85 p 3

/From the "Problems and Thoughts" column: "The Load Haulers"/

/Text/ The Second Attila ended in August 1984 /as published/. The third followed immediately after the destruction. It took the form of gross and indigent settlers from Anatolia. This newspaper, from the very first day of its publication, had made note of the frightful danger of Turkish settlers because we believed and still believe that they constitute the most dreadful Trojan Horse for the definite conquest of Cyprus. What is the importance that the Turks are giving the settlers? First of all, they are aiming at changing the demographic composition of Cyprus' population. Secondly, they make up the second force, militarily, politically and otherwise in the occupied regions. Thirdly, they have been used and are still being used for supporting Ankara's servant, i.e. Denktas. Fourthly, they constitute a counterweight to those Turkish Cypriots who might oppose possible actions by "Mother" Turkey. Fifthly, because of their increased birth rate levels it cannot be ruled out that at some point they might outnumber the Turkish Cypriots themselves who would be downgraded to second class citizens. For us, however, the dangers that are presented are more frightful because a new Alexandretta is being tried out here. The government has not recognized as it should have and has not denounced as much as possible this third Attila. Thus, we are now being informed that settlers in the occupied regions surpass 50,000, i.e. at this very moment the Turks in the occupied regions surpass 200,000 taking into account the occupation forces. One Turk for three Greeks. One can figure out the frightful prospect of a complete alteration of the demographic composition of Cyprus' population in a few years.

Turkish Cypriots Reportedly Unhappy

Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 13 Jun 85 p 3

/Editorial: "Only Two Instances"/

/Text/ We would want to show what the consequences --undetermined at the moment-- would be following the "presidential elections" as well as the "parliamentary elections" in the occupied portion of Cyprus. What these consequences in the coming years will be have not been determined by any of our organized bodies. We may all

talk about the unfavorable repercussions on our problem by this action by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership but more specifically no one has been able to speak and will not be able to do so so long as there are no scientifically determined evaluations of those whose task should be the constant and close scrutiny of activities that directly, and also indirectly, relate to the Cypriot problem.

Our concerns over the devastating consequences from the presence of settlers in the occupied regions of Cyprus (this is another added adverse instance) have begun to be shared by more Turkish Cypriots. The concerns have reached such levels that Turkish Cypriots are talking about the danger of their becoming a minority compared to the settlers from Anatolia.

All of these direct and obvious things, compared to many indirect and not too visible ones, are problems that should be faced in depth so as to permit the responsible leadership to make the necessary decisions.

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

RADICAL LIBERAL'S SPOKESMAN BILGRAV-NIELSEN PROFILED

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 20 Jul 85 p 14

[Article by Harry Rasmussen: "He Still Seeks New Society"]

[Text] So what's new? Radical Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen is inviting Anker Jorgensen in to finance bill negotiations with the government. Schluter quite certainly does not know anything about the invitation and obviously cannot really like it, but **Bilgrav** has carefully weighed his idea and says that it is always an obligation of the government to bring about improvements in the political climate. This thaw in the climate was brought about by tax reform, which is a milestone in Danish politics, he said.

Typically Radical, in a way. "I am not the cold war fighter," Bilgrav can almost be heard to say--and we can also suspect that before he lies down to sleep in the evening he reflects on his real problem: how will we Radicals get out of our tight tie to the Conservatives?

In the long term this dependence must be a handicap, and inasmuch as Bilgrav has also read political history, he will think about the many years when Radicals and Social Democrats could be a match for the Conservatives and the Moderate Liberals.

This Bilgrav

So, who is Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen?

He will turn 50 next year, a farmer's son, a college teacher who received his teaching training at the Free Teacher's College in Ollerup on Fyn, has taken education courses in Askov, has been a teacher at the Glamsbjerg Free School, a teacher at Uldum College, has worked in agriculture, has been a member of the Egtved city government, a member of Parliament from 1966 to 1977 and again since 1979, a member of the Finance Committee and the Radio Council.

He is a new partner of Niels Helveg's in the traditional Radical structure of a leadership of two, who were mainly dissimilar and often not in agreement. A duo has always been honored in the party: Zahle-Munch, Dahlgard-Jorgen Jorgensen, Baunsgard-Niels Nelveg, and the Radicals, who until now could have been taken to be Helveg's weapons, fall apart just the same, so that there is a genuine need for a colleague at the top.

Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen could be that man.

The party in the middle

It is a Radical wish to be "the party in the middle," that little blob with the big influence. The Radicals say in an official party presentation: "In day-to-day matters we will unceasingly influence and put our stamp on legislative work. This basic fact is a significant part of the explanation of why the party is always there when decisions are made."

And indeed it has to be admitted that the Radicals have had influence. The Radicals have thumped their chests about being "the party in the middle," but that no longer holds. Baumsgard led the Radical Left over to the conservative side, and Helveg followed up this line. Is Bilgrav perhaps in on an attempt to turn things around? The wish to be "the party in the middle" and turning to the right has big risks. When Hilmar Baumsgard stated that he would both hold his party to its line and get its influence together with the Moderate Liberals and the Conservatives and thereby ensure a brilliant position for itself, this really was biting off more than he could chew, and everything went wrong.

No one has depicted it more graphically than Tage Kaarsted, the Radical historian, who portrayed the party after Baumsgard in these terms:

"The Radical Left could be compared to a ship which had run aground, but had freed itself by its own help. With a broken mast, ballast partly heaved overboard and a contentious 20-man crew."

New tones

For a while now, Niels Helveg Petersen has laid down ultimata and apologies for Radical support of the Conservative government, but all the same there are once again breezes around the Radical small craft. It is there with the very narrowest of margins. Kaarsted has described one situation. Earlier another occurred, when political ironists said that the Radical group in Parliament kept its balance nicely through political storms: three of the group's members listed to the left, three to the right, and three wanted to try to hold together a Parliament group which then had 9 men.

But it is not just on the spending bill the Radicals seek to join forces with the Social Democrats.

Erhard Jakobsen has said too much about regulating the subsistence allowance --but the matter is now being acted on by the Radicals. HOLBAEK AMTS VENSTRE-BLAD, which is a Radical paper and tries to be that to the same high degree as the SKIVE FOLKEBLAD, has written of the subsistence allowance that Niels Helveg Petersen, the Radicals' leader, has said from his summer house on [the island of] Langeland that there will be an increase in the subsistence allowance rate. Anders Andersen, the Finance Minister, says flatly that there can be no talk of this.

But the Radical Holbaek newspaper comes along with this declaration:

"The Finance Minister must see that he is up against powerful political forces...There can be no doubt of the fact that there will be an increase in the subsistence allowance rate. There can be a freeze for a time, but this cannot be made permanent...Another reason for an increase may also be that more and more wage earners are compelled to go to the public assistance office because the subsistence allowance is not enough...Also in the picture is the fact that the government's original proposal about the subsistence allowance was a good deal more far-reaching, viz. a reduction of the maximum subsistence allowance from 90 to 80 percent. After Radical pressure, this was abandoned. In return for maintenance of the 90 percent, automatic regulation would be dropped." The Radical newspaper concludes: "For this reason, it is reasonable for the government and the Radicals to assess the situation during the fall and discover a regulatory rate which can allow the subsistence allowance rate to keep pace with the wage trend in society besides."

Just so.

But that was the Holbaek newspaper. Perhaps Bilgrav-Nielsen has a much better proposal, viz. that the Radicals and the Social Democrats, the Christian People's, Socialist People's, Democratic Center and if necessary other parties work together on better subsistence allowance rates (despite Anders Andersen), on an OD scheme (despite Ib Stetter), on a clear interpretation of taxation of capital (despite Isi Foighel)...and there will be a score of other things that can be solved through joint effort.

Bilgrav-Nielsen has made an interesting move.

12789

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

BILGRAV-NIELSEN SEES BETTER HOPES FOR BUDGET COMPROMISE

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 20 Jul 85 p 15

[Article by Ole Lorenzen: "Bilgrav Stands Firm: The Government Must Reconsider"]

[Text] When the summer heat has subsided and the government gets to think, it will still end up by inviting the Social Democratic Party into negotiations on the 1986 finance bill.

So said Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen, the Radicals' spokesman on finance policy, to AKTUELT after the chilly reception of his urging of the government to invite the Social Democratic Party.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative) does not wish to comment on the matter now, and Finance Minister Palle Simonsen (Conservative) said that there is nothing special about it.

"I can't imagine getting into a finance bill agreement with the Social Democratic Party. The finance bill will come up for regular treatment in the finance committee," Palle Simonsen said.

"The government will think better of it and send an invitation. Given the Social Democratic Party's positive reaction to the encouragement, the ball is in the government's court and it can't hold it too long," Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen said.

Less controversial

He believes that the proposed finance bill will be a good deal less controversial for the Social Democratic Party than it was last year.

"We have come so far that we won't get the whole thing to come together through new drastic rounds of savings. For this reason, there is a good basis for discussing a broad agreement. We now expect that the bill will be proposed on August 16, with reactions from the parties coming in afterwards. When this has occurred, there will be a basis for initiating the negotiations," Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen said.

For the time being, only the main outline of the government's proposal is known. And there has not yet been contact between the government and the Radicals.

Palle Simonsen has stated that in 1986 the government expects a deficit in the state budget of 26 billion kroner. This is 10 billion kroner lower than last year. This means that the government still expects the deficit to be quite disposed of by 1990.

However, at the same time it means that, without losing sight of this objective, a few billion can be used to alleviate social cuts which have been carried out. Among others, the Democratic Centrists and the Christian People's Party have already stated this.

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

JORGENSEN ATTACKS RADICAL LIBERALS ON BUDGET COMPROMISE VIEWS

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 21 Jul 85 p 13

[Article by Grimme: "Anker Jorgensen On Top Politicians: They Have Bad Conscience"]

[Text] "Can there be cooperation between the government and the Social Democratic Party over the impending finance bill?"

That is a bit difficult, because the government is heavily stressing its ability to manage everything by itself, that is to say, with support from the right side of the Parliament chamber. But we can still be permitted to hope when the Radicals speak of the need to bring the Social Democratic Party in on negotiations on the upcoming finance bill. If we should receive an invitation --prompted by the Radicals' initiative--then of course we would say yes, said Anker Jorgensen, chairman of the Social Democratic Party and former Prime Minister.

Why is Prime Minister Poul Schluter so evasive on this question?

The prime minister says that he cannot take a position during the heat of the summer. This surprises me a bit, considering that there are so many other major things he takes positions on. But it may be that Schluter does think what Palle Simonsen has said outright--a clear and unambiguous no to cooperation with the Social Democratic Party. The Finance Minister's categorical no is all the more extraordinary considering that we are in a state where we will not just be coming up with a finance bill but also possibly tightening up finance policy. Who will he do this with?

Weakened

Do you have the impression the Radicals will demand that the government bring the Social Democratic Party into negotiations on the finance bill?

The Radicals will indeed demand that, but they have weakened themselves beforehand by saying that there is no doubt that a new finance bill can be put together unless the Social Democratic Party is in on it. Palle Simonsen knows this, he doesn't need to deal with us at all. He can quietly estimate that the Radicals will do as the government wants. But, as I said, if we are invited, we will show up and naturally we have our points of view and demands to put forward.

There is much talk about an increase in the subsistence allowance rate. Do you think a parliamentary majority can be had about this?"

It is interesting that there is so much talk about it, because one has the impression that several parties are about to have pangs of conscience about social cuts. Not just the Radicals, but the Democratic Centrists and the Christian People's Party are saying that now is the time to increase the subsistence allowance for the unemployed again. I think this is a sign of bad conscience. I very much hope a majority can be gotten for such an increase. This is an opportunity to take a position as soon as possible based on initiatives from the Social Democratic Party.

Transparent

By increasing the subsistence allowance, isn't there the risk of introducing an increase in contributions to unemployment funds?

The possibility cannot be excluded that the current talk of increasing the subsistence allowance rate will clear the way for shifting the burden for unemployment insurance unilaterally onto wage-earners. By increasing the insurance element, as we neutrally put it.

The Radicals seem more eager for cooperative work than ever. Why?

Let me put it in a friendly way. It might be that the party leadership is now listening more to people who advocate the Social Democratic Party as the Radicals' most logical partner in cooperative work. I hope this is what will happen.

You don't think the Radicals are trying to put distance between themselves and the Conservatives because there will be municipal elections in the fall?

Of course that may be a factor, but the Radicals have stuck so close to the Conservatives and the other non-Socialist parties that such a tactic would be easy to see through. In the end, the Radicals' seemingly greater willingness to participate in cooperative work may be due to the fact that the Radicals are in the process of being afraid of their own shadow.

12789

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

SDP WANTS GOVERNMENT TO TOUGHEN STAND ON SOUTH AFRICA

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen: "SDP Wants To Tighten Danish Relations With South Africa"]

[Text] Denmark ought to act on the UN resolution condemning South Africa by expressing even sharper Danish dissatisfaction, the Social Democratic Party believes, and counts on broad backing from the parties in the government as well. A majority already exists, since the Radical Liberal Party is supporting the Social Democratic Party. But the Conservatives flatly refuse on the matter of a Danish "go-it-alone" on the South Africa issue.

It is a positive sign that the government is changing its position on the South Africa issue, and I very much hope that the government will participate in acting on the just adopted UN resolution by supporting our motion for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. The majority is there, but it would be desirable if the government could also give its support.

So said Christian Kelm Hansen (Social Democratic Party), who in the coming session of Parliament will make a motion for a parliamentary resolution for a distinct tightening of Denmark's relations with South Africa.

Bernhard Baunsgaard (Radical Liberal) said that the Radicals are naturally interested in the imposition of sanctions against South Africa and in having the bans which have already been approved made more effective.

"What we are seeing today in South Africa is the most abominable form of persecution ever. For that reason we are particularly in favor of the Social Democratic motion," Bernhard Baunsgaard said.

Bo Kristensen (Conservative), the chairman of the Foreign Committee in Parliament, encouraged the throwing of cold water on the face to determine what really should be done in South Africa. He believes that the path of confronting the country is not a good one and could result in having thousands of people run the risk of standing with their backs up against the wall. For this reason, a little thought should be given to the measures to be used to call attention to dissatisfaction with the South African government.

We are prepared for any tightening that may occur between the Nordic countries, in Europe or internationally in general, but Denmark will not go it alone. That we cannot accept. It serves no purpose for us to apply sanctions and claim glory. This has neither value nor force and would only make a laughingstock of Denmark, Bo Kristensen said, as he pointed out that if Denmark backs out of trade and transport, for example, another country would quickly take them over.

What the Social Democratic Party wants is a stop to the transfer of technology, bypassing the purchase of coal would be prevented, a ban on transport and the sale of oil on Danish ships, winding down imports from South Africa, a renewal of the ban on the importation of South African gold coins, and direct support of the opposition movement African National Congress, for example through support of its office in Denmark.

12789

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

BRIEFS

AID TO AFRICA, VIETNAM--The Foreign Ministry on Wednesday [31 July] decided to grant 18 million markkas to the World Bank's Africa Fund as Finland's first payment portion. Finland has announced that it is going to place almost 80 million markkas into the Fund during the years 1985-1987. Establishing of the Africa Fund was agreed on last winter. It is estimated that the Fund will collect a little over 6 billion markkas for directing into cooperative development work. The Foreign Ministry also earmarked 7 million markkas of development funds for a project to dredge the Pha Rung channel in Vietnam. An additional 2 million markkas has been reserved for the same purpose next year, based on a letter of intent. In addition, the Foreign Ministry granted a little over 2.3 million markkas for a crushing plant in Zambia. Eleven million markkas will be provided this project in the next 2 years. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Aug 85 p 9]

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

CITIZEN AWARENESS OF POLITICAL FIGURES, STRUCTURES MEASURED

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French Feb 85
pp 72-89

[Article by Pascal Perrineau: "The Cognitive Dimension of Political Culture: The French and Their Knowledge of the Political System"]

[Text] In their classic work, "The Civic Culture,"¹ Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba define political culture as consisting in knowledge, feelings, and judgments as a whole concerning political subjects. Of these three dimensions, the cognitive, affective, and evaluative, researchers and polling institutes traditionally pay attention only to the last two. The feelings and judgments of citizens concerning political figures, parties, and public policies are the subject of a great deal of study and are frequently measured. On the other hand, the level of knowledge of politicians, political forces and institutions is largely ignored.

Apart from the interest derived from breaking new ground that remains more or less unexplored by political scientists, a study of the cognitive dimension in political culture is worth undertaking for two reasons. On the one hand, it is an important dimension of political culture inasmuch as cognitive political culture in a way provides the primary material for political feelings and judgments which constitute evaluative and affective political culture. As a matter of fact, the capacity for appreciating and making judgments about the political system presupposes a more or less extensive knowledge of the latter. However, evaluations and feelings can be expressed even in a context where the knowledge of the political system is very poor and diffuse.² On the other hand, study of the cognitive dimension of political culture permits measuring the degree of citizen familiarity with the political system. The level of this familiarity, whether high or low, constitutes a measure of the degree of alienation and even exclusion of citizens from their political system. This alienation and exclusion shed light on the distance separating the cultural reality of western democracies from the objectives of the theoreticians of the Age of Enlightenment, for whom instruction and knowledge were the corollaries of

democracy.³

Despite this twofold interest in determining the political culture of citizens in western democracies, the whole area remains a neglected continent. Neglected because it is difficult to get to know it. As a matter of fact, researchers and polling institutes are reluctant to ask cognitive questions inasmuch as they depend more on examination or interrogation than on the traditional survey questionnaire. Thus in opinion surveys, the evaluative and affective dimension of political culture is favored. Either implicitly or explicitly, knowledge of the subject concerning which the interviewee is questioned is postulated.⁴ Nevertheless, even in answers to purely evaluative questions, the level of knowledge of people questioned can be measured indirectly in the "no reply" category. If it is estimated that the majority of individuals unfamiliar with the situation concerning which they are questioned take refuge in the "no opinion" answer, a study of the proportion of "no opinion" answers can be used for determining indirectly the level of political knowledge. Nevertheless, from time to time citizens are asked real cognitive questions. This is where we will focus our attention in our study of French cognitive political culture.⁵ Based on answers to cognitive questions asked in a nonexhaustive series of French opinion polls taken over the last 20 years, we will attempt to evaluate the French level of knowledge with regard to the various categories of political subjects (political roles, structures, and events). To evaluate the cognitive political culture of French citizens also means endeavoring to determine the factors affecting knowledge or lack of knowledge of political subjects. Such a sociological study of French political competence (in its cognitive dimension) has been undertaken and has isolated a set of social factors affecting political competence⁶: the cultural level, social level, and position in the work force. Basically, political knowledge increased according to position in the social hierarchy, cultural level, and a favorable position in the work force (male sex, in the economically active age groups). This sociological study is worth extending, updating and possibly emending in the light of a systematic analysis of the cognitive data gathered by the polling institutes. The questions asked by these institutes concerning political knowledge cover three areas: knowledge of political roles, of political structures and, finally, of political events.

Role Knowledge

Questions concerning political roles deal with knowledge of those holding institutional offices (mayor, general councillor, deputy, assembly presidents, members of the government) and knowledge of those holding political office in the strict sense (party leaders, electoral candidates, foreign politicians). Knowledge of institutional offices varies enormously depending

on the office concerned (table 1).

Table 1. The French and Their Knowledge
of Their Representatives

Aware of the name of their:	
Mayor	92% (SOFRES, January 1983, national sample)
General Councillor . .	50% (SOFRES, February 1982, national sample)
Deputy	44% (IFOP, 1976, sample of Val-de-Marne population)

Whereas nearly all French people know the name of the mayor of their commune, half or less than half know their representative in the General Council or National Assembly. Knowledge of representatives thus seems to vary according to the distance existing between the citizen and their representative. As a matter of fact, the mayor of the commune is better known than the canton's general councillor, and the general councillor than the district deputy.⁷ The more close-knit the community represented, the better is the political representative known. The larger the district represented and the more distant its representative, the less well-known the latter is. This distance with its adverse effect on the familiarity of institutional office holders can nevertheless be partly offset by the media. Indeed, holders of national institutional office (assembly presidents, ministers, president of the republic) who are regularly featured in the press and over radio and television to which citizens are exposed, are more familiar than are the general councillors and deputies who are nevertheless relatively close to their electoral base.

Knowledge of institutional offices also varies according to the type of population concerned.

Here one finds the social factors affecting political awareness and competence as Daniel Gaxie determined them: "To sum up, political awareness therefore results from two major factors: the cultural level, itself dependent mainly on the length of schooling and secondly on social milieu on the one hand, and on the other the position occupied in the social division of labor."⁸

In other words, there is less political knowledge among those in social strata with little cultural capital (laborers, tradespeople and craftsmen, and farmers), among women and young people.

However, as one can see from reading table 2, in some cases social determination of political knowledge has its limits. As a matter of fact, when it is a question of knowing the mayor, two

socio-vocational categories with little cultural capital--farmers and tradespeople, and craftsmen--are among those with the highest level of knowledge. Close-knit societies, which small rural communes often are, favor citizen knowledge of the political elite. Farmers, craftsmen and tradespeople, especially numerous in these small communes, thus have a high level of knowledge of municipal and canton representatives (table 3). Thus the fact of being a close-knit society has a real effect on the political recognition of representatives.

Independently of the fact that the small size of a community favors relations of mutual knowledge, other factors become significant and restrict the classic social determination of political knowledge. Other than traditional factors (level of education, social level, sex, age), these factors include vocational proximity, ideological proximity, and the visibility of holders of institutional office. Three factors were isolated based on a

Table 2. Socio-Demographic Variables and Knowledge of the Mayor

Know the Mayor of Their Commune (Total: 92)	
Sex:	Socio-vocational categories:
Men 93	Farmers 99
Women 90	Tradespeople, craftsmen . . . 95
Age	Managerial staff, liberal
18-24 years 83	professions 92
25-34 85	Trained personnel,
35-49 94	employees 88
50-64 95	Laborers 87
65+ 98	Inactive 96

SOFRES, 1983.

Table 3. Membership in a Close-Knit Society and Knowledge of Local Representatives

Know Their Mayor*	Know Their General Councillor**
Total population . . . 92	Total population 50
Farmers 99	Farmers 77
Tradespeople, craftsmen 95 . . . 95	Tradespeople, craftsmen . . 59

*SOFRES, 1983. **SOFRES, 1982

Table 4. Socio-demographic Variables and Lack of Opinion
(Per-centage in the "No Opinion" Group)

	Deferre (total 31)	Jobert (total 47)	Beregovoy (total 50)	Cheysson (total 42)
Sex				
Men	22	33	39	30
Women	39	60	61	54
Age				
18-24 years	42	61	63	54
25-34	30	48	48	41
35-49	29	45	48	42
50-64	31	42	45	33
65+	25	43	51	46
Socio-vocational Categories				
Farmers	39	52	58	47
Tradespeople, craftsmen	39	45	59	45
Managerial staff, liberal professions	16	40	43	22
Trained personnel .	28	44	42	38
Employees	33	49	57	46
Laborers	37	52	52	49
Inactive	27	44	48	43

L. Harris-France - LE MATIN, 1983.

study of the "no opinion" group in response to the question of the L. Harris-France-LE MATIN survey concerning ministers: "For each of these government members, could you tell me if you are somewhat satisfied or somewhat dissatisfied with the way in which he carries out his duties?" Just as for purely cognitive questions, it can be seen that lack of opinion is determined by the same factors as political ignorance (table 4).

Women and young people, laborers, employees, farmers, tradespeople, and craftsmen are much more likely than men, adults, managerial staff and the liberal professions to have no opinion on governmental personnel. Nevertheless, this lack of opinion, the symptom of political ignorance, particularly conspicuous in some categories of the population, may disappear when other factors enter the picture. What are these factors?

--Proximity of profession or of status.

Political figures who are concerned with one's vocation or condition are better known (table 5).

Farmers, tradespeople and craftsmen, women, and young people are four groups whose cognitive political culture is generally weak. This ceases to be the case when one measures their cognitive awareness in relation to the ministers who are responsible for their interests. Whereas 59 percent of tradespeople and craftsmen (compared with 50 percent of French people) had no opinion concerning Beregovoy in March 1983, only 55 percent were in the "no opinion" group when it came to their guardian minister Delelis (compared with 74 percent of French people).

--Ideological proximity.

Those to whom one feels ideologically closer are better known (table 6). For example, among the electorates of the four major French political forces, the communist electorate feels most comfortable making statements about the four communist ministers of the Mauroy government.

--The "visibility" of political personnel.

Ministers who develop an "enhancement" strategy are better known.⁹ The legislative "enhancement" seems to be particularly

Table 5. Vocational Proximity and Political Knowledge
(Percent-age in the "No Opinion" Group)

	E. Cresson	A. Delelis	Y. Roudy	E. Avice
Total	43	74	52	56
Farmers	27			
Tradespeople, craftsmen .		55		
Women			50	
The 18-25 year olds . . .				55

L. Harris-France - LE MATIN, March 1983.

Table 6. Ideological Proximity and Political Knowledge
(Percent-age in the "No Opinion" Group)

	C. Fiterman	J. Ralite	A. Le Pors	M. Rigout
Total	40	47	50	63
Partisan leanings				
Communist Party	26	30	44	46
Socialist Party	32	42	54	58
Opposition	34	39	55	63

L. Harris-France - LE MATIN, March 1983.

Table 7. Visibility of Political Personnel and Political Know-ledge (Percentage in the "No Opinion" Group)

	Auroux	J. Lang	R. Quillot	L. Mexandeau	A. Henry	J. Laurain
January 1982 . .	64	54	67	63	64	75
March 1983 . . .	51	44	54	61	62	74
	-13	-10	-13	-2	-2	-1
L. Harris-France - LE MATIN, January 1982, March 1983.						

effective. As a matter of fact, the ministers who have become best known in the L. Harris-France-LE MATIN survey, from January 1982 to March 1983, are three ministers who attached their names to a law: J. Auroux, J. Lang, R. Quillot (table 7).

Thus, the visibility of the governing elite, ideological proximity, and vocational proximity are the factors which promote political knowledge and serve to limit the effects of ignorance linked with belonging to the popular classes (cf. the analysis in "The Hidden Census").

Knowledge of political personnel, of the political class, is poor even during electoral campaigns.

In October 1965, before General de Gaulle made his candidacy in the elections public, and when that of Mitterrand was already known, the spontaneous familiarity¹⁰ of the various actual or presumed candidates was slight and was always less than 50 percent: 48 percent for F. Mitterrand, 44 percent for C. de Gaulle, 43 percent for J.-L. Tixier-Vignancour, 13 percent for R. Marcilhacy, 3 percent for J. Lecanuet.¹¹ A few months earlier, in January 1965, 42 percent of French people did not know who G. Defferre was.¹² Thus, during the mid-1960's, at best one Frenchman out of two had a spontaneous knowledge of the candidates in the presidential election. About 10 years later, the spontaneous familiarity of politicians does not seem to have improved:

--In an IFOP-LE POINT survey (June 1976) of managerial staff and employees, it was discovered that 33 percent of employees did not know who the minister of the interior was, 81 percent who the secretary general of the UDR [Union of Democrats for the Republic] was, 57 percent the secretary general of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], and 42 percent the secretary general of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor].

--More specifically, in February 1983, in an L. Harris-France study carried out in Lyon's sixth district, the spontaneous familiarity of R. Barre was 58 percent, and that of F. Collomb 47 percent. Their suggested familiarity, on the other hand, came to nearly 100 percent even though 2 percent of the inhabitants of Lyon's sixth district did not know who the mayor of Lyon was, just as 4 percent of Parisians could not name the mayor of Paris (L. Harris-France-PARIS HEBDO, February 1980).

Thus, although the spontaneous familiarity of political office holders is slight, by contrast their suggested familiarity is greater, at least where the "stars" of political life are concerned. It is easier to recognize than to know. If one studies an IFRES-PARIS-MATCH (April 1980) poll on the ministers of the Barre government, it can be seen that suggested familiarity is higher than 90 percent only for R. Barre and A. Peyrefitte. By contrast, ministers such as J.-P. Lecat, P. Mehaignerie, J. Barrot have an overall familiarity of only 47 percent, 40 percent, and 38 percent.

This relatively poor knowledge of the names of political office holders remains just as poor when it comes to specifying the political label or the candidate or representative's party.

Questions on this subject are very rare in the polls.

--In an IFOP survey of 2 December 1965, devoted to the 5 December presidential election, between 25 and 50 percent of French people did not know what candidates were supported by the major political parties of the period: the UNR [Union for the New Republic], the PCF, and the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International] (table 8). Three days from the first ballot in the presidential election, between one and two voters out of four did not know the candidates that the three major parties of the period were supporting. A sizable minority of French people thus seems to have difficulty in placing politicians in the political party system.

--At the local level, we know that the French know their mayor well: 92 percent can name the mayor of their commune (SOFRES, January 1983). The figure drops to 81 percent who can specify the latter's political affiliation (89 percent in communes with more than 30,000 inhabitants where the question really has any meaning). Thus, a large majority of French people know their mayors and their political affiliations. Knowledge of the political figures and parties who support him, however, decreases as soon as one moves away from the communal scene. General councillors, deputies, lower ranking ministers, and party and union secretaries are often only known by a minority of French people. What is the situation with regard to political structures (political parties and institutions) through which politics is presented in a more depersonalized and abstract

light than in the area of political office?

Table 8. Knowledge of Political Affiliations of Politicians

For each of the following political parties, can you tell me who is the presidential election candidate it supports?

	PCF	UNR	SFIO
Mitterrand	63%	--	49%
De Gaulle	--	74%	2
Others	3	2	9
No opinion	38	24	40

Knowledge of Political Structures

Here too, questions concerning knowledge of political structures are extremely rare. Nevertheless, some questions are asked from time to time about people's knowledge of French and foreign political parties, institutions (basically European institutions) and the methods by which elected assemblies are appointed.

The French seem to be rather weak in their knowledge of political parties.

Nevertheless, this weakness is accentuated by the fact that such questions on knowledge of political parties were asked at the time when these parties were being created. For example, in April 1966, only 47 percent of French people knew, at least approximately, what the FGDS [Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left] was, and 41 percent what the Democratic Center was. The categories which know the most about political parties are the same as those which have a good knowledge of political office holders: men, managerial staff, and liberal professions, and those with a high level of education (table 9).

Whatever the political subject concerned, the social factors affecting political knowledge remain the same. One finds, for example, the same pattern when questioning French people about foreign political parties. Admittedly, the level of ignorance

Table 9. Social Factors Affecting Knowledge of Political Parties

Know the:	FGDS	Democratic Center
Aggregate	47	41
Men	62	53
Women	34	30
Farmers	40	39
Industrialists, shopkeepers	42	57
Managerial staff and liberal professions	74	65
Employees, trained personnel	55	48
Laborers	41	31
Inactive	51	44
Educational Level:		
Primary	38	31
Upper primary	56	48
Technical and trades	62	58
Secondary	60	52
College	79	71
IFOP, 1966		

increases, but the social pattern of those with knowledge and those without remains the same (table 10).

The knowledge French people have of European institutions is relatively poor.

A month and a half before the 1979 European elections, 65 percent of French people had read or heard something about the European Parliament, but only 38 percent could specify that it was the election of the European Parliament, a percentage 34 points lower than the participation ratio of 10 June 1979 (cf. Euro-barometre, 11, May 1979). Political knowledge and participation are therefore two quite distinct phenomena. If phenomenological knowledge of the political field encourages participation, a large number of the "ignorant" also participate in elections. As for countries which are members of the Common Market, whereas 77 percent of French people knew that the FRG was part of the EEC, only 46 percent and 33 percent knew that Denmark and Ireland were members (cf. SOFRES-RTL, January 1979). It is easier to be unaware of the EEC membership of cutting, distant countries. Here too, when it comes to the European continent, distance does not promote political knowledge. Just as the deputy is less well known than the mayor, the membership

in the EEC of Denmark or Ireland is less well known than that of Italy or Germany.

Table 10. Knowledge of Foreign Political Parties

	Christian Democrats	Other Parties & "No Opinion"
Aggregate	27	73
Men	36	64
Women	18	82
Managerial staff, industrialists, business owners	30	70
Laborers	23	77
L. Harris-France - L'EXPRESS, February 1980.		

In the relatively technical area of the methods by which assemblies are appointed, only one Frenchman out of two knows how assemblies, such as the General Council or European Assembly, are appointed (table 11).

Thus, when one goes from the knowledge of politicians and political institutions to that of political procedures and technology, the French level of knowledge can plummet to the point where, for example in February 1983, only 26 percent of French people knew that the balloting method for the 1983 municipal elections had changed (IPSOS-LIBERATION, February 1983).

Table 11. Knowledge of Assembly Appointment Procedures

They are Appointed by:	All Voters in Universal Direct Vote	Other Assumed Modes of Appointment, & "No Opinion"
General Councillors*	43	57
European Assembly Members**	54	46
*SOFRES, February 1979. **SOFRES - RTL, January 1979.		

Knowledge of Events

Finally, in the area of the knowledge of political events, cognitive questions are also rare inasmuch as polling institutes assume such knowledge. Rather than measuring knowledge of the

mere occurrence of events, it is the judgments and feelings of citizens about these events that interest polling institutes. For specialists in public opinion research, political events are of interest only insofar as they reveal value systems. It may be noted, however, that this reticence in asking cognitive questions on current events tends to be attenuated when it is a matter of past events. Where current events are concerned, the level of political knowledge of course varies enormously according to the nature of the question. In the middle of the Central African crisis, very well covered by the media, more than two thirds of French people knew that the serious events which were taking place in the country concerned the massacre of children (L. Harris-France-L'EXPRESS, February 1979). In March 1982, only 37 percent of French people were aware of the televised broadcast of the American program "Let Poland be Poland" (L. Harris-France, March 1982). Finally, at the beginning of April 1981, only 16 percent of French people were able to attribute the slogan "the calm party" to candidate F. Mitterrand (IFOP - Medias, April 1981). Whatever the level of knowledge, for each of these

Table 12. Socio-demographic Variables and Knowledge of Political Events

We have heard recently of Bokassa I, emperor of Central Africa, in connection with serious events which took place in his country. Can you tell me what sort of events were involved?

	Massacre of children	Don't know	Other Replies
Men	71	20	9
Women	66	28	6
18-24 years of age	59	29	11
25-34	71	23	6
35-49	74	22	4
50-64	72	19	9
65+	61	33	6
Farmers	53	39	8
Tradespeople, craftsmen . . .	63	27	10
Managerial staff, liberal professions	94	3	3
Employees, trained personnel	79	16	5
Laborers	62	30	8
Inactive, retired	64	29	7
Aggregate	69	24	7

L. Harris-France - L'EXPRESS, February 1979.

questions one finds the same pattern of political knowledge: the "knowledgeable" tend to be men, of mature age and from a comfortable socio-vocational milieu, whereas the "ignorant" are more often women, young people, laborers and farm workers (table 12).

Here also, the classic pattern of ignorance and knowledge can be questioned when the citizen, because of his vocational experience or ideology, is familiar with the political event concerning which he is being questioned. For example, to a question about which area of the world suffers most from hunger (L. Harris-France-Telerama, September 1982), it was observed that after the managerial staff/liberal professions category which traditionally has a high level of political culture, the farmer/farm worker category gave the most correct answers. From their professional experience, farmers know better than do other categories of French people the problems in agricultural production and malnutrition. Vocational proximity favors political knowledge. The same is true for ideological proximity (table 13).

Table 13. Vocational Proximity, Ideological Proximity, and Knowledge of Political Events

Of these areas, which do you think is the one where people suffer from hunger?

	Asia	Others
Farmers	36	64
Tradespeople, craftsmen . . .	26	74
Managerial staff, liberal professions	43	57
Employees, trained personnel	34	66
Laborers	32	68
Inactive	25	75

In your opinion, how many people in the world today suffer from hunger?

	Good Answers	Others
Those who had participated during the year in Third World aid associations . . .	35	65
Those who contributed	29	73
No participation	28	72

L. Harris-France - Telerama, September 1982.

One is not surprised, for example, to find in the same L. Harris-France-Telerama poll that whereas only 28 percent of French people knew how many people in the world today suffer from hunger, only 35 percent of those participating in associations concerning themselves with the Third World were in the same category. This reflects the phenomenon of "selective knowledge": where there is a sense of intellectual or ideological proximity, there is greater knowledge. The same phenomenon as "selective knowledge" can also be discerned in the area of political knowledge of the past. Individuals who in their youth lived through certain political events have a better knowledge of them than individuals of previous or subsequent generations. There is certainly a "generation effect" on the level of political knowledge (table 14). French people who know that France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, that Auschwitz, Buchenwald and Dachau are concentration camps, that the May-June 1940 battle of France cost the country 100,000 men, are mainly men and women who were between 20 and 30 years of age in 1939-1940. In 1980, 48 percent of 50-64 year olds (compared with 27 percent of 18-24 year olds) knew that it was France that declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939 (SOFRES, May 1980). In 1979, 76 percent of 50 year olds and over knew that Auschwitz, Dachau and Buchenwald were concentration camps (compared with 62 percent of 18-29 year olds) (SOFRES-Antenne 2, January 1979).

This generation effect is also a factor in the knowledge of more recent political events such as the Algerian war. In 1979, the age group in 1979 which best knew the date when the Algerian war ended is the 35-49 age bracket, i.e., the generation which made up the 18-32 year olds in 1962 (which includes the generation of the contingent called up for duty in Algeria).

Beyond this perceptible "generation effect" in all answers concerning cognitive questions relating to past political events, one observes once again the classic pattern of political knowledge, that it is the preserve of men, adults, the comfortable socio-vocational categories with a high level of education.

This specific pattern of knowledge is not peculiar to the political subject. It is also found with quite different subjects, for example the knowledge of wine¹³, or fairly similar ones, like general cultural knowledge.¹⁴

Thus, the knowledge of which political knowledge is but one aspect, is firmly tied to a set of social conditions. As Daniel Gaxie writes: "The differential politization of social classes is linked... to educational inequalities distinguishing social groups."¹⁵

Table 14. "Generation Effect" and Political Knowledge

You know that France and Germany went to war on 3 September 1939. Which of these two countries, in your opinion, declared war on the other? ... France.		The May-June 1940 battle of France lasted about 40 days. During this period, what in your opinion was the number of French casualties? ... About 100,000 deaths.	
18-24 year olds	27%		17%
25-34	29		17
35-49	30		16
50-64	48		27
65+	47		18
Aggregate	36		19
SOFRES, May 1980			
When you hear Au- chwitz, Buchenwald and Dachau mention- ed, what do these names mean to you? ... Concentration camps		As far as you know, in what year did the Algerian war end? ... 1962	
18-29 year olds	62%	18-29	20%
30-49	74	30-34	29
50+	76	35-49	35
		50-64	26
		65+	19
Aggregate	72		25
SOFRES, January 1979.		L. Harris-France, October 1979.	

However, a nuance must be introduced into this analysis. As a matter of fact, the analysis that we have made of "generation" effects, "social proximity," "ideological proximity," and "membership in a close-knit society," well shows that if political competence (in the sense of political knowledge) is a social competence, it is not only that. The proximity between the citizen and the subject of political knowledge in geographical, socio-vocational, ideological, and temporal terms, can negate the effects of political ignorance due to social position (disadvantaged socio-vocational category and low level of education) and the position in the social division of labor (being female

or a young person). In the last resort, political knowledge cannot be understood solely on the basis of these social conditions which produce it. Political knowledge is also response to a stimulus, to a question. Whatever the individual's position in the social structure may be, the level of political knowledge may vary substantially as a function of the geographical, social, or ideological distance which exists between the individual and the political subject to be known. This study of the cognitive political competence of French people enabled us not only to take up and refine the explanatory schema of factors affecting political competence. It also showed how far French citizens are from fulfilling the aspirations of democracy's founding fathers who too often made a close connection between a high degree of political knowledge and the capacity for democratic expression. Contrary to what the scheme implicit in "The Civic Culture" indicates, democracy does not necessarily presuppose a mass of attentive, aware, and competent citizens. Approximately 50 percent of French citizens have only very little or no interest at all in politics; less than 50 percent know their deputy or the way in which general councillors are appointed, and only 25 percent know when the Algerian war ended. This weak interest in politics and uncertain political knowledge does not hinder high electoral participation, a strong sense of involvement in electoral activities,¹⁶ a high degree of citizen satisfaction with regard to their political information¹⁷ and a confirmed civic concern.¹⁸ There is only a very indirect connection between the fate and vitality of democracy and cognitive political culture.

Abstract

"The Cognitive Dimension of Political Culture: The French and Their Knowledge of the Political System," Pascal Perrineau.

In studies in political science, the cognitive dimension of political culture is most often ignored. Yet this dimension provides the basis for the political judgments and sentiments which constitute the evaluative and affective dimensions of political culture. Based on data from opinion polls, a preliminary evaluation of the level of French political knowledge is given, together with an analysis of the factors affecting knowledge and ignorance of political subjects. Political knowledge is definitely linked with a set of social circumstances (cultural level, social position, position held in the work force). Nevertheless, political knowledge cannot be understood solely on the basis of the social circumstances which produce it. Whatever the position of the individual in the social structure, the level of political knowledge may show considerable variation as a function of the temporal, geographic, socio-vocational, and ideological distance that exists between the individual and the political subject to be known.

FOOTNOTES

1. G. A. Almond, and S. Verba, "The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations," Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.
2. Knowledge of the political system and the expression of opinion on it do not always go together. Political ignorance does not prevent "ignorant" citizens from taking positions on general political problems. The combination of ignorance and the desire for expression may even characterize some political cultures like that of Mexico where, according to G. A. Almond and S. Verba, the country's political culture "harbors a strong aspiration factor. That is to say, a tendency to want to express opinions--at the same time lacking information" (p 99).
3. Condorcet who is in many ways a sort of living compendium of the Age of the Enlightenment, advocated not only that the sexes should have free and equal access to secular education, but also that there should be ongoing instruction in order to teach the people concerning new laws and maintain their civic training. Many theoreticians of the Age of Enlightenment, believed democracy and cognitive culture should develop in parallel.
4. The following are examples of evaluative questions where knowledge is explicitly assumed: "You know that Giscard d'Estaing has taken a position in favor of self-determination for the Palestinian people, for the participation of the PLO in negotiations, and the guarantee of safe, recognized borders for Israel. Do you agree or disagree with this position?" (SOFRES-Provincial Newspapers, March 1980). "You know that at the present time in Portugal, all told there are six political groups. Can you tell me which of these groups you personally favor most?" A list of the six groups followed. (SOFRES-Provincial Newspapers, February 1975).
5. The following are examples of cognitive questions: "Have you heard of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, i.e., NATO?" (IFOP, July 1963). "Do you know who is the present general councillor of your canton?" (SOFRES, February 1979).
6. D. Gaxie, "The Hidden Census: Cultural Inequalities and Political Segregation," Paris, Le Seuil, 1978.
7. In French communes, this "distance effect" is substantial: 97 percent of those in small communes of less than 2,000 inhabitants know their mayor; by contrast, only 90 percent of those in communes with more than 100,000 inhabitants know theirs.

8. Daniel Gaxie, "The Hidden Census," op. cit., p 161.
9. With G. Lagneau, "we call enhancement any procedure used socially to enhance something ... in the eyes of those for whom it is intended," in "Sociology and Publicity," Paris, PUF, 1977, p 13.
10. Spontaneous familiarity is constituted by the percentage of those surveyed who can cite from memory the name of this or that holder of political office. Suggested familiarity is established on the basis of a list of names showed to those surveyed.
11. IFOP polls.
12. Ibid.
13. In a poll taken by SOFRES-CUISINE ET VINS DE FRANCE, of February 1982, knowledge of wines varies substantially according to sex and especially socio-vocational group. Managerial staff gave correct answers twice as often as do laborers.
14. In a survey made up of 31 cognitive questions asked of a sample of students graduating from high school, the best scores in general culture based on their answers were those of male students, and children from comfortably placed social classes. (SOFRES-FIGARO MAGAZINE, May 1981).
15. Cf., "The Hidden Census," op. cit., p 160.
16. In an Indice-Opinion poll of March 1980, 72 percent of French people stated that they felt they were doing something important when they voted.
17. Only between 10 and 14 percent of French people think that the newspapers, radio, and television do not devote enough space to political life. (SOFRES, September 1976).
18. According to a SOFRES-L'EXPANSION survey of December 1976, 87 percent of French people think that it is very or fairly important to be a good citizen.

9824

CSO: 3519/262

COMMENTS ON ALLEGED U.S.-PAPANDREOU COLLUSION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4-5 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by "E": "A Servant of Foreign Interests..."]

[Excerpts] It is beyond doubt that [Mr Robert Keeley] has committed a gaffe. He ignored the passage of about 11 years from the fall of the dictatorship until now and scorned, not only two prime ministers, Karamanlis and Rallis, but also some of his own colleagues, dignified and pleasant diplomats. And he enthusiastically gets to Mr Papandreou, who, according to what has been told us, is an old close friend of his. If only for this, he should have been more careful and should have avoided emphasizing it so openly and so prematurely.

It is almost certain that, under present circumstances, Mr Keeley will come to our country, that he will not evidence any special sensitivities and that he believes that at least half of the Greeks will welcome him joyfully. Besides, the PASOK has accustomed us to limit ourselves to half-shares, which term themselves a whole whenever it is convenient for them to do so.

The subject, however, is of more long-lasting significance than Mr Robert Keeley, whether he comes or not.

The subject is, why are the Americans, the State Department, and perhaps also Mr Reagan, supporting Mr Papandreou?

Forget about what newspapers say and write at times, forget about the gossip that travelers bring back from the United States.

In reality, they are helping him as much as they can. And what else, if not help, is the fact that they chose the greenest [the PASOK's color] employee of the State Department to send him to Greece as ambassador?

And in the other hand, has Andreas Papandreou's government ever refused a favor to the Americans? In really important matters?

We have accused Andreas not once, but untold times, that he is fooling the Greek people. We have also said that the Greeks like this kind of fooling, that they delight in it, they swallow all the tales, they rejoice about all the promises, they admire all the big plans, they believe all the future tenses, all the "Purchases," all the Akheloos [Rivers].

But these Greeks, after all is said and done, are his own men, his followers, and it would be difficult for them to find another such story-teller.

And the fraud he is serving them is a common political recipe, this time perhaps richer than others.

But if it hides another kind of fooling, which is aimed not only at his own people, but also at us, the whole subject deserves to be studied.

Because if it is proved in the end that Andreas Panadreou is close to the Americans and the Americans close to him, then what? Must we be displeased and bitter because we made a mistake, or, on the contrary, must we be genuinely relieved, even if this wounds our pride?

What do we care, if he has betrayed, if he has always been betraying, the naive leftists hanging from the PASOK?

What do we care, if he is playing a role, if he is inducing the Third World advocates into error, if he is embracing the various 'Arafat?

If this is being done with the approval of the Americans, is Greece more secure or isn't it? And isn't this what really matters?

The answer is positive. It is better if Andreas is a "double agent," in the style to which so many present-day tales of espionage have accustomed us, it is better if he wears all these outside trappings of Marxism to induce his followers into error and for him to be--deep down--an imperialist, a capitalist, a servant of foreign interests, as he says himself.

Or isn't it?

CSO: 3521/321

POLITICAL

GREECE

POSTMORTEM: GRASS ROOTS SEEN KEY TO PASOK SUCCESS

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 30 Jun- 15 Jul 85

/Editor's Note/ The political section of KATHIMERINI feels that one of the most significant elements--if not the most significant--of the recent elections is the electoral rise PASOK scored in 14 nomes of the country compared to the vote percentage it received in the 1981 elections. This rise, which fluctuates from 0.28% in the Karditsa Nome to 7.26% in Samos, must be of particular concern to ND because it contravenes the rule of "inevitable decay" the party in power suffers.

It should also be noted that this rule held without exception during the 7-year period ND was in power. Indeed, the 1977 and 1981 electoral results confirm ND's fall in all 56 nomes of the country. Analytically, the 14 nomes where PASOK increased its percentage compared to 1981 are:

Nome	% Increase	Nome	% Increase
Lesvos	4.56	Kerkyra	0.33
Rethymno	6.05	Khios	3.26
Florina	3.17	Levkas	1.29
Samos	7.26	Zakynthos	0.68
Karditsa	0.28	Lakonia	0.61
Kozani	0.57	Kefallinia	1.52
Kilkis	1.24	Kyklades	1.12

From the above nomes, KATHIMERINI's political section chose Lesvos, Rethymno, Florina, Samos, Kilkis, Khios and Kefallinia as more typical and more representative areas of the country from a geopolitical point of view. A group of the newspaper's editors, consisting of Kostas Iordanidis, Giorgos Tambakopoulos, Giannis Vlastaris and Athina Kovfopoulos, visited these areas for a "political autopsy" of the election results.

Their findings, publication of which starts today and will continue for the next few days, aim at pinpointing and recording the factors which contributed to PASOK's success and which surely are part of its overall strategy which brought about its second electoral victory.

TABLE OF ELECTION RESULTS
IN THE FLORINA, KILKIS AND PELLA NOMES

	FLORINA			KILKIS			PELLA		
	1981	1984	1985	1981	1984	1985	1981	1984	1985
ND:									
Votes	19,021	18,266	20,797	29,146	33,195	36,632	38,258	42,324	46,888
Percent	48.69	44.05	47.69	41.86	44.63	46.37	39.42	41.04	43.08
PASOK:									
Votes	15,436	16,371	18,613	28,314	28,525	33,101	49,188	46,501	53,480
Percent	39.51	39.48	42.68	40.66	38.35	41.90	50.69	45.09	49.13
KKE:									
Votes	2,593	3,663	3,061	7,809	8,265	7,293	5,926	7,412	5,985
Percent	6.63	8.83	7.02	11.21	11.11	9.23	6.10	7.19	5.50
KKE-Int:									
Votes	250	749	398	619	1,384	777	608	1,951	997
Percent	0.63	1.81	0.91	0.88	1.86	0.98	0.62	1.89	0.22
EPEN:									
Votes	--	1,252	397	--	1,594	745	--	2,165	882
Percent	--	3.03	0.91	--	2.14	0.94	--	2.10	0.81

/Article by Kostas Iordanidis/

/Text/ The nomes of Florina and Kilkis primarily and of Pella secondly--
KATHIMERINI's Investigation started with them--show the following common
characteristics:

- a. All had become theaters of operation during the civil, anti-guerrilla war.
- b. During the 1945-1949 period they were developed by forces opposing the national army and by separatist trends which were cultivated by Tito and Skopje. As a result, an artificial, but actually non-existent division of the people had emerged into natives and refugees.

c. The two previous reasons, coupled with the interest shown for the area's development by the dictatorial regime of 21 April 1967, resulted in a strong presence of the extreme Right in the 1977, 1981 and 1984 elections.

d. Finally, in two of the three nomes--Florina and Kilkis--PASOK scored a rise of 2.97 and 1.24 percent, respectively.

Despite the fact that as a result of the 1945-1949 events the Florina and Kilkis nomes have a truly rightist tradition, the persons who headed the ND electoral lists in these nomes were not of rightist persuasion. Specifically, Dimosthenis Theokharidis, the ND Florina deputy, was a member of the secret communist organization which was completely broken up by the XV Army Division just a few days before the strong communist attack against the city of Florina the night of 28/29 May 1947 ("The Greek Army During the Anti-Guerrilla Struggle," published by DIS, 1980). Also, Al. Avramidis, the person at the top of the ND ticket in Kilkis, is of centrist persuasion and joined ND in 1974.

An analysis of the election results shows that these cases did not create displeasure in the extreme Right since the percentage of the National Political Union /EPEN/ in the Florina and Kilkis nomes was reduced dramatically to 0.91 and 0.93 percent, respectively. On the contrary, despite the overall ND centrist character, no shift of centrist voters from PASOK to ND was noted and the "enrichment of the ND tickets with centrist cadres did not bring it even one vote," according to I. Belkas, the publisher of the newspaper MAKHITIS in Florina.

However, even though ND won both the nomes of Florina and Kilkis with 47.69 and 46.42 percent, respectively, the result is not considered satisfactory.

Immigration

According to assessments by local leaders the development of the 1985 election results is due to the following reasons:

1. The gradual change of the nomes' political character as a result of immigration. It is pointed out that during the 1950's and 1960's more than 70,000 persons immigrated from Florina and Kilkis to European countries, Canada and Australia. Since a certificate of social belief is necessary for the issuance of an exit permit, the overwhelming majority of the immigrants belonged to the area of the conservative front.

While areas such as Niki in the Florina Nome and villages such as Ethniko, Parori, Kladorakhi and Proti had literally lost their conservative voters, something similar was observed in the Kilkis Nome as well as in most of the other nomes with the result that according to ND leaders in Northern Greece, the rural areas give majorities to the leftist parties during normal periods.

Artificial Division of the Population

2. The votemongering and to the artificial division of the population which certain PASOK cadres promoted in border nomes of Northern Greece--a practice for which PASOK deputy Petsos, who had become independent /but later rejoined PASOK/, had sharply criticized Premier A. Papandreou.

Specifically, in the context of a policy of "equality", PASOK tolerated the use of local institutions while at the same time it promoted its "social" policy and allowed the Nomarchial Council to take away, from Tymbanidis, only a few weeks before the election, the exploitation of the Bazar mineral baths in Pella and assign them to the Loutraki Community.

Political observers in Northern Greece also point out the votemongering initiative taken by those responsible for the PASOK campaign without asking the movement's leading cadres and the government and on the basis of which, through an oral order of Public Order Minister Tsimas, 1,500 escapees of the Civil War (who became naturalized citizens of Skopse) were allowed to visit relatives in the nomes of Florina, Pella and Kilkis.

The result of this tactic was evident in the 2 June election. In Florina villages such as Triatafyleia, Meliti, Xino Nero, Polypotamos and Perasma, PASOK surpassed ND by 50 percent while in the Kilkis province of Paionia, PASOK came first with 46.47 percent compared to 44.99 percent for ND.

KKE Devitalization

3. The KKE pre-election devitalized presence which had as a result the decrease of its electoral strength by 1.98 percent in Kilkis while in Florina it marked a slight increase of 0.39 percent compared to the 1981 elections.

The political observers are not impressed as much by the fluctuations of KKE strength in the two nomes as by the apathy the communist party cadres exhibited during the whole pre-election period.

A few days before the election campaign began, KKE Central Committee Secretary General Khar. Florakis visited the town of Metalitko in the Kilkis Nome--TV had covered the event--creating the impression that KKE would give battle even in the last village. But the impression...evaporated.

ND party leaders in the nomes of Florina and Kilkis claim the KKE grass roots organizations received orders to support PASOK but the KKE leadership was not able to establish the percentage of such support. The same ND party leaders named KKE cadres who helped shift voters to PASOK. Related reports about the KKE decision to support PASOK circulated in Athens very intensively on the eve of the elections.

These claims, which were supported by almost all ND cadres and by ND deputies, have not been proved. But, as political observers in Northern Greece assert, if no such order for supporting PASOK existed and if the "line" of the KKE leadership was to contest the very last vote, then in the 1985 elections one observed not simply a diversion of KKE votes to PASOK but an unprecedented political disobedience by KKE cadres to the party line since, during the election campaign, the presence of the communists in the provinces of the Florina, Pella and Kilkis Nomes was subnormal.

It is possible that the KKE cadres yielded to the psychological blackmail "PASOK or the Right's bare islands /islands for exiles/," which determined the electoral behavior of many communist voters. Incidentally, it is noted that the person responsible for the KKE party organizations is K. Tsolafis who was publicly reprimanded at least once by the KKE leadership when, speaking at an open gathering in Ioannina, he supported the repatriation of those who escaped to Skoplje and assumed "macedonian" citizenship.

Government Work

4. The positive aspects of the government work and especially to its successful propagandistic projection. In this case, the facts in the Florina and Kilkis Nomes show an astonishing change.

In the Florina Nome particularly, no noteworthy projects were constructed during the years PASOK was in power. Tolis Tsomitis, who is a member of the local city committee, observed that Florina is a place with many monuments but without factories.

Under Developmental Law 1116 only two industries were established and the results from the implementation of Compulsory Law /AN/ 1262/82 have been minimal. The only noteworthy industry is in the village Viloti in the Amyndaioi Province--it is the thermo-electric station which is being built in cooperation with the USSR.

In the Florina Nome, the Nomarchial Committees for the Advancement of the People /NELE/ have developed significant activity and provided positions and jobs for PASOK followers. The government uses the NELE's in an attempt to give a false appearance of political activity. Yet in all international events, the country in general and the nome in particular are represented by the Literary Society "Aristotalis" which has a rich national background.

The residents of the area gladly accepted Social Tourism. During the pre-election period 450 coupons of social tourism were distributed in only 3 days. Those getting the coupons can have, by paying only 150 drachmas a day, 7 days' vacation with paid hotel room and lunch. At the same time they are given a 50 percent discount on bus, air and train fares.

By contrast, in the Kilkis Nome the NELE's were disorganized and did not function as PASOK agents of influence. Social Tourism served only the PASOK

votemongering expediences and created the impression that PASOK is indeed interested in the "non-privileged" Greeks. On the other hand, in the same nome there was intensive activity before the election in the sector of public works and investments--which resulted in the temporary employment of a significant number of the jobless. However, in addition to the pre-election tactics the PASOK government was also promoting a number of developmental projects in the nome.

Specifically, on the basis of AN 1262/82 a nome industrial zone was established in the area of Stavrokhorí (the first zone was created by the ND governments in the Nea Sandra area). Also, the infrastructure projects were completed for the Kilkis-Polykastro-Axioupolis-Nea Sandra and Stavrokhorí road network.

Well-informed nome leaders point out that the construction of these nome projects--as well as of the municipal ones--was not based on a firm government plan but was rather temporary and was intensified during the pre-election period.

Weaknesses of Organization and Tactics

The 1985 elections showed one more peculiarity. For the first time, the responsibility for conducting the campaign in the country's nomes was assigned to the party's Nomarchial Committees and not to the deputies. There were two factors which contributed to this decision: First, the rapid development of party organizations and second, the imposed requirement of the "list" (of candidates). The result of these developments was the elimination of certain parameters on the basis of which the election struggle was conducted and, primarily, on the basis of which the ND front as the former conservative party ensured contacts with the grass roots.

"With the imposition of the list," points out Kilkis ND Deputy N. Avramidis, "the umbilical cord which connected the deputies with the party rank and file was cut off. A deputy now cannot assume responsibility anymore for a specific number of voters and the personal deputy-voter relationship on which the ND strength depended was reduced to the minimum."

ND voters and cadres in Northern Greece also point out that the imposition of the list reduced the rivalry between deputies on the same ticket and limited the visits to homes of potential voters to a minimum. Also, the speeches of the candidates were as a rule formal since the element of a greater personal success was missing.

Another important parameter, which still in the formation stage, is the ND grass roots party organization. The organization of the ND Nomarchial and Local Committees started in 1983 by imitating the corresponding PASOK organizations. In a short period of time they increased very impressively. Specifically, as N. Toulíos said--he is a member of the Florina Local Committee--53 Local Committees are in operation in a total of about 90 villages,

not including the various cells--in some cases a Local Committee has more than one village such as, for example the Prespai Local Committee which has 11 villages.

A. Nalmbandis, member of the city of Kilkis Local Committee, said that in the Kilkis Nome there exist 50 Local Committees and 10 cells. The whole nome is thus covered organizationally just as is also the Florina Nome.

It should be noted that members of the ND Nomarchial and Local Committees are not paid and they suffer the persecution and pressures of the PASOK state and party machinery and find themselves on the front line where the confrontation with the agents of the government policy is direct and ever present.

It was noted earlier that the ND Nomarchial and Local Committees are still at the stage of their final formation. In other words, they can achieve very impressive mobilizations but have not yet reached the point of effectively delivering to the grass roots the leadership's political message.

The Center's Weaknesses

According to assessments by local party leaders the same immaturity has also characterized the Center. The section chiefs--usually retired officers--who supervised the election in the various nomes, simply augmented the bill of the Greek Telecommunication Organization which was paid by each Nomarchial Committee.

The impression one gets by talking with ND cadres is that the party organization is undergoing a more substantial phase of political emancipation. Proposals such as, for instance, that the party must designate from now on the candidates for the next parliamentary elections and that in their greater percentage they should not be presently active deputies, sound rather extreme and perhaps unjust.

Yet, no one doubts that the need for renewal is imperative and that the intra-party democratic procedures should be absolutely enforced for the meritocratic emergence of the Nomarchial Committees and for the nomination of candidates for parliamentary elections.

It is unusual that the recent defeat has not at all affected the morale of the ND cadres in the rural areas who insist that what matters most at this time is the organizational completion which will permit the party to act with greater determination.

Finally, according to ND cadres, the party should abandon the dogmatism and generalizations which serve nothing, and the appeals and references to the past, which even though creative, are rejected by the voters. They also point out that the whole effort should be focused on coping with certain events because "the result of the next electoral confrontation will depend on the details of the daily experiences and not on undefined generalities."

/4 Jul 85 p 8/

/Article by Athina Koufopoulou/

/Text/ ND Deputy G. Misailidis and party cadres told us that the principal rival of ND in Khios Island was a very capable, active and popular woman - /Nomarch/ Aleka Markogiannaki to whom the ND representatives entirely attribute PASOK's success in the island and whom they accuse of partisanizing and exploiting her position in every way possible for the benefit of her party. On the other hand, they admit it was very difficult to effectively fight her and to change the picture of the government policy which she herself has many times consolidated by deeds.

As a result of the prudent government policy, which was promoted in every way by the ever-present A. Markogiannaki, PASOK increased its percentage at the expense of ND and KKE. The following table specifically reflects this increase:

	1981	1984 (Euroelections)	1985
ND:			
Votes	14,320	12,995	14,946
Percent	42.68	38.16	39.09
PASOK:			
Votes	16,428	15,846	20,008
Percent	48.97	46.54	52.33
KKE:			
Votes	2,076	2,668	2,259
Percent	6.18	7.84	5.9

The number of votes shows that KKE did not lose its strength. The percentages, however, changed in favor of PASOK as a result of the large number of persons who register to vote in one place but live in another ("eterodimotes").

Misailidis told us that ND succeeded in transporting /to their respective voting precincts/ 2,500 eterodimotes despite the fact that PASOK had monopolized the /nationalized/ Olympic Airways and the passenger ships. According to ND assessments PASOK also transported about a corresponding number of eterodimotes.

The battle ND had to wage, said some of its cadres, was doomed in advance since it was impossible to catch up in the "race" with the nomarch who, during the 4 years since the 1981 elections, was ceaselessly visiting the villages and communities winning friends with her smile, the formality with which she befriended the humblest of villagers, and the money she had available for communities, thus satisfying the small requests of her constituency.

Madame Markogianni told us that about 160 public meetings took place in 1984 in villages and communities; that the islanders show their nomarch frequently in their homes, in squares and community offices, while the waiting room at her office is always filled with people even though she receives the public--as scheduled at the entrance of the nomarchy--twice a week.

Perhaps the easiest thing for one is to see the nomarch participating in discussions taking place in squares, while in the coffee houses one could hear: "I am going to see the nomarch in order to have a talk about it..."

Personal Contact

Some islanders told us that Madama Markogianni always finds time to talk with people, drink coffee with them, and to help find a solution to their personal problems.

This Markogianni policy, coupled with the 2 billion drachmas the nome received--compared to the 200 million drachmas given in 1981 but which, according to the nomarch, were not totally absorbed--gave a greater majority to PASOK than in 1981 and satisfied, perhaps, a section of ND undecided voters since 53 of the 55 community presidents of the island--among whom are many ND members--signed a resolution "in support of the government of Change PASOK."

It is the view of Nomarch Markogianni that the islanders voted PASOK because they felt that the government projects reflected its interest in their "forgotten and tired" island. Such projects on Khios were: well-equipped rural clinics, roads, telephones in all villages, water supplies and sewer systems in communities, the Khios swimming pool which, as ND cadres admitted, was neglected by the previous ND governments, the Kambos Gymnasium which is attended by children in areas around the city of Khios, the Health Center in Pyrgi, and the completion of the gym the construction of which was started by ND governments.

A percentage of PASOK's success is due to the mayor of Khios City G. Boumbaris who is a PASOK party member, but entered the election as an independent since the party refused to endorse him and nominated someone else. His election shows the measure of his popularity since he had to face 98 percent of the voters the three large parties--ND, KKE and PASOK--represent. He said his cooperation with the nomarch is excellent and productive.

Weaknesses

On the other hand, ND had to cope with some weaknesses besides the popular nomarch such as the electoral material (information and advertising brochures) which arrived at the villages late, thus failing to inform the public properly and in time. Also, ND did not properly utilize its cadres who were willing to offer their services but were not given the opportunity. Thus, ND failed to inform the farmers and villagers that part of the money PASOK gave them represented EEC subsidies--a fact the nomarch stubbornly refuses

to admit. Of course, say ND cadres, it is not certain if the election result would have been different and point out that a deputy's personality and behavior toward the residents of the island should be modernized and should be 'more natural and normal' because the only way ND can reverse the situation on Khios to its advantage is to approach the people with the same simple, smart and flattering policy of the present nomarch. Furthermore, the ND cadres propose that the nomination of the candidate for parliament should be made through intra-party elections with the participation of all ND voters throughout the island.

In Samos

Almost the same situation prevailed on Samos Island, which is represented in the parliament by one deputy. There were, of course, some differences. Specifically, and according to assessments by ND cadres, the election results were due to the following reasons:

1. To the nomarch who spoke for the government.
2. To the government's past programs.
3. To the new government tactics.
4. To the death of ND Deputy G. Spyrou.
5. To the fact that the region elects only one deputy and therefore the campaign was harder.
6. To the local organizations of the parties.
7. To the island's singularity.

The residents of Samos are small property owners, workers and employees, small storekeepers and very few persons who in the past 10 years have become large property owners. However, the island's population decreases continually as a result of immigration. Part of this population has a radical, liberal past, another equally significant part has its roots in the resistance (during the occupation years), and another part, which was dominant for years, has conservative views.

According to ND cadres the death of Deputy Spyrou played an important role. He was a physician and for many years was elected as Samos deputy first with the Liberal Party and later with the National Radical Union /ERE/. By joining ERE he prompted many voters, who gave him their vote for personal reasons, to move to the right of the center. After his death this large number of voters felt free to join the party of their choice and most of them joined PASOK. Here, precisely, lies the mistake of ND, say its cadres: it failed to attract to its ranks these politically unaffiliated people. As a result they chose the governing party.

If one carefully analyzes the percentages the parties received in the 1981, 1984 and 1985 elections he will observe that ND shows a steady decrease and PASOK a continuous rise due especially to the centrist voters who joined it. Specifically, the percentages of the parties since 1981 are as follows:

	1981	1984 (Euroelections)	1985
ND:			
Votes	12,053	10,311	11,846
Percent	41.20	35.55	36.20
PASOK:			
Votes	9,867	10,311	13,415
Percent	33.70	35.25	40.99
KKE:			
Votes	6,159	6,480	6,135
Percent	21.00	22.34	19.32

It should be noted that, according to ND cadres, ND was able to transport-- in contrast to PASOK--a significant number of Eterodimotes during the Euroelections. Therefore, the number of voters who left ND was greater than originally thought. On the other hand, the losses (in votes) of the two communist parties were not as great as the percentages show since these leftist parties did not transport eterodimotes on a large scale

ND Tactics

During the campaign PASOK accused ND of neglecting the island when it was in power. ND did not try to refute this accusation with arguments and limited itself to pointing out only that the projects constructed in the nome since 1981 were made possible through the money the EEC programs provided, an argument the nomarch categorically denied. Anyway, the result shows that the voters either did not care where the money came from or believed the nomarch's denial.

Also, the government's subsidies to the farmers and pensioners had a large and positive response in Samos since these two categories constitute the majority of the islanders. On the other hand, the frequent presence of the very able nomarch in the villages and communities, which used to be bastions of ND, as well as the solution of local problems such as sewers, roads, water supplies, etc., which were the island's permanent problems, persuaded even the most reluctant voters. The ND cadres say that Nomarch Pandazis was "PASOK's best asset in the nome."

Pandazis does not agree with such an interpretation. He told us: "There are no protagonists to what happened. Administration, local self-government, technicians, workers, professionals--together we all gave battle with decentralization and democratic programming as our means." ND cadres question Pandazis' behavior during the campaign--whether, that is, and how effectively he had factionalized his position. He himself denied that he made pre-election appointments and transfers and said that he is not absolutely satisfied with the election results.

To inform the people of Samos about the government activities on the island, the nomarch issued a pamphlet whose contents, however, are not true according to ND cadres. It refers, that is, to many projects which either were completed or initiated by ND.

Specifically, this pamphlet states that during the 1978-1981 4-year term the government contributed to the communities and municipalities of Samos 388 million drachmas, while in the 1982-1985 4-year term such assistance reached 2.13 billion drachmas, a sum which in real non-inflated prices is 5 times as much as that given in the previous 4 years. Among the projects of the last 4 years are the improvement or construction of new roads and ports on Samos and Ikaria, the Ikaria airport, water supply and sewage systems in various communities, health centers, et al.

ND cadres told us that the PASOK Organization, more experienced than that of ND, had organized the island long before the elections in cooperation with PASOK Deputy Khoulis. By contrast, ND started its campaign rather belatedly and with inexperienced cadres, moreover. The mayor of Samos P. Goulas, who is affiliated with ND told us that ND based its hopes mainly on Th. Sofoulis candidate for deputy. However, despite the fact that he is affiliated with the Center, Sofoulis failed to attract the centrist voters. The mayor told us that he and the nomarch cooperated very well. "The nomarch," he added, "never denied me a favor."

Thus, the harmonious cooperation between the nomarch, the deputy and the party organizations, coupled with the projects the government constructed and the money it gave, appear to have had positive results for PASOK and won voters from both the Right and Left.

/7-8 Jul 85 p 8/

/Article by Giannis Vlastaris/

/Text/ "In these elections both parties drew water from the same well." The words belong to Rethymni Nomarch Thomas Merenditis, but reflect the first "assessment" of all parties. In the 2 June 1985 election PASOK increased its electoral strength by 6.5 percent (compared to 1981) and ND by 9.6 percent. The "pool" where both parties "fished" their new voters was the Liberal Party /KF/ which from 17.38 percent in 1981 dropped to just about 0.80 percent.

The above explanation, however, is not complete despite the fact that it is easily derived from the simple addition or subtraction of the percentages. It shows--and this is very clear--only one of the basic shifts of the local electorate. It does not, however, reflect other shifts which concern the "exchanges of votes" primarily between PASOK and ND, PASOK and KKE, and PASOK and KKE-Int., shifts which took place during the 1981-1985 period and (to a degree) are reflected in the 1984 Euroelection results. At that time the KF dropped to 4.8 percent and ND increased by 4.3 percent.

But increases were also scored by PASOK (2.72 percent), KKE (2.0 percent), KKE-Int. (1.56 percent), the Christian Democracy (0.71 percent), and the extreme Right (0.80 percent). In the 1984 elections, therefore, the KF "losses" were distributed in a way different than in 1985 and this can have only one interpretation: larger or smaller realignments at the electoral base of all parties...

In Athens the political leaders may now be getting oriented to the battles to be given in the new Chamber of Deputies but in Rethymno the people still live in the...pre-election period. The automobile still carries the party banners while the posters on the walls continue to invite the people to the struggle "for the new victory" or "for the welcome of the valiant Cretan /Mitsotakis/."

In the evening the party differences may be toned down on the city's boulevard along the waterfront, but in the center of the city and in the villages one can still see the coffee houses decorated in green /PASOK/ and blue /ND/ colors. Here, the partisan views have divided people who are alike in everything: in treating each other to drinks, in simplicity and in anonymity. No green or blue party follower gives his name because "it will appear in the papers."

The "Parliament" of Pensioners

At Madame Elenis' small store a KATHIMERINI journalist is always welcome. The "rakis" /Local drink/ arrives simultaneously with the introductions: "You were fooled at the coffee house. He is an ND follower," Manolis says proudly. And the most senior of the group explains: "Unfortunately we have been divided here in Rethymno. The PASOK followers provoke us continually and there is no margin for discussion. Imagine! Old friends have now reached the point of not talking to each other! The city's central park, which in the past was the 'parliament of the pensioners' now remains empty for fear of arguments which will create more heartbreak."

After about 4 years in power how is PASOK's new rise explained? Everyone gives the same answer:

--It made lots of appointments. It accommodated its followers and promised as many more positions to prospective voters.

--Our side (ND) did not provide the proper information. In the villages the people believe only what they see on the /government-controlled/ TV.

--The people were fanaticized. They voted PASOK because the message stuck that ostensibly the Right is against their interest.

An observation by "a devil's advocate" rendered my fellow conversationalists contemplative: "OK, boys, but before 1981 all these people were voting for ND."

The most senior in the group takes the floor again. "Things have changed, my friend. Do you know why? Because PASOK finished in a few months the projects which ND had initiated and always delayed. It built 2-3 KAPI (Centers for the Rest and Care of the Elderly)--it could have built 10--and thus won the pensioners. It increased the farmers' pensions which for years remained frozen and don't tell me that it is difficult to explain that these increases do not offset the rise in prices. Are ND we to blame that the voters changed their mind, my friend...?"

The members of the group seem to agree in silence.

--How did the election campaign go?

--What do you mean how did it go? The PASOK people flooded the streets pasting photographs on the walls (no one calls them posters). Even the nomarch himself helped... They gambled all for everything...

--What about the New Democracy?

The answer is the same: "We could not have a better campaign. The doctor (now Deputy Kefalogianis) has many friends here. And the organization worked hard. For the first time we had so many young people with us. The fact that we gained 10 percentage points more than in 1981 proves that we won most of the followers of Pavlos Vardinogiannis.

--By the way, did the members of the Vardinogiannis families support any of the two parties?

--No. As a matter of fact their families denied immediately local press reports that they would be voting one or the other party. Our party won the new voters on our own merit, and it could have won more had it enlightened the people properly.

--But how could you enlighten them, I interjected, since you say that you are all divided and do not talk calmly to each other?

The Green Coffee House

For years, the small coffee house by the waterfront has been branded as green, because in every election it becomes PASOK's electoral center. Its customers are younger than those who frequent Madame Elenis store. It is owned by die-hard Andreas fans but everyone there is friendly to this reporter. The scene is repeated: raki, slices of cucumber on a plate (as appetizers) and "no names" given...

From the very start the discussion had in store a surprise: the PASOK followers are...displeased with the percentage increase in their electoral strength.

--Well, you reached 57.2 percent while the second party follows you with only 24 percent.

--What of it, asks Giannis, the public employee and PASOK member since 1974. The projects constructed here could give PASOK a second deputy. He lost by 500 votes. But many people thought that ND would win and wanted to be on the side of the victor, while others voted ND in order to have a Cretan as premier. A third group did not vote PASOK because we ourselves failed to explain the "cosmogony" which occurred in our nome these years.

--Come on, now...not a cosmogony!

--Excuse me, journalist, but I think that up there in Athens you live behind your desks and you know nothing about what happens in other places. Have you seen our hospital?

--Ues, but the new wing was started by ND...

--That's exactly what I want to tell you. For years now plans remained on paper or as promises. Within three and a half years the PASOK government gave us a complete hospital, three health centers of which even Athens would be envious. The government also established health stations and rural clinics...

--Well, if that is so, how come they are not acknowledged by the whole population? Why are you still divided even though the elections have been over for some time?

--Look. The confrontation was big. Besides here in Crete we are a bit tough... well, some of us...parted ways...

--And you drink your raki in different coffee houses.

--No, PASOK does not do it. ND wants to give the impression that its followers are persecuted in order to keep them united, together. They reached the point of buying cheese only from stores owned by rightists. I understand that in Athens they are opening offices for finding jobs for their followers.

--Where will all this lead?

--Oh, it's nothing. Things will calm down. The ND followers will understand that nothing will happen to them and our fanatic members will calm down and life will become normal again. As for the frenzied, the extremists of both parties will always be that way: plain rivals.

We thought this last remark had particular significance for the nome. The confrontation between rival voters--with the exception of the party cadres--has no ideological basis at all. The "leaders" of the rival groups remain

almost unknown and stay away from political discussions--and our experience from contacts with the residents of Rethymno can be reflected up in the words of a farmer we accidentally met at the bus station: "A good party is the one that does projects and gives money. To me it makes no difference if it is Marxist, communist, capitalist or anarchist."

This remark is related to the "formulative" role the eterodimotes played in this year's elections. Since the "local" voters were not ideologically tied to their party, they accepted without serious reservations the influence of their eterodimotes' relatives who came from Athens or other cities with good arguments about the choices they proposed. The significance of this fact becomes more evident if one considers that the eterodimotes in Rethymno represent 20 percent of the electoral body. A "third" observer, a KKE cadre (Giannis S.) told us:

"This year both parties organized carefully the transport of eterodimotes to Rethymno. In my opinion, PASOK won the battle since it has greater strength in the patriotic societies of Cretans residing in large cities."

At this point it is worth noting that PASOK's 1985 victory in Rethymno did not affect the Left. KKE increased its strength by 533 votes and KKE-Int. by 209 (a rise of 0.44 percent). This is one more proof that during the 4 years of PASOK rule ND or KF followers shifted to PASOK while a very small number of voters joined the Left. The results in the various election precincts in the country show that this shift is most apparent (and is limited) in the city of Rethymno. There--many political observers assert--the University of Crete students (mostly leftists) whose number in recent years increased greatly, influence to a large degree the political views of the new students.

The Nomarch's View

However, Nomarch Thomas Marendinis disagrees with the view that in their totality the citizens of Rethymno are interested only in "the immediate consumer present."

"Our people trust PASOK because they see a different rationale in governing," he says. "In the past 3 years alone we had 300 people's meetings in all the nome's villages. For the first time their residents saw the official state approaching them and asking them about the needs of their villages. The 3 billion drachmas spent in Rethymni Nome were not wasted. They were transformed into a 140-bed hospital, three health centers (in Spilaion, Perama, and Agia Foteini), 10 elementary schools, 4 gymnasiums, 100 kilometers of asphalt roads which connect all 256 villages.

"There were also infrastructure projects for the agriculture and livestock breeding economy (plants for processing milk, carobs, and animal feed, water supply systems, etc). I should also mention the programs for tourism by establishing an ice skating center, the installation of systems for the sanitation of tourist centers, the port projects, etc."

--But many of these projects were planned or started before 1981.

--Only a few. But they too remained just plans on paper as no sooner were they started then they stopped. because the amount of money ND appropriated for the nome was small. For water supply projects, for example, ND spent in 1981 39,430,000 drachmas while in 1984 the amount reached 666,836,000 drachmas. And there is more to be done for completely solving the problem.

--They accuse you, Mr. Nomarch, of partisanship. It is said that you supported PASOK with all means at your disposal and you made appointments for vote solicitation reasons.

--Listen. This myth must end sometime. I have not hidden from anyone the fact that I am a PASOK follower. Just as no nomarch during ND rule did not hide his political identity. The question is not what my beliefs are, but what I do for the nome. Let all who are ready to start accusations come into the open and charge that it was wrong to build the hospital while PASOK was in power. Let them declare publicly that they are against the projects PASOK completed in the nome.

As concerns the persecutions and the alleged appointments, let me say this: during the whole 4-year term no one was fired and only two transfers were made to meet service needs. All appointments were made on the basis of the point system or through irreproachable written tests about which not a single charge was made. The fact, moreover, that in our nome there is no unemployment but, on the contrary, a demand for workers and professionals proves that no one was fired for political reasons and an appointment could hardly be used as an enticement for getting votes.

The nomarch expresses his views with the ease and confidence of a leader of the party which prevailed in the elections. For this reason, perhaps, the positions of a "beaten" party or leader assume some other validity. Andonis B., an old centrist politician who, this year cooperated with ND, said:

--I think the projects done in the nome were the major cause of PASOK's predominance as was, also, its unprecedented activity among the new voters (it registered 6,917 since 1981) and among those citizens who had not voted in the Euroelection (about 20,000). In these sectors, PASOK's work was continuous and persistent and the result was effective.

--What about the New Democracy?

--Look. It did the best it could, but I think it made serious tactical errors. I think the handling of the Cretan Sartzetakis election /as president/ has frightened some moderate voters since the sensitivity of the Cretans on matters of origin is well known. We promoted the need to elect a Cretan premier /Mitsotakis/ who would get rid of the new president. Such a thing should not even be mentioned in Crete. And let us not forget the climate we created. By propagandizing ND's sure victory and "our return to power" we

pushed some leftists to PASOK. Thus, PASOK was strengthened at the expense of KKE and KKE-Int. which, I think, have more votes than they received.

--And now? What are your plans for the future?

--I don't think we have reached any definite conclusions yet. It is my view, however, that much attention must be given to the question of enlightening and informing the people. The villages are prisoners of the /controlled/ TV. ND must be near the voters on a permanent basis. It should assume a new personality and should present to the people on a daily basis well-planned positions. In Crete there has already been created a new negative tradition about ND. We must and we can reverse this impression. In this effort, we shall unfortunately have the assistance of the economic crisis which, in my opinion, is very near. The people should then be ready to turn their backs on PASOK's false promises.

/11 Jul 85 p 8/

/Article by Athina Koufopoulou/

/Text/ Government concern, a capable nomarch, an active deputy, 2 billion drachmas, and the leftist past coupled with a relative inaction by ND, gave PASOK an increased majority compared to the 1981 elections also in the third large border island of the Eastern Aegean--in Lesbos where the three parties (PASOK, KKE and KKE-Int.) have been winning about 70 percent of the votes since 1981.

The bureaucratic state, the known antithesis of the "red island" to the governments of the Right and the great delay in the construction of public projects forced the islanders--as they themselves admit--to find the solution somewhere else in 1981. And the 1985 elections show that the people were satisfied with the PASOK government policy which, it seems, had an effect on voters of other parties also, given that PASOK increased its percentage more than four units.

Specifically, the following table reflects this increase:

	1981	1984 (Euroelections)	1985
ND:			
Votes	24,108	21,670	25,832
Percent	31.39	28.29	30.31
PASOK:			
Votes	30,639	28,661	37,991
Percent	39.90	38.34	44.46
KKE:			
Votes	19,979	19,430	19,311
Percent	26.04	25.98	22.60

A comparison of the above results shows that the eterodimotes also played an important role since PASOK received about 7,000 more votes than in 1981, while KKE lost only 600 votes. No one, however, could give us information about the number of eterodimotes the two parties could transport to the place of their registration.

ND followers told us that the party's campaign in Lesbos was very difficult because they had to cope with, besides the prejudice against "the Right," the subsidies the PASOK government had given to the farmers who constitute the island's majority; the positive attention the nomarch paid to the "neglected" villages and communities; the reorganization, staffing and reopening of the Limnos Eparchy office which until 1981 was considered "dead" through the decentralization of its services and the strong presence of KKE followers.

The same ND followers told us that a large part of the PASOK success in Khios and Samos islands also is due to Lesbos' nomarch K. Sifounakis and the policy he followed--a policy of always being in touch with the people, of having the doors of his office open to all at all times, of visiting the villages and communities and of calling meetings of the people.

The ND followers accused this policy as vote mongering and called it a policy of "impressions" and "window dressing." Yet this policy did impress the islanders who were persuaded that the PASOK government showed interest in their islands since certain small projects were completed in communities and since some of the residents' demands were met.

In Limnos the normal reopening of the Eparchy headquarters and the decentralization of the services won for PASOK "rightist, centrist and leftist" votes. Since the closed headquarters was a constant wound for the residents because for the smallest formal procedure they had to go to Mytilini of Lesbos through Athens, moreover.

The whole picture is completed with the 2 million dollars the government gave to the nome--an amount which is a record in the annals of Lesbos--for the construction of projects. EEC's participation was 30 to 50 percent of the total amount, a fact which the PASOK campaigners "conveniently forgot" to mention. Yet, despite this large amount, not a single large project was completed--such as the airport which was constructed by ND, but whose extension is still continued, the Mytilini-Kaloni road which--according to plans will become a boulevard and which is under study since 1982, the Mytilini-Agiasos road whose construction is at a standstill, the milk processing factory which, if completed, will solve many of the farmers' problems, the Papados-Plomarion road, et al.

Of course, certain small-budget projects were completed in some villages which left the residents of these areas satisfied.

Another great advantage for PASOK was its Deputy D. Vounatsos who actually started his 1985 campaign for re-election the day after the 1981 elections.

He responsibly put into practice a program according to which he spent 4 days a week in Mytilini (the Lesbos capital) and frequently visited villages in Limnos. Residents of Lesbos pointed out that if Vounatsos' name was second on the ND electoral list for Lesbos, the major opposition would have elected two deputies. This effort on the part of Vounatsos--though he had to cope with intraparty animosities and clashes as a result of which he fell into disgrace and was placed second on the list--brought fruit and many PASOK members voted for him for personal reasons.

According to residents of the islands, his frequent visits, the ease with which he approached the villagers and the attention he paid to their problems convinced the people of his true interest in them with the result that they voted for him and not for the PASOK candidate. Among them were also KKE followers.

Finally, according to the ND cadres, the PASOK Local Committee worked like a clock not only during the campaign but long before. PASOK cadres and its organized potential, literally plowed the island. They visited even the most remote villages, they went from door to door, talked with everyone proclaiming the good deeds of the PASOK government and they warned the islanders--again according to ND sources--and especially the leftists "about what sufferings they would undergo if the Right regained power." Thus, according to the ND cadres, the false dilemma "PASOK or the Right"--a dilemma the governing party spread--had its effect among the islanders.

The ND Organization

This constant and intensive PASOK activity pointed out more and more ND's weaknesses according to its cadres who admitted that their party lacked in organization compared to PASOK. As a result, in many villages the residents continuously met only PASOK representatives since ND's presence was non-existent.

Thus, many areas were unaware of the ND messages and programs while in others the people learned only formally about such programs from wall posters or occasional campaign speeches. Because of such poor and unorganized campaigns the ND cadres were unable to present their arguments persuasively and failed to exploit to their benefit the displeasure and dissatisfaction PASOK had caused with the pre-election appointments and its all-powerful branch committees.

These same ND cadres further pointed out that the political approach their party follows is rather "anachronistic" compared to the modern and alluring PASOK policy. Even though such a policy is based on the development of impressions it, nevertheless, finds response among the islanders who believe that "the state reached the people and the people assumed the power." On the contrary, with its policy, say its cadres, ND maintains a distance from the people.

The ND cadres told us that there were also objections about ND's Deputy D. Nianias who for 4 years did not visit the island and was unable to convince the people of his interest in them and the island. He was especially unable to adjust to the new style PASOK had introduced through its representatives in this electoral confrontation. They also accused him of not making his presence felt in the villages and communities where ND's struggle should be more intensive and the deputy's interest more evident, especially since these areas were the ones to which the PASOK government had given special attention and care. Thus, while the villagers and the farmers of Lesbos had frequent visits from the nomarch, the deputy and the PASOK cadres, they never saw the ND deputy.

The ND cadres pointed out also that the party did not sufficiently inform the public as concerns the EEC programs and that some unbecoming behavior by party members reinforced the PASOK slogan that "the people don't forget what the Right is"--a slogan which ND failed to refute effectively as it failed also to separate the past from the present and future. As a result, it failed to win the confidence of the undecided centrist voters who finally voted for PASOK.

Thus--say the ND cadres--the well-organized PASOK campaign; the successful government representation through Sifounakis; the government subsidies to the farmers; the popularity of Vounatsos and the rather dull KKE campaign which failed to unite its followers and win new voters; and the ND organizational failures, led to the known election result.

The ND cadres propose a "greater flexibility of movement" by letting the local ND potential to nominate the candidate for a parliamentary seat and to decide the manner of conducting the local campaign since they know well the problems, anxieties and hopes of the island's residents.

/14-15 Jul 85 p 8/

/Article by G. Tambakopoulos/

/Text/ When they went to the polls in 1981, the residents of Kefallinia Island gave PASOK 42.56 percent. In the 1984 Euroelections they gave it 39.38 percent and in the 1985 elections 44.08 percent, or an increase of 1.52 percent. Kefallinia is one of the 14 districts where PASOK increased its strength.

However, ND had a more significant increase. In 1981 it received 32.96 percent and in 1984 34.6 percent. In 1985 this percentage reached 37.34 percent! The PASOK percentage was increased by the KKE followers whose presence on the island is strong (this conclusion is clearly arrived at by the figures). In 1981, KKE had received 32.0 percent, in 1984 18.35 percent and on 2 June 1985 it received just about 15.62 percent. By contrast, KKE-Int. succeeded in maintaining its strength compared to the 1981 parliamentary elections. In 1981 it received 1.2 percent, in 1984 3.01 percent, and in 1985 1.74 percent.

Comparison of the percentages shows that PASOK won 1.70 percent from KKE and 1.27 percent from KKE-Int. How much did PASOK gain exactly from the two communist parties?

No doubt the increase in the PASOK percentages is due to the KKE followers. The rise of the ND percentage is due, besides to the activities of ... "Tasis" (as the locals are used to calling the politician Tasos Zisimatos) to the votes of the National Political Union /EPEN/ (2.06 in 1984) and the Party of Democratic Socialism /KODISO/ (0.5 percent).

Acquaintance With the People and the Leaders

Argostoli /the island's capital/ is a beautiful place. The Kefallinia residents seem to respect and love their history. They remember their struggles and the liberation of the /Ionian/ islands from "the British conquerors" according to a PASOK newspaper which was pasted on the wall. But they also love their Tasis (our lawyer). They stress this "our" regardless of political persuasions.

"We increased our votes by more than 2,000 than in 1984 and by more than 2,500 than in 1981," says Tasos Zisimatos. "The KKE," he continues, "has supported PASOK and they brought to the polls non-locals. On election day the residents of Argostoli were surprised to see in operation for the first time the Patrai-Argostoli rail line... One boat brought to the city more than 400 of their voters. They impressed the city employees and... here is the result."

But according to ND leaders Zisimatos' struggle in Kefallinia is evident. In the campaign he had to face Arsenis and Tritsis and had to give the answer to a crucial question: "What has ND done for Kefallinia?" He, himself, admits that the answer is difficult! It suffices to tell you that it /PASOK/ constructed roads even in mountainous villages!

But there is something else that affects the trend in Kefallinia--the foreign exchange! Every household has a member abroad--in America, Australia, Germany, even in New Zealand. Therefore, the "Greek economic crisis" did not but slightly affect the island's residents.

But even though the figures are harsh, the activities of Tasis on the day we visited him were something also... There was the first festive ND post-election meeting attended by a large, very large crowd--many members with a desire to work. There were marathon discussions, criticisms and decisions were reached to continue the struggle. There were the Women's Local ND Committee, The local ND Youth Organization, the committees from the villages. One had a feeling that for all these people and for Zisimatos the elections were not yet over...

The Figures Are Harsh

For ND, the figures are indeed harsh. We cite here how the government took care of the island and its population. Here are the verified figures:

Municipal road construction: 1974-1981, nothing; 1982-1985, 106.6 million drachmas.

Rural road construction: 1974-1981, 7.5 million; 1982-1985, 39.5 million drachmas.

Slaughter house: 1974-1981, 232,000; 1982-1985, 15.1 million drachmas.

Monument maintenance projects: 1974-1981, nil; 1982-1985, 35.7 million drachmas.

Construction of squares, sidewalks, public facility areas: 1974-1981, 1 million; 1982-1985, 29.7 million drachmas.

Recreation and tourism projects: 1974-1981, 0; 1982-1985, 50 million drachmas.

We should mention at this point that the islanders still talk about their hospital (they finally built one), about the workers' homes (187), the reservoirs at Fiskardo, the fishermen's shelters at Zola, the airport which will be improved (until 4 May 1985 the credits for the airport reached 108,977,000 drachmas). They also talk about the MOMA quarries which will be exploited by the municipalities and communities (construction material for roads will thus be available), etc.

When we remind them that most of the money mentioned in the nomarchy's propaganda leaflets came from EEC the answer is the same one Tasis is always reciting during the campaign: "Hell, what do I care where the money comes from?"

The Other Answers

When one tries to give an answer to the question, "why PASOK increased its strength in Kefallinia," he would do well to present the testimony and mentality of the islanders besides the easy explanation through figures (which, without doubt, contribute in forming, more than any other factor, public opinion).

We met Giannis Kosmakis outside the village Divarata at the northeastern section of the island. "Why did you vote PASOK," we asked. His answer: "What are you talking about, mister? Do you know where Marinos Antypas was from?"

I. Petratos tells us that PASOK reigns in the historic memory of the Kefallinia and Ithaki residents when it persuaded them that all those fighters of times past were their forefathers and that they, being their successors, should vote for PASOK.

But to what fighters was he referring? One learns by asking...They were the "socialists" (as all members of the PASOK Local Committee know and proclaim),

Platonas Drakoulis, Rokkos Khridas, Marinos Antypas--radicals who hailed from these islands. Andonis Tritsis calls Kefallinia "the most underdeveloped area of the cold war." The elders remind us that Kefallinia was a victim of the civil war and that the beheadings in the public square remain indelible in some corner of their memory.

Furthermore, Kefallinia is, as the locals claim, the place where the struggle against the British started for the independence of the Ionian Islands. And if certain people had forgotten it, the PASOK Local Committee made sure to remind them of it. It also reminded them the 1953 earthquakes when almost all Kefallinia was destroyed...

PASOK also tried to persuade the people that "no government of the Right" has done anything worthwhile for the island. For Andonis Tritsis, until 1981 Kefallinia has been "a rejected place and received no benefits whatever from the government."

At the present time the islanders somehow fear the ND. Stelios, a man we met at the square told us: "This 'democratic' area, which always votes 60 to 65 percent for the Left, how could they have voted for Mitsotakis?"

Gianis Kambitsis (a photographer and vice chairman of the municipal council), a PASOK member, speaks very flatteringly about Tasis: "Tasis", he tells us, "is my lawyer. He came to see me before the elections and I told him: 'I'm sorry, Tasis, that I can't wish you success in the election. I reserve it for myself.' But we remain friends."

Anyway, no matter how things stand, life in Kefallinia flows normally. The hospitable islanders, heirs to the "radical ideas" and the liberation struggle against the British conquerors, today open their homes and stores to welcome the ... British tourists who, as every year, this year also are many. The years change and oblivion lives and reigns after the elections!

Conclusions

Continuing the reasons which led the residents of Kefallinia to the polls with PASOK votes in hand we mention:

- a. The purely developmental reasons which have to do with projects, loans, etc.
- b. The "historical" awakening of Kefallinia's residents (first radicals, civil war, a place for exiles in modern times).
- c. The assistance by KKE followers who became scared...("man, such a demonstration in the square was unique; the radicals behaved like dogs")...

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
POLITICAL

GREECE

CARTOONS ALLEGE PAPANDREOU INATTENTION TO GOVERNMENT BUSINESS

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 5 Jul 85 p 10

[Cartoon: "The Third Road to Immobility"]



The way we are
delaying, we will
lose socialism.


And if we have lost
it already? Why
run?

Mr Prime Minister...



Mr Prime Minister,
what is happening...

Shhhh...





Look at that, for a prime minister... This is how the leader who has been entrusted by the people for a second 4-year term spends his time!

So? What should I do? Somersaults?



What should you do? Here the Americans have declared economic war on us! The Greek people are angry and...

...And they are gathering around the government. Even the KKE is with us!



So, this is how you see it...

Of course, with the people's eyes... Is there anything else?



Anything else? And how about the EEC? The EEC which is getting ready to abolish our veto? Our only strength? The people are asking that...

...we make no moves at all from our initial positions. So, that's what I am doing. Immobility. Even the KKE is in agreement with us.



I really don't understand what else one could do with this heat!!



And socialism?

Ah, this is the only thing you can think of!! Listen, Giorgio, if Andreas does not go to socialism, socialism comes to Andreas. What are you getting excited about?



Please spare me the jokes, because socialism will come, whether you want it or not. This has been scientifically proved, Mr Prime Minister.

Well, that's nice. Why should we exert ourselves?



And how about calling me "dad" sometimes?... Like all the other children in the world?

Mr Prime Minister!



...Mr Prime Minister, what are we going to do with that law about the new structure of the government? Are we going to publish it?

Oh God, look what they are thinking of, just to upset me! Let it stay where it is. Or rather not... Half the ministers should become deputy ministers. Go now!



Listen, you, so that you will learn... You keep the same numbers in order to do the work, but you make them deputy ministers in order to keep the power in your own hands. Get it?



OK, so you have the power... What do you do with it? Oh, shucks, here he fell asleep again...

POLITICAL

GREECE

COMMENTS, BIO DATA ON 'NEW' GOVERNMENT FIGURES, MINISTRIES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28-29 Jul 85 pp 1, 3

[Text] On Thursday evening eleven new individuals were named by the premier to take over an approximate 25 percent of the ministerial chairs and the vital deputy ministerial positions of the last governmental formation. Mr. Papandreou put together this "eleven" with the conviction that the "new blood" (with the parallel upgrading of other old cadres) will allow PASOK "to realize what it was unable to do in the past." Time will tell concerning the effectiveness of the premier's selections. In the meantime, it would be useful to make a first acquaintance with the new ministers, alternate ministers and deputy ministers.

As a whole, "the eleven 'green' ministers" include eight deputies, one member of PASOK's Executive Office and four cadres of its Central Committee. The majority of them entered political life with PASOK and three come from the Center Union.

Three of the new government top-staffers are ministers (they do not hold particularly "critical" portfolios), one took the oath as alternate minister (in the Ministry of Finance) and the remaining seven are deputy ministers (in key positions of vital sectors). The oldest of the eleven is close to 70 and the youngest is not yet 30 years old.

The office of Minister of Northern Greece (the title was changed officially) was assumed by Mr. Giannis Papadopoulos. He is a physician (a plastic surgeon) and was born in Samothraki in 1924. He is a graduate of the universities of Athens and London and was elected, for the first time, as deputy from Evros on the Center Union-New Forces ticket in the elections immediately following the dictatorship. Today he is a PASOK deputy. He is married to Eleni Kavaratzi and has one son.

If the elevation in rank of the Ministry of Northern Greece in the order of portfolios with the provisions of the new law "on the government and government organizations" is taken into consideration (it went to the spot immediately following that of the Ministry of Finance and comes before the Ministries of the Aegean, Agriculture, Labor, Physical Planning, Housing and Environment, Commerce, Industry, Transport and Merchant Marine), the role of Mr. Giannis Papadopoulos can become significant. This conclusion can be attributed to both the premier's statements on the subject and the expected decentralized nature of the ministry, which will be making decisions for the overall government operations in the North.

The Minister of the Aegean

Heading the newly formed Ministry of the Aegean is the 36-year old deputy from Dodekanisa, Mr. Kosmas Sfyriou. He was born in Rhodes and studied civil engineering. He is married to Mika Mikhaliaki and has a son. He was first elected deputy in 1981 on the PASOK ticket and has a reputation in party circles "as a cadre who works tirelessly."

His selection may perhaps be due to the above because he will be called upon to organize the services and to define the operations of a ministry which is literally on paper and whose headquarters as yet remain unknown. In the meantime, reports on this subject claim that there will soon be some developments because this year the region voted overwhelmingly for PASOK. "To the glow that we have created with the establishment of a separate Ministry for the Aegean--government sources say--we must now add the operations that will be carried out by it, which will hold the voters from the islands close to us."

The new Minister of Transport and Communications is an old Center Union deputy from Aitolokarnania, who, after the dictatorship, has been a regular in PASOK parliamentary group. He is Giorgos Papadimitriou who was born in Mbambini village in 1916 and studied law. Mr. Papadimitriou has caused many reservations among PASOK's cadres as it appears that he keeps "a personal electoral clientele" in his jurisdiction, where, as a matter of fact, he does not hesitate to make public his occasional dissent with the administration's actions or party choices. On the other hand, certain political observers remark that "the centrist votes of the new minister and his parliamentary-old party origin constitute his greatest assets." These assets, which the premier utilized for some intra-party balancing, in the end, brought Mr. Papadimitriou the longed-for portfolio.

Taking over as alternate Minister of Finance is a former assistant district attorney of the Court of Appeals, Mr. Nikos Athanasopoulos, a PASOK deputy from Salonica in recent years. The new minister was born in Arkadia in 1923. He studied at the Middle Agricultural School of Patrai and the Athens Law School. He is married to Katerina Angelaki and has two sons.

New Role for the Deputy Ministers

If the assignment of four new individuals to ministerial positions created some surprise and perhaps monopolized the conversations on the subject, the taking over of seven deputy ministries (which, according to the new law, "are of a 'working' nature") by an equal number of new political figures should not go unnoticed: party origin (high or low PASOK cadres), experience (in secretariats general of ministries or in organizations) and age (an average that does not exceed 40 years) of most of them indicate, most probably, the kind of duties they will take over.

Deputy minister of the "second ranking" Ministry of Interior and Public Order was sworn in day before yesterday, PASOK deputy from Salonica, Mr. Kharis Kastanidis, just 29 years old, an attorney, married to Elizabeth Symeonidou and the father of a girl. The old leader of PASOK's youth in Salonica and presently a member of the Central Committee, Mr. Kastanidis is considered one of the most important cadres of the party in power. Reports have it that he is to take over the Local Self-Government Division--at least, according to official announcements--will

constitute a fundamental priority of the government: "the energizing of the second echelon of Local Self-Government (which is expected to become law soon), the process of transfer of jurisdictions to the regional administration and the organizing of popular participation according to areas of the government's operation-- [illegible; possibly "informed PASOK sources say"]--will be his top priority duties.

To the sensitive area of National Defense was appointed as deputy minister in the National Defense Ministry, Arkadia deputy, Mr. Anastasios Skhiotis. Born in Tripolis in 1922, a retired attorney, married to Kyriaki Dedeia, has two daughters. He served as mayor of his hometown from 1978 to 1981 and later entered politics with PASOK and was twice elected deputy. Of centrist persuasion, Mr. Sekhiotis is among the few deputy ministers who are not considered "party men." At the National Defense Ministry he is expected to take over the economic and defense industry division. In the meantime, quite a few maintain that his duties will be strictly "managerial" and will be permanently subject to the approval of Mr. Drosogiannis and top supervision by the premier himself.

One of the three non-parliamentary members of the "eleven new ones" is the first deputy minister of National Economy, Mr. Giannis Papandoniou. He was born in Paris and he is just 36 years old. He studied economics at the universities of Wisconsin and Cambridge. He is married to Lia Kartali and has a son and a daughter. He first entered politics in the Euro-elections of 1981 when he was elected to the Europarlament on the PASOK ticket. He is considered to be an accomplished economist and an excellent technocrat. It is said, actually, that a contributing factor in his selection as deputy minister was the high opinion of his capabilities held by the new minister of National Economy, Kostas Simitis.

The Premier's Son

The premier's son, Georgios Papandreou, 33, took over as first deputy minister for Culture. He studied sociology in America, England and Sweden and is married to Eva Zisimidou and is the father of a son. A deputy from Akhaia since 1981, he is a member of the Central Committee of PASOK. There is speculation as to whether he will take over the sectors of Popular Education and Immigrant Affairs (which were finally transferred to the Ministry of Culture), without excluding the Bureau of New Generation.

The former secretary general of the ex-Ministry of Public Works, Kostas Geitonias, is the new deputy minister of the unified Ministry of Physical Planning, Environment and Public Works. An old non-parliamentary PASOK cadre, in charge of its economic committees and member of the party's Central Committee, Mr. Geitonias is considered to be a personal friend and collaborator of the (present) minister to the premier, Aki Tsokhatzopoulos, whose views he shares, both on a party and governmental level. He is expected to be placed in charge of the division of public works of the ministry.

The Eyes and Ears of the Party

Mrs. Vaso Papandreou, deputy minister of Industry, Energy and Technology is the only female presence among the "eleven new ones." She is 38 years old, an economist and a member of PASOK's Executive Office. Mrs. Papandreou was president of

EOMMEKh [Hellenic Organization of Medium and Small-size Enterprises and Handicrafts] until the elections of 2 June when she was elected, for the first time, a deputy-at-large. In her new position, it is said, she is charged with the task of modernizing and importing new technology for industrial production. For many, however, Mrs. Papandreou will be the "eyes and ears of the party" in the ministry, a second minister who will (atypically) coordinate his [sic] activities with the overall economic choices of the government.

Finally, Mr. Alkis Roussopoulos is the new deputy minister for Transport and Communications. Formerly the secretary general of the Ministry of Communications, Mr. Roussopoulos is considered one of the most productive, non-parliamentary cadres of PASOK. Communications will once again be--according to all indications--his responsibility in the position he took over day before yesterday.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

SARTZETAKIS STANCE PRESAGES POSSIBLE COLLISION

Government Fears

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28-29 Jul 85 pp 1, 14

[Text] The surprise move by Mr. A. Papandreou on 9 March to ensnare the leftist voters and the exploitation of their repressed complexes, and especially his choice, constituted decisions which, it is possible, in the post-electoral period, will politically prove to be extremely costly to the government.

This is being pointed out by opposition circles, who, in analyzing the present level of relations between the presidency of the Republic and the government, observe that this price, to be sure, does not come as a result of the fact that a dispute between the current president and the premier could be translated into a rejection of Mr. A. Papandreou by a sector of the electorate representing the "popular appeal" of the president, this because their individual popularity cannot be compared. Even the political price cannot be the result of some clashes of presidential interference in governmental breaches of formality. On the other hand, Mr. A. Papandreou, for better or for worse, would wish to be able, during the summer, to bring to a vote before the full Chamber of Deputies the constitutional provisions that had been considered to need revision by the majority of the previous legislature. These, as is known, regard significant presidential jurisdictions.

What became an aggravating circumstance for the government in a dispute between the president and the premier--the first indications of it have already appeared--is the fact of Mr. Papandreou's clash with an individual for whose appointment to the highest office, the government resorted, first, to immoral behavior towards the former president of the Republic, and, afterwards, to unconstitutional machinations, to unacceptable measures of controlling the government majority and to the destruction of the secrecy of the ballot. Thus, it is easy, after all of this high-handedness by the government has taken place, for a rift at the summit of the State to be interpreted ambiguously, that is, not only that certain initiatives or postures of the president of the Republic, who, because of an evident lack of political experience, upset the established political practice and political balance, creating new precedents. However, whatever the clash may be, it constitutes--after the high-handedness of the government that has taken place--an indication of a refusal for the PASOK-elected president of the Republic to become subject to that party in exchange for his election. It is precisely this interpretation that increases even more the price the government

must pay, as well as Mr. Papandreou personally, a price that has its beginning mainly--as previously stated--in the rejection, so soon, of the person for whom the administration showed high-handedness by trampling on every principle of elementary democratic behavior and moral code.

The government, being aware of these consequences, has attempted in the past few days to show with ambiguous interpretations, on the one hand, its popular power against Mr. Sartzetakis, letting it be understood that something actually happened that it itself disapproves of because it has political responsibility for the president's actions and, on the other hand, to "confirm" the harmony of the relationship between Sartzetakis and Papandreou, severely confining it, however, "within the framework of the constitution," a fact that means that the invitations to the reception on 24 July was a matter that goes beyond the provisions covered by the country's constitution.

Already the events that preceded the "assurance" of the premier about the amicable relationship between the president and the premier do anything but confirm its sincerity. Thus, the government's version about the invitation that was not extended to Karamanlis on 24 July because he had allegedly refused the invitation to the Zivkov dinner and it was consequently assumed that he would refuse the invitation to the presidential reception, was belied by the peculiar presidential demand to invite only those who acknowledge the new status of Mr. Sartzetakis. The refusal of Mr. Papandreou to personally inform Mr. Sartzetakis about the Council of Ministers--when the premier's repeated telephone calls to inform Mr. Karamanlis, whose advice he sought at every chance, are common knowledge--constitutes the most serious indication of the present reality, that not only does the relationship of the presidency with the government have the characteristic of the kind that is peculiar to "soured friendships," but that the premier is seeking at this stage, discreetly at least, to show to outsiders the dominance of his own prestige as compared to that of the president.

The revision of the constitutional provisions that deal with presidential authority now constitutes the primary concern of the administration--the premier's, to be exact--before the possible occasion of a new skirmish between Sartzetakis and Papandreou--or even a presidential quibbling on the intransigent, literal interpretation of the law at the expense of political maneuverability--gives the former the excuse to make--to all appearances, at least--life difficult for the latter. Of course, the premier's desire for a speedier revision runs into the difficulty of time in view of the fact that the process involves the full membership of the Chamber of Deputies after 2 months. The strange thing is that the premier's concern "for the trouble he has brought upon himself" is justified, up to a point, perhaps because Mr. Papandreou makes the same mistake of coining words that made him speak about presidential "superauthority" and the need for its revision.

The constitutional provisions do not define the effectiveness of presidential powers in a manner so that their exercise may detract from the premier's prestige because they simply confirm, even indirectly, through the president, the power of the people (see referendum). The strength of the presidential powers is defined by the popular prestige of the person who holds the highest office, his political "apex" and his effect on the broader masses.

From this point of view, Mr. Papandreou has nothing to worry about. More than anything else, however, he should be concerned about the repercussions of the rejection of his choice, especially when he has been irreparably exposed--at least in the democratic conscience of the non-fanatic citizens--by imposing his choices with methods that have become the stigma of the political reform in the operation of the Greek parliament.

'Arrogance' Decried

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28-29 Jul 85 p 4

[Excerpts] The Greeks had noted the penchant of Mr. Sartzetakis for making flowery speeches and delivery panegyrics. Celebrations, holidays, anniversaries and meetings are opportunities for rhetorical broadsides. In this manner, it appears, the pleasure of authority becomes more enjoyable, but finally the Greeks encountered a human weakness, they allowed him the harmless way out by letting him recount events and bestow praise.

And they stopped paying attention to the subject of his speeches, which are in the style of an elementary school teacher of the past century, filled with Latin rhetoric, a labored affectation of sentences, and unsteady syntax, the substitution of length for depth and cliches. They even baffle television.

Those who heard Mr. Sartzetakis address President Zivkov a few days ago cannot but justify this prefacing.

This business with this phenomenon is not recent, of course. This rambling led to the known statement by the presidential office that painfully surprised the government itself and, naturally raised justifiable commotion in the entire nation. I will not deal with its entire content. It was a convoluted and clumsy text, malicious, spiteful, childish and egomaniacal. The greatest pettiness and the smallest wisdom were to be found in six pages of unconstitutional allegations and confusions about the role of the people, of the highest chief and the State.

Sometime in 1945, De Gaulle received General De Lattre de Tassigny, who stated:

"France believes that ..."

De Gaulle Interrupted dryly:

"When I wish to know what France believes, I question myself."

He surpassed even the French president!

Such arrogance of power!

The greatest interest, but the most frightful irrationality, is to be found in the justification for refusing to invite former presidents K. Karamanlis and K. Tsatsos. Mr. Karamanlis was not invited because he did not "acknowledge his status." Mr. Khr. Sartzetakis is not amenable to offer the "base" satisfaction

of refusing the invitation. (Good Lord! From now on whoever refuses the invitation of the ruler must know that he performs a base act). It is, actually, the justification with which Charles VIII of France (1470-98) accompanied the famous Ordinance of 12 May 1497: "Because this is our pleasure." Citizens who did not acknowledge the status of Mr. Sartzetakis must give up all hope. Away with the sacriligious at the palace on Irodou Attikou! Mr. Sartzetakis alleges that he is president of all acknowledging Greeks.

In principle, the invitation to the presidential palace to celebrate an anniversary is not a personal matter of the president or a matter of his "responsibility alone." While it is a customary act, it also has a clear political connotation and goes back to political responsibility. Many political crises have been caused by clumsiness, or intentionally, by invitations to ceremonies. On the other hand, the expenses are not being paid from Mr. Sartzetakis' private funds. They are part of the budget of the presidency. The holiday celebration that was decreed to strengthen the memory of the Greeks has nothing to do with the anniversary of the person who sends out the invitation.

However, the question, beyond all this, is: What written or customary, constitutional or otherwise, provision calls for the presidents of the Republic to be acknowledged by the political figures and especially for this acknowledgement to be a condition for exercising the rights that automatically derive from their office, their titles and their contribution to the country? Since when is it mandatory for certain citizens to kowtow to the ruler?

How is it done? Verbally, quietly or simply tacitly? Those who did not run out into the square to shout "Bravo," those who did not send congratulations or did not make a deposition before a notary acknowledging the unmerciful monarch, [elected] thanks to Alevras [the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies], are characterized as outcasts.

Conclusion: The premier was caught in his own web with his choices. He found the "real" president. Tomorrow he may expect even more. The ending and the prospective is graphically given in an anecdote about an American and an Englishman who were giving toasts at a state dinner:

The Englishman: "To our gracious Queen, may God bless her."

The American: "To our president's health, may God help him."

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POLITICAL

ICELAND

PAPER ASSESSES ALTHING ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AS SESSION ENDS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 23 Jun 85 p 20

[Editorial: "Long Althing Finished"]

[Text] The Althing session ended on Friday. Thereby an Althing was dismissed that was in session for a total of 216 days, longer than any other Icelandic Althing. The reasons for such a long Althing session at this time were due in particular to the fact that the coalition parties have placed great emphasis on achieving those goals that they have agreed on. They were successful in doing this in all major areas.

This session of the Althing was characterized by the fact, as so often before, that it worked under pressure and really only began its work when it was decided when the session should end. Thorvaldur Gardar Kristjansson, president of the Joint Session of the Althing, referred to this during his speech at the close of the session when he said: "It is not true that the Althing did little into well into the session since government proposals piled up at the end of the session. A major problem for the session now ending was due to the fact that of 107 government proposals, 31 were presented after 10 April. I mention 10 April since after that date consideration of new measures other than amended measures was not permitted, according to the new Althing rules that it has established for itself. This will have to be changed."

Members of the Althing say often among themselves and in their speeches that they have poor contact with the mass media. During this session there were 1424 printed Althing acts and a total of 537 matters in all were considered. We are reluctant to report in the mass media on everything that the members of the Althing say before it. This paper has noted before that, for example, a simple change such as holding Althing sessions in the morning and committee meetings later in the day would make it easier for the mass media to report on what the Althing is doing.

Although the Althing session was a long one it cannot say that it was stormy. There was no sharp conflict between the government and its opponents. Especially noteworthy was the disagreement within the coalition parties and among them, but this was reduced by the train of events. The much discussed life of the coalition did not hang by a bare thread in the Althing. To measure it people will rather have to look to agreements on wages and whether they lead to

"subversion" or not. With the end of the Althing session the government sails quiet seas, although sounds of alarm will be in the offing as before. In many ways the just ended session of the Althing marked a turning point or sorts. It is wonderful that an advance has been made towards freedom from restraints through, for example, abolition of the government monopoly in television broadcasting. Changes have also been made in other areas as for example through the new legislation on banks and savings banks, the growth of the state Investment Institute and in the area of the production and sale of agricultural policy. To be sure, one may argue about certain individual articles in these new laws, but that is true for any portion of an agreement between political parties and is in fact a precondition for the agreement of the parties. The Beer issue had a large impact upon the Althing and will continue to be connected with the name of the Althing, until the members of the Althing clear up the situation by removing restraints.

If we look at the positions of the political parties at the close of the Althing session it is clear that, of the coalition parties, the Independence Party has come out better than the Progressive Party. The People's Alliance, which claims to be the strongest opposition party, is in the process of dissolving into splinter groups on account of disagreements on the function and role of the labor movement. The Social Democratic Party has enjoyed growing popularity outside the Althing but within it the party had dealt with issues awkwardly, its government opposition is for show and its support in public opinion polls seems hesitant and not firm. The Althing delegates of the Social Democratic Alliance have held the balance in some important issues such as the television question, but issues supported by them such as the ending of parliamentary democracy make its policy untrustworthy for the people. The Althing delegates of the Women's List are among those that are the most reluctant when there is discussion of any change in the public system. Most are happy that the Althing session is over. News of political losses in the Althing would be more suiting to the short winter days than sunniest time of the year. Hopefully it will be brighter for Icelandic national life in the autumn when the Althing meets again than it was last autumn when the wave of strikes swept over us.

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MARITIME POLICY ERRORS BEHIND RAINBOW NAVIGATION ISSUE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 21 Jul 85 pp 4-5

[Article: "The problem is the Greed of Icelandic Shippers"]

[Text] There would have been no Rainbow Navigation Inc. but for the inordinate greed and the doubtful trading practices of Icelandic shippers.

The interference of "certain" members of the Althing and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this matter has exhibited a kernel of ignorance and much naivety and can directly damage more important Icelandic interests and even the interests of the shippers themselves.

These are the major conclusions of the detailed appraisals of an unnamed "independent party" published in the most recent issue of VIKURFRETT in Keflavik under the headline "Are Rainbow Navigation voyages more 'pigish'?" Those in charge of the paper are Emil Pall Jonsson and Pall Ketilsson.

Greed

The author of the article says that the arrival of Rainbow Navigation may be due to the abnormal shipping rates of Icelandic outfitters and to support his position he goes over the history of shipping for the garrison force back to the beginning. Initially shipments were in the hands of the American shipping company Moore-McCormack, but the sailings were unprofitable for various reasons and The Steamship Company quickly became much higher than is customary for Atlantic routes, both on account of technological developments and competition, says the author of the article.

The Steamship Company was the only shipper involved until the second half of the last decade when the shipping company Bifrost Inc. began operations with garrison force were so high that although the Motorship "Bifrost" was altogether an inconvenient ship for such voyages it was possible to make a profit from them," says the author, or around three times higher than was customary for Atlantic sailing from the mainland of Europe to the same harbor in the United States.

A rates battle then began that lasted five years and ended with the Steamship Company purchasing its competitor. "The Ocean Shipping Department of the garrison force was happy with the competition of Icelandic shipping companies and benefited from it. Shipping rates to Iceland decreased by more than 50 percent," says the author of the article, but adds that the Ocean Shipping Department was to the same degree unhappy over the Steamship Company's achieving a monopolistic position, since freight rates increased rapidly as a result.

It came about that Hafskip Inc. began shipments to the United States in 1980, but no competition resulted since the shipping companies came to an agreement about rates for shipments to the military base. "This development naturally created great vexation with the Ocean Shipping Department of the garrison force since it was clearly a case of monopoly. Events culminated during the years 1983 and 1984 when both the Steamship Company and Hafskip began sailing with container ships over the Atlantic to Iceland. By this time the Ocean Shipping Department was paying \$3,600 for a 20 foot container shipped from the United States to Iceland while there were on board the same ships equivalent containers, shipped from the United States for reshipment in Iceland to Europe, costing \$1,000."

The author then states that dissatisfaction of the Ocean Shipping Departments on account of the greed of Icelandic shipping companies reached a high point and led to American parties seeing themselves called upon to create a shipping company for garrison force shipping, something that seemed profitable on account of the high shipping rates. And thereby Rainbow Navigation Inc. came to life.

Interference of the Authorities Dangerous

"The proposed changes in American law to support special privileges for Rainbow Navigation Inc. are by the way since the sailings of this shipper are part of something much larger," says the author of the article and points out that "Rainbow Hope" accounts for but 15 percent of all shipping between the United States and Iceland and that almost half of the ships owned by Icelandic shippers on these runs are manned by foreigners and sail under foreign flags.

The author of the article warns of the danger that could result from the interference of the Icelandic authorities:

"Icelanders, more than any other people, need to have complete control over the shipping going on between it and other nations and that is something highly beneficial to Iceland. For that reason, all reactions that endanger this national advantage are to be cautioned against and the greatest possible freedom for shippers is very important for Iceland. Legislation and limitation of sailings, of the sort under discussion now, are of immediate danger since they could result in some of our trading partners, such as Nigeria, Portugal, etc., making the demand that we ship a portion of the export goods that we sell them in their ships, without regard to freight rates. The interests here are in and of themselves far greater than is the case with Rainbow Navigation since the market price of Icelandic products is endangered if we do not consider the interests of the Icelandic shippers that carry on such shipping at present."

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: KNOWN, POSSIBLE NEW CANDIDATES

'Three Greats'

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 19-25 Jul 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Three 'Greats' in the Running"]]

[Text] At least three great actors in the Portuguese political scene are already in the presidential race, undoubtedly polarizing the expectations of the vast majority of the Portuguese voters. Although the rest of the precandidates for tenancy of the rose-colored Palace of Belem merit some consideration, no one can fail to recognize that Lourdes Pintasilgo, Freitas do Amaral and Mario Soares are, to date, the strongest pieces, whose position is virtually certain on the chess board on which the Portuguese citizens will, for the third time under freedom, play out their right to choose the president of the republic.

It is quite possible that some other "strong" candidate will come to claim a position on the presidential chess board, expanding the range of choices, but serving to bolster or diminish the hopes which each of these three legitimate candidates nourish, of becoming the chief of state.

Many citizens will not identify politically with any of the three said candidates, although all of these try to place themselves outside or above the parties, seeking the status of "independents," even if it has not been long since one of them was president of the CDS [Social Democratic Parter Party] and one of them is still the figure who most symbolizes the PS [Socialist Party]. However, if many people have misgivings about each of the candidates in question, it does not require excessive impartiality to recognize that these are all personalities with the political, technical and moral status equal to the dignity of the post for which they are competing, whatever merits or faults each one may have.

This relative similarity in political stature of the three precandidates for chief of state is perhaps the most striking characteristic of the presidential election scheduled for the end of this year, the results of which it is impossible to divine. Unlike what occurred in the two previous presidential elections, this time it is impossible, so close to the beginning, to reduce to its simplest form the final picture in which the issue will be settled.

Conducted far in advance, the opinion polls which have been published up to now give some indication of the voters' intentions, but no reasonable person would guarantee that the election results will not be different from those

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suggested to date. Not only has the presidential campaign barely begun, but before that election we also have the parliamentary elections to come, elections whose results could significantly alter the panorama for the presidential election. For some reason, none of the future contenders for the presidency has supported early legislative elections; each of them may have reason to fear the effects of a "shakeup" of the voters caused by a campaign at the end of the summer and, particularly, of the changes that could result in the parliamentary picture, with the possible formation of new majorities on which the next government could be based.

It would be pointless to attach more importance to the legislative or presidential elections, but the profile of the candidates who are virtually known to be in the race for Belem allows us, at least, to look forward to an interesting presidential campaign. If an election campaign has something of theater about it, we are at least guaranteed that the actors are of a high calibre and will know how to play their roles as few others can, certainly in terms of the ethical and moral aspects without which politics is not worthy of the name. So we are guaranteed a spectacle. We can only hope that the "ending" will be happy.

Lisbon Prefers Pintasilgo, do Amaral

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 19-25 Jul 85 p 13

[Text] Lisbon prefers Lourdes Pintasilgo and Freitas do Amaral, according to a Marktest/O JORNAL survey. The poll also included two other candidates: Mario Soares and Cavaco Silva, who came in third and fourth, respectively.

According to the survey (conducted only in the city of Lisbon and surrounding area), Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo would take 28 percent of the votes, followed by Freitas do Amaral, with 26 percent, while Mario Soares would collect 15 percent and Cavaco Silva 12 percent.

Based on the 1983 elections, the study indicates that 45 percent of those who voted for the PS [Socialist Party] in those elections would give their vote to Mario Soares, who would also attract 9 percent of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] vote, 3 percent of the APU [United People's Alliance] vote and 8 percent of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] vote. The CDS would provide Freitas do Amaral with his largest group of electors (82 percent), but he could count on 54 percent of the PSD electorate, from whom Cavaco Silva would take only 29 percent.

Some 83 percent of those who voted with the APU [in 1983] would vote for Lourdes Pintasilgo, who would also win 24 percent of the PS voters, 2 percent of the PSD voters, 5 percent of the CDS voters and 52 percent of those who voted for "others"

The Marktest survey was conducted, as we said, in the city of Lisbon and environs, with 420 respondents polled in the Largo da Graca, Campo de Ourique, Largo do Calvario, Estrada de Benfica, Paiva Couceiro/Morais Soares and Avenida de Roma (Lisbon) and also in the outlying areas of Linda-a-Velha, Queluz, Amadora, Almada, Cascais and Odivelas.

The information was gathered in a straw vote by secret ballot.

Table: Voting Intentions in Presidential Election (vertical percentages)

<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>How Respondents Voted in 1983 Legislative Elections</u>					
		<u>PS</u>	<u>PSD</u>	<u>APU</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Abstained</u>
Pintasilgo	28	24	2	83	5	52	16
Freitas Amaral	26	10	54	1	82	19	21
Mario Soares	15	45	9	3	8	-	12
Cavaco Silva	19	9	29	5	3	10	15
No response	19	12	6	8	2	19	36
Sample	420	91	80	77	40	21	61

Lemos Ferreira Possibility

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 16 Jul 85 p 5

[Commentary by B.T.: "Lemos Ferreira: Decision in October"]

[Text] The candidacy of Gen Lemos Ferreira for the presidency of the republic will be formalized in October, after the results of the [legislative] elections are known. This information was confirmed to us by a source close to Lemos Ferreira--the same source, incidentally, who assured O DIABO several weeks ago that the current CEMGFA [Armed Forces chief of staff] would run for Belem.

We note here that although our information was first-hand, it was not picked up by any of the rest of the media. The journalistic class has only now shown a glimmer of reaction because the report was carried by the Portuguese news agency ANOP. It is another instance of the incompetency out there.

In any event, we do not look upon the report as anything new. It is simply that the date on which the candidacy will be officially announced was changed because of the political calendar which has since been established.

Lemos Ferreira will wait for the 6 October election results before he announces. At this time, the general is refusing to comment on the possibility of his candidacy. This is natural behavior, particularly because Gen Lemos Ferreira is currently the highest-ranking military officer, on active duty, and this precludes any statements regarding politics.

Reason for Candidacy

According to sources which we contacted, Lemos Ferreira's candidacy is justified now, particularly because all the other presidential possibilities are, in one way or another, linked to political parties.

According to our source, no other true "independent" has yet appeared who is capable of leading the movement for change which the voters certainly want and will certainly make known in the October legislative elections. In the

opinion of the source, this aspiration must be embodied in an individual who is truly "independent" and free of party involvement.

O DIABO has learned that the committee in support of the Lemos Ferreira campaign is being formed. It will include various personalities, particularly some highly respected university figures. Some eminent individuals in economic circles have also pledged their support, although their names were not divulged to us.

Lemos Ferreira will attempt to advance on Belem leading a movement for national reconstruction. The fact that he will accept the possible support of parties such as the CDS and the PSD (although this appears difficult to achieve) was suggested to us as a reasonable move. These forces, we were told, were at one point attempting to find a national common denominator in a civilian candidate. Lemos Ferreira is now attempting to become this common denominator, with the added advantage of being a military officer.

Freitas do Amaral Said Hurt

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 16 Jul 85 p 5

[Commentary by B.T.: "Problems of a Candidate"]

[Text]]Freitas do Amaral's election precampaign will not stop because of the legislative elections; it will be adapted to this circumstance, we learned from a source close to the former CDS leader. The source added that a promotion campaign will be launched this month.

The source also reported that, on 11 August, Freitas do Amaral will be honored in the community of Varzim, on the initiative of a group of his fellow natives.

Meanwhile, the announcement of Lemos Ferreira's intention to run for the presidency was greeted with surprise by sources close to Freitas do Amaral.

Our informant felt that the official announcement of the current CENGFA's candidacy would have serious repercussions, not only for Freitas do Amaral but for the project which he is attempting to carry out. The appearance, within a certain area, of a candidacy linked to Lemos Ferreira would be serious in terms of what it could represent for a whole political area.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

EANES' POLITICAL PLANS REVEALED INDIRECTLY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Jul 85 p 3

[Commentary by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "Ask the President"]

[Text] One of the typical replies which 25 April introduced into our political vocabulary is this one: "You shouldn't be asking me this question; you should ask the president (or the prime minister, or the deputy)."

In addition to being useful, this type of reply sounded well and made sense.

In fact, when a journalist approached a politician (or military officer or labor leader) as he was leaving Belem Palace and asked what position the president of the republic had taken on the matter which had just been discussed, it was natural to reply: "This question should not be put to me, but to the president of the republic."

It was natural for two reasons:

--First, because the president might not want an opinion which he had expressed in a private conversation revealed publicly.

--Second, because the speaker might not be strictly accurate in interpreting the president's position.

The foregoing is by way of preamble to statements made by Engineer Herminio Martinho at the end of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] National Council, according to which General Eanes would assume leadership of the party in the first quarter of 1986, when the party would be turned over to "its natural leader, Antonio Ramalho Eanes."

In view of the definite tone of this statement, two conclusions may be reached.

One is that the president promised Herminio Martinho that he would take over the party leadership at the time announced.

The reason: since the Eanist party has condemned the lack of morality which has characterized the actions of the other parties and has, in fact, proposed to bring new morality to party life by practicing politics on an "ethical foundation," it is unthinkable that the party would begin its activity by attempting to dupe the Portuguese people.

In other words, if Herminio Martinho were not absolutely sure of General Eanes' future intentions, he would not have made the statements he made, seducing the electorate and winning its vote with false promises.

The second conclusion to be drawn is that Ramalho Eanes authorized Engineer Herminio Martinho to announce his future association with the PRD.

In fact, considering Martinho's steadfast loyalty to the president, it is impossible to believe that Martinho would have committed a breach of trust, reporting to the press an intention which Eanes had communicated strictly in confidence.

At this point, we could ask why the president of the republic did not explain his relations with the PRD to the country and allowed others to speak for him.

Could it be that Eanes is playing a "double game," making promises in private without committing himself in public so that, if things go badly, he can retreat from affiliating with the party?

This possibility is ruled out, because this game would not be honest and nothing in the president's past conduct would lead anyone to doubt his honesty.

Therefore, there is only one explanation.

General Eanes does not want to lose the independent image which he enjoys among the Portuguese and thus thought it better not to announce his decision to lead the PRD.

On the other hand, he does not want the PRD to suffer a political disaster (which would jeopardize his political future, since it would make him the leader of an insignificant party), so the president did something seldom seen anywhere in the world: he authorized a third party to communicate his intentions to the country.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

EANIST PARTY MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN PRD IN POLLS

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 12-18 Jul 85 p 11

[Text] If legislative elections were held today and the PS [Socialist Party] PSD [Social Democratic Party], APU [United People's Alliance] and CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] were competing with a party clearly identified with Gen Ramalho Eanes ("Eanist Party/ party associated with Eanes"), this party would win, taking 27.3 percent of the votes, according to a Marktest/ O JORNAL national survey. The results would be very different if the survey used the label PRD (Democratic Renewal Party). According to another survey, covering only the Lisbon region, the PRD would only win 8.1 percent of the votes.

In this latter survey, conducted last weekend in the Lisbon region, the information was gathered in a mock election by secret ballot. According to the results, the PSD would receive the most votes (21.9 percent), followed by the APU, with 19.3 percent. The PS, which is now the most popular party, would move to third place, with 18.6 percent, and the CDS would win 13.5 percent, whereas the PRD would not win more than 8.1 percent. Blank and voided votes would account for 18.6 percent. In the survey, the sample was previously broken down by sex and age; i.e. 216 [males] and 204 females, totaling 420, with 144 of the respondents in the age group from 18 to 30 years, 145 from 31 to 44 years old and 131 over 45 years of age. The PRD, which received only 8.1 percent of the votes, was preferred by the males (9.3 percent) more than the females (6.9 percent). By age group, the greatest percentages came from the age groups 31-44 (9.7 percent) and over 45 (9.2 percent). In the age group from 18 to 30 years, the percentage was 5.5 percent.

These results reflect one of the great concerns of the PRD leaders, who are more aware than anyone of the electoral advantages of being easily and, if possible, graphically identified with Gen Ramalho Eanes.

APU and CDS Up

If elections were held only among the parties which currently make up the Assembly of the Republic, abstentions would rise to 28.2 percent (they amounted to 24.2 percent in 1983) and the results would be as follows:

The PS would register the greatest decline, from 37.1 percent of the votes in 1983 to 27.6 percent now, thus losing its lead.

The lead would go to the PSD, which took 27.9 percent of the votes in 1983 and would hold on to this percentage.

The APU and the CDS (18.6 percent and 12.9 percent, respectively, in 1983) would be the only parties to gain: the APU coalition (PCP/MDB [Portuguese Communist Party/ Portuguese Democratic Movement] would take 21 percent of the votes and the CDS would take 18 percent.

Another reading of these results, concentrating on the losses and gains in vote transfers based on electoral percentages in 1983, shows that the most "loyal" voters are those of the APU and the CDS: 84.1 percent and 77.2 percent, respectively. The PS maintained the loyalty of 58.5 percent of its voters and the PSD maintained 69.3 percent. The PS had the largest number of former voters who would now abstain (31.2 percent), followed by the PSD (14.5 percent), the APU (12.3 percent) and the CDS (11.3 percent).

Regarding the 1983 voters who would now switch to other parties, the most accentuated "flight" would occur in the PSD (16.2 percent), followed by the CDS (11.5 percent) and the PS (10.3 percent). Some 3.6 percent would transfer away from the APU.

As mentioned, the situation would be very different if the "Eanist party" were competing as well. Marktest itself notes that "it is important to point out that the new party introduced in this survey was always understood as the 'Eanist party/ party associated with Eanes,'" adding: "We feel that the results would be very different if we had used the label 'PRD.'"

The difference has already been observed--or at least an indication of such a difference, since the survey which used the name "Eanist party/party associated with Eanes," held in June, was national in scope and the other survey, in which the PRD label was used, was restricted to the Lisbon region.

Changes Caused by 'Eanist Party' Label

If an "Eanist party/party associated with Eanes" competed in an election now, the PS would drop sharply, to third place.

In fact, according to the Marktest/ O JORNAL survey, the PS would register the greatest decline, putting it in third place, with about 17.7 percent of the vote. Although the PSD would also register a loss, it would remain in second place with 21.4 percent, while the APU would drop 4 points, winning about 14.2 percent of the vote, thus going to fourth [sic] place, and the CDS would be the only unaffected party; it would even register a rise to 16 percent.

If there were an "Eanist party/ party associated with Eanes," it would take most of its votes from the PS and the APU, which means that the percentage of the "faithful," based on the 1983 elections, would decline.

Regarding the parties' losses and gains if the Eanist party competed, we see that 41.7 percent of the PS voters would remain "loyal," as would 65.6 percent of the PSD electorate, 67.8 percent of the APU electorate and 70.7 percent of the CDS electorate. The "Eanist party" would absorb 40.5 percent of the "defectors" from the PS, 27.2 percent of the "defectors" from the APU,

6.9 percent of the "defectors" from the PSD and 4.8 percent of the "defectors" from the CDS.

On the other hand, there would be a decline in abstentions among voters in the PS (11.1 percent), the PSD (also 11.1 percent) and the APU (3.7 percent, but an increase in abstentions (13.2 percent) in the CDS electorate.

Table 1: Results of Marktest National Survey, Using 'Eanist Party' Label

<u>Party</u>	<u>1983 Vote</u>	<u>June 1985 Survey</u>
"Eanist party"	[-]	[27.3]
PSD	27.9	21.4
PS	37.1	17.7
CDS	12.9	17.0
APU	18.6	14.2
Others	3.5	3.4
Abstentions	24.2	17.5

Table 2: Results of Lisbon Area Survey, Using 'PRD' Label

<u>Party</u>	<u>1983 Vote</u>	<u>June 1985 Survey</u>
PSD	27.9	21.9
APU	18.6	19.3
PS	37.1	18.6
CDS	12.9	13.5
PRD	-	8.1
Blank and void	-	18.6

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PINTASILGO SOLUTIONS SEEN BELONGING TO 'FANTASY' REALM

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 25 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Luisa Manoel de Vilhena: "Prestidigitator"]

[Text] What is marvelous about Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is the ease with which she achieves the disappearance, with a smile, of all the complicated and troublesome problems of Portuguese reality, substituting them with the enticing facility of obvious and rapid solutions which she holds for us up her sleeve--like a prestidigitator; always smiling, and without anyone understanding anything about it, she transforms the grey, used-up, crumpled handkerchief into a new, fresh, pink one that jumps from her hands.

A disastrous economic situation? Unemployment? Inflation? The Portuguese people's buying power decreasing by 20 percent a year instead of growing, like in well-administered countries? The enormous housing problems? The failure of nationalized enterprises devouring all the scarce resources? The tragic occurrence of unpaid wages? The precarious conditions in private enterprises?

Maria de Lourdes smiles. Were she to be elected president, nothing of all this would continue to occur. How? Easy: it would be enough to implement the constitution, to promote cultural groups, to provide an impulse for all forms of social-mindedness.... The person who is experienced in international organisms understands very well the way in which these problems can be solved.

Will the candidate find it necessary to establish a consonance between the presidency, the majority and the government? Does she think she would dissolve Parliament if she were elected?

Maria de Lourdes smiles. No, of course not. Alliances, up to now, have all been bad, but parties have all been good, from the PC to the CDS. It is only necessary for them to work harmoniously. Only that. So easy! If she were elected, consonance would exist by itself, because Pintasilgo would see to it that parties should work following her orientations. Or did she say the opposite? That if she were elected she would adapt herself to any government and any majority? It was not made quite clear, but it is not awfully important, because, in any case, the fundamental principle is right there: harmoniousness and facility. How wonderful!

NATO? But of course, it is in the constitution. But what is important is to be independent, to cultivate both East and West, North as well as South. The Common Market? Sure, but also the other countries. Obviously, the Third World. And all the other worlds.

Wonderful. Maria de Lourdes does not exclude anything. She does not exclude anyone. She launches an appeal to the romantic left, to the populist left, to the hard left, to the conservative right, to the conservative Church and to the progressive Church, to all "God's people," to Portuguese women--who are not conservative--and to those who are. To all the countries in the world. ("If all the children in the world would hold hands...")

One could almost say that Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is a candidate to the presidency of the UN or the UNESCO. But no: She specifies: her political candidacy involves the entire area of Portuguese interests. It is a wonder. Because, we are told, Portugal's interests are to be found in the unification, around Pintasilgo, of all the rights and all the lefts in the world, of all the parties, of socialism and capitalism, of Moscow and Washington, of all the large Lusophone areas from Rio de Janeiro to Launda, of the Roman Curia, of the theology of liberation--everything besides the problems. No problems. The existing ones will be quickly overcome if only the candidate wins the election. Maria de Lourdes smiles. She always smiles. But the error is ours. It is not right that we should want to know the secrets of a prestidigitator when he makes marvelous things happen on the scene, things that do not belong to our concrete reality. To watch a prestidigitator is not to understand, it is an illusion, it is a spectacle. It happens up there, on the scene, but is not applicable to real-life problems.

Our grey, sorry handkerchief will not become new and pink through the magic of optimistic gab, and no promise, no matter how smiling, will make our garden sprout gold or will bring a bevy of white doves into our room through the window. But we are grateful to Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo for her hour of fantasy she graciously offered us. She has a pleasant smile. Her manner is affable. And in this troubling world in which we must live, in this long-suffering Portugal that is our only country, it is good to hear a candidate who can transform our grey prospects and our difficult future into a refreshing pink scenario. What a pity that this cannot happen! What a pity that we do have to face problems that the smiling candidate cannot solve through her utopian theories!

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

ARABS PRESSURE ADMINISTRATION NOT TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL

Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 1 Jul 85 pp 24-28

[Article by Juan Giron Roger: "Evidence of Arab Blackmail Against Felipe"]

[Text] The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel brings pressures of every type. The radical Arab regimes are opposed, the Arab League states that Madrid will not take this step without an Israeli peace initiative and the Gulf countries have warned Fernando Moran of the consequences of a rapprochement with Tel Aviv.

The year will not end without an exchange of ambassadors between Madrid and Tel Aviv. Last week in The Hague, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez acknowledged that the establishment of relations would occur "on a date not far in the future" when peace negotiations begin in the Middle East. However, he stressed that no precept of international law requires EEC members to have diplomatic relations with Israel. Tension in the Arab world is growing visibly as the decisive moment approaches. They ask which Israel will be recognized by our country: the 1948 one or the one with successive annexations since 1967? Diplomatic sources consulted by TIEMPO revealed that the document that will eventually be signed "will not mention the occupied territories," but will include the "establishment of diplomatic relations" (because recognition by Spain is already a fact). It will allude to "continued defense of the just Arab cause with special emphasis on the Palestinian people's right to self-determination."

Arab contacts with the Spanish Government intensified beginning last 6 November when the secretary general of the Arab League, Chadli Klibi, came to Madrid to preside over the 10th Meeting for European-Arab Dialogue. The displeasure toward Spain of the legations from the Magreb and the Middle East had already been noted by reports that the ambassadors sent to their respective countries: Spain was getting too close to Israel. On 12 November, a dossier classified "top secret" was sent by the General Directorate of Foreign Affairs of the Arab League in Tunis to all the Arab governments. The document--which we publish for the first time in the West--notes Klibi's contacts with Spanish authorities about the establishment of Spanish-Israeli relations. Classified "sirri yiddan" (top secret), the document indicates that Prime Minister Gonzalez told Chadli Klibi: "Spain is going through a very delicate situation right now, referring to the establishment of relations with Israel....The government is

pressured to establish these relations and, at the same time, the Arab world continually expresses its concern about the Spanish Government's position. It will still be patient and careful before beginning any initiative." It was also emphasized that "the Spanish decision will be free and based on Spain's national interests." At the same time, "Zionist forces violently pressure Spain to force it to recognize Israel." The report continues: "The Israeli campaign in Spain is more active today but the Spanish Government will not take any gratuitous step because it is convinced of the need for Israel to make an initiative toward the progress of peace so that recognition be in harmony with the principles cited on more than one occasion." After indicating that "the relations between Israeli leader Shimon Peres and the Socialist Internationale are good," the dossier stated: "There are still difficulties to be ironed out with Israeli leaders." The Spanish Government has resolved to ask for help from the European social democrats in the search for peace in the Middle East. The secret report also states that our country "will contact all parties at the opportune time to avoid any surprise announcement of positions and initiatives."

Recommendation

According to completely reliable sources, another communication from the Arab League around that time recommended "urgent actions by the Arabs to abandon the current policy of passiveness and achieve results." On 14 December, Klibi sent a confidential letter to Felipe Gonzalez. It was written in a cold and official tone with the heading: "Mr Prime Minister." The contents of the letter explained that "to recognize Israel now, when it is following an expansionist policy, can only be interpreted by the Arab world--which likes the Spanish people so much--as a very surprising decision. To go ahead with recognition of Israel will produce a very negative reaction in the Arab world. I hope you take this letter into consideration." It took Prime Minister Gonzalez 4 months to draw up a response delivered 10 May by our ambassador in Tunis, Antonio Fournier Bermejo. Its contents would cause a storm.

Felipe Gonzalez' letter acknowledged for the first time the Spanish decision to exchange ambassadors with Israel. The complete text of the document states: "Mr secretary general: For its national interests, Spain wants to have relations with all states based on the principle of generality. The Spanish Government does not consider the establishment of diplomatic relations with a country the same as recognizing its good conduct or giving its blessing to a foreign or domestic policy. This abnormal situation where we do not have diplomatic relations with Israel will be corrected when Spain feels it is appropriate. We will not heed the pressures brought to bear from either direction. The objective of this initiative is to create a means of dialogue with a state that has diplomatic relations with all the countries in Western Europe of which Spain is a part. It does not seem logical to me that we be required to act in a basically opposite way than the rest of our geographic and cultural sector. Diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel, when they take place, will have a significance in the political scenario I explained to your excellency during our November meeting."

Prime Minister Gonzalez continued in his letter to Klibi: "This establishment of relations in no way means that Spain is abandoning its policy of support for

the just Arab causes, especially rejection of the occupation of Arab lands and recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. Spain will encourage dialogue between Europe and the Middle East, using its knowledge of the Arab world, friendship and understanding of Arab sentiments, especially because it is impossible to work for peace and justice if communication with some of the parties is disrupted. Spain carefully follows the continual initiatives proposed to achieve a just and permanent peace in the area. The Spanish Government supports all the noble efforts and will direct its actions--including its relations with Israel--toward improvement of the progress toward peace in the Middle East. Therefore, as to our strong friendships, I don't see any reason for the Arab world to worry or be disappointed. I hope that our relations and trust remain good. Accept my highest regard" (Felipe Gonzalez Marquez, prime minister).

Growing Displeasure

When the secretary general of the Arab League sent a copy of the letter to the Arab governments, the displeasure increased. Emilio Barcia Garcia-Villamil, the Spanish ambassador to Kuwait, was urgently summoned by the Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs. He told him that his government did not approve of the Spanish position. It was a bad scene for Ambassador Barcia who did not know about the letter Felipe Gonzalez sent Chadli Klibi. Precisely to avoid incidents of that type, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs just sent complete information to our legations in Europe, Washington and Beijing. Reports have also been received from the Spanish embassies in the Arab world about the consequences of the initiation of Spanish-Israeli relations.

Diplomatic sources consulted indicated that the immense majority of the Arab countries "assume Spanish relations with Israel are a fait accompli. They yield to the inevitable although they hope that the conditions will be favorable." According to these sources, positive aspects of the diplomatic exchange would include the exploitation of the Israeli antiterrorist technology and techniques. (It is assumed that members of State Security have received advice from the Israeli secret service, Mossad, and the Israeli domestic security services, Sheirutei Bitajon.) There would also be new markets and agricultural collaboration.

Spain, however, is being extremely careful about taking that step. According to reliable sources, a secret resolution of the Council of Cooperation in the Gulf held last fall in Kuwait advocates the suspension of relations with Spain by the six countries in it (Kuwait, Qatar, Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman) if relations between the two countries begin. If the matter is postponed indefinitely, a motion by the same organization proposes that Spanish enterprises be given preferential treatment.

According to the prestigious Lebanese weekly AS-SAYAD, Israel is devoting a budget of \$500 million to propaganda about establishing relations with Spain. According to the same source, the Madrid synagogue began to issue visas at the beginning of the 1970's after the United States pressured the Spanish Government for Israel. During those years, a Department of Spanish Affairs was established in Israel under the Presidency of the Israeli Government. It was directed by

General David Eleazar who organized the infrastructure and the strategy for penetration when Franco's death seemed imminent in 1973. Jose Maria de Areilza, minister of foreign affairs, and Fraga, minister of interior, assumed Spain's position toward Israel would change. Fraga evolved toward pro-Israeli positions, a complete change from his stand in 1967 when, as minister of information and tourism, he said in Beirut that his government would not recognize Israel and had even banned Zionist films or those that contained Zionist propaganda.

Israel's permanent representative to the World Organization of Tourism, Samuel Hadas, could become the first Israeli ambassador to our country although Elyahu Barak--former Israeli ambassador to Colombia and an expert in antiterrorism--has also been mentioned. He is now responsible for the Israeli military industry sector in Spain. Moshe Shoham and Gregorio Maranon y Bertran de Lys, president of Roche, head up the Chamber for Development of Spanish-Israeli Economic Exchange, an organization supported by the Catalan-Israeli Chamber of Commerce (based in Barcelona) and the Israeli-Spanish Chamber of Commerce (based in Tel Aviv).

Israel is interested in the modernization in Spain of the Mirage-III by IAI [Israeli Aviation Industries] and has already made deals through Ta'as-IMI [Israeli Military Industries] to sell us 4,000 M-94 90mm missiles for M-47 and M-48 combat vehicle weapons. (The Spanish Army has 512 of these.) It is also possible that the 72 M-47 vehicles that our Armed Forces plan to manufacture will contain the Israeli system. It is said that Spain spends about 1 billion pesetas per year on Israeli military products. This could be multiplied by five in the future.

In his visit to Spain, Ronald Reagan brought up the topic of recognition of Israel. The most influential Jewish lobbies in the United States--United Jewish Appeal and American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee--had let him know their interest in this. A few weeks earlier, David Kimji, general director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had made a quick visit to express to Manuel Sassot, general director for Africa and the Middle East, his concern about recognition.

Unofficial Relations

Economic relations between the two countries qualitatively and quantitatively surpass those recorded between Spain and certain Arab countries. According to a well-known Israeli financier with considerable influence among Spanish businessmen, "Spain maintains underground, embarrassed relations with Israel due to Spain's passive hostility toward Israel." The truth is that last year our country imported Israeli products worth \$34.4 million and exported products worth \$78.3 million to Israel. That is much more than to Arab countries like South Yemen (2.5 million), Sudan (6.4), Qatar (7.2), North Yemen (8.8), Bahrain (11.6) and Oman (13.7). We sell Israel cars, tractors and chemical products and we buy fertilizer, electronic technology and precious stones from it.

According to Israeli professor Tobias, in 5 years Spanish-Israeli trade could reach \$500 million.

In October, the Israeli Weitzmann Institute will hold its annual congress in Spain (Madrid-Barcelona) in collaboration with the CSIC [Higher Council for Scientific Research]. Recognition will be imminent then or already a fact. It remains to be seen if the Arabs consider Spain's "wafa'" (loyalty) toward them weakened. Some countries in the Gulf have told Fernando Moran that they would take measures "to treat Spain the same as Zaire." (The first African country to reestablish relations with Israel was the target of economic sanctions and the withdrawal of Arab ambassadors.) Spanish diplomatic sources did not deny that, when the time comes, the security measures in our missions in Arab countries with radical regimes could be tightened because a violent reaction cannot be discarded.

7717

CSO: 3548/152

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

DANISH SUBMARINES GET SWEDISH HELP

Danish-Swedish Exercise

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Jun 85 p 1

[Text] On Tuesday, the Danish submarine "Killer Whale" dove down to the bottom of the southern part of the Stockholm archipelago north of Nynashamn, not far from the naval base.

The highly probable submarine from NATO member Denmark is playing a significant role in a submarine rescue exercise involving the Danish and Swedish navies. Since the 1950's, Sweden has had an agreement with Denmark to rescue submarine crews in peacetime.

The naval salvage ship "Belos" made its first rescue on Tuesday when it lifted Danish submarine sailors from a depth of 30 meters.

"Belos" is testing its complete submarine rescue system, which can also be used in the final stage of anti-submarine warfare when a foreign sub is disarmed.

NATO Submarine 'Rescued' Near Musko

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Jun 85 p 60

[Article by Anders Ohman: "NATO Submarine 'Rescued' Near Musko"]

[Text] Jimmy Larsen, a 24-year-old submarine sailor from Fredericia, Denmark, breathed with relief after he climbed out of the rescue chamber "Svea" onto the naval salvage ship "Belos."

"I wasn't going to escape this time, it was all over for me," he said after having travelled 25 meters up through the water from his ship the "Killer Whale," which lay motionless on the sea floor in a position directly north of Nynashamn.

Swedish and Danish sailors are practicing submarine rescue for two days this week. These exercises have been repeated yearly since the 1950's. The Swedish fleet has been mostly in Denmark. Now for the first time the action took place in the Stockholm archipelago.

"This exercise is important to us since we now have a complete system for salvaging submarines," says Sten Svenlund, head of the fleet's first submarine flotilla.

The Danish-Swedish exercises were, of course, given new life by the foreign underwater activity which has been directed toward the Swedish coast since 1980.

It was exciting to get to see a "probable" rather than a "possible" sub not far from the Swedish navy's top secret base south of Musko, the scene of the submarine incident in 1981 which became a world event. The "Killer Whale" from NATO member Denmark--a 500-ton built 1956-63, with 600 tons displacement, a 35-man crew, diesel-electric propulsion, and four torpedo launching tubes--looked black and menacing out in the mist over the archipelago.

The navy had petitioned to be allowed to practice within a militarily restricted area, but the government turned down the request. A practice area directly north Nynashamn was used instead.

The "Killer Whale" submerged and landed quietly on the sea floor.

The "Belos" anchored nearby in the calm water. The ship is able to set anchor at a depth of 100-150 meters. Then preparations for lifting the submarine crew were begun.

In an actual submarine rescue operation, the period of the search itself is the most difficult and time consuming.

In the past, a rescue crew had only a few days to find a damaged submarine and rescue the men. Modern subs have more endurance, and now the "Belos" has up to a week to find a damaged boat.

A high-frequency hydrophone is used in the search. It resembles underwater radar, which sends out waves that bounce back from the object; the echoes can be read on a screen. Then the picture on the screen must be interpreted: is it a submarine, a shoal of fish, stones, or something else?

The "Killer Whale" appeared clearly on the hydrophone screen.

There was no search period in today's session, only a rescue of the crew. The leader of the exercise was the commander-in-chief of the Danish submarine squadron, Captain P. B. Nielson, who was glad at the same time that the Danish navy will be able to increase its fleet of submarines.

The rescue chamber "Svea" was able to lift out the submarine crew. The chamber is well tested; it has existed since the 1940's and has been modified several times. The submarine rescue occurs under atmospheric conditions, so that the sailors in distress are taken out of the water in their overalls and shoes. It looks extremely comfortable.

The rescue chamber is lowered down to the submarine on a cable which had been attached to the sub's hull earlier. Then the chamber is placed firmly on the submarine with the help of hydraulic pressure--something like the stopper in a kitchen sink. Then the pressure is equalized, a hatch can be opened in the chamber, and the crew climbs in. In an actual rescue, the chamber can lift seven men at a time.

The most dangerous moment in the salvage operation occurs when the "Svea" reaches the surface. When the water is rough, the 8-ton rescue chamber can begin to swing on its cables, and this is dangerous. Excessive turbulence can reduce the opportunities the "Belos" has to complete its rescue mission safely.

Atmospheric diving with the rescue chamber "Svea" is possible to a depth of approximately 150 meters.

The latest addition to the submarine rescue system of the "Belos" is the URF, a ship that looks like a mini-sub, which is able to descend 450 meters and save a submarine crew of up to 25 men at one time.

The Danish navy will be able to test this during the second day of the exercises.

12573

CSO: 8150/1655

MILITARY

DENMARK

AIR FORCE PILOTS ASSOCIATION SPOKESMAN ON DRAIN TO AIRLINES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Jul 85 p 8

[Op Ed Article by Birger Kagan, First Lieutenant, Pilots' Representative at Vaerlose Air Base, and Board Member of the Air Force Pilots Association]

[Text] From time to time, under panic-stricken headlines, articles appear warning of mass defections of pilots from the air force. Each time, this gives rise to the same old discussions concerning keeping pilots in the air force and/or establishing a civilian pilot training school from which the airlines could recruit pilots. Many believe that, in this way, it would be possible to end the "raids" on military pilots who have undergone expensive training. It is certainly reasonable to present these ideas when the question comes up but, on the one hand, this is an "old" topic that has often been discussed and, secondly, the debate has not yet led to the establishment of a civilian pilot training school in this country, as we know. Supposedly, the idea behind the establishment of a civilian school is that pilots could be trained for the civil market for a fraction of the cost of training a military pilot. Many figures have been mentioned, but the figure quoted most often indicates that 70 to 80 percent of the cost could be saved. It may be assumed that the experts have taken everything into account when they present these figures, including the cost of operating the planes, wages, fuel costs, and thousands of other things that must be included. It can be stated, however, that the military leaders and politicians involved have forgotten one thing.

The reason why military pilots want to go over to the civil sector is simply that military pilots are offered wages and working conditions that are much too inadequate. For one reason or another, they believe they can stop the loss of pilots by creating a surplus of pilots instead of creating the necessary conditions so that pilots will want to remain in the military. Do they really believe that they can make centralized decisions so that Per will fly for SAS and Paul for Maersk Air, while the military will hold on to Peter? Who says that the airlines will obligate themselves to take the product offered by a civilian pilot training school? If an airline must choose between two applicants, then obviously it will take the one who possesses the qualifications the airline requires of its pilots, regardless of what it has cost to train him.

What will prevent a military pilot from applying for a civilian job after his

10-year military obligation has expired? If military pilots see their working conditions as so unsatisfactory, what will prevent them, for example, from leaving the air force and becoming independent? What will prevent them from seeking work under conditions that seem more attractive? Finally, it is predictable that young people with an interest in flying will look first for the highest paying job. At present, that means civilian jobs. If they should fail in their civilian career but retain their interest in flying, then they may have to be satisfied with a career as a military pilot.

These are harsh words, to be sure, but as the situation appears now they are justified and those in charge should be given the following warning.

Stop fooling each other and yourselves. With the present imbalance in wages and working conditions, a civilian pilot training school would mean only that becoming a military pilot would be a secondary choice.

Those who are in the air force cannot avoid noticing the methods that are used to hold on to air force pilots. When pilots see that every conceivable method is being used except improving their conditions, it will be almost impossible to make them stay. With the advanced systems at its disposal today, the air force cannot be satisfied with "crumbs from the table of the rich."

What, then, does the air force need in order to compete with the civil companies? The answer is quite simple.

Wages and working conditions must be brought into line with those of the pilot market as a whole. Unfortunately, politicians and military leaders often say that they cannot and will not compete with the airlines in the area of wages. This must be because the government wage system, despite "modernization" of government activities, is not suited to that type of wage policy, since it cannot be because reasonable wages would break the military budget. If paying considerably higher wages would break the budget, then it is difficult to understand how the budget can withstand paying several hundred kroner each year on training. In addition, it must be said that the newly trained young pilots do not have several thousand hours of air time like the pilots they are replacing. Perhaps there is simply no alternative to competitive wages and, especially, working conditions.

The unsatisfactory aspect of the working conditions is that the general regulations used by the entire military do not consider the special conditions and tasks of the individual units. As a result, the good intentions behind decentralization of government activities do not seem to work. Apparently, even the most minute detail must be resolved at the highest level, since lower level officers are not given the necessary authority. As a result, the system of cooperation is seen as an illusion. This is unfortunate, since multifaceted and exciting work is a strong drawing card, but exciting and challenging work does not compensate for the economic advantages offered by civil employment.

The pilots and many others believe it would be madness not to rectify this situation as soon as possible. The fate of the people is in the hands of

the authorities. If no arrangements are made to keep pilots in the air force, then it will cost the taxpayers more than 1 billion kroner in training costs over the next 3 or 4 years. To the extent possible (there are many possibilities and no obstacles), the pilots will find better paying jobs and will experience a marked improvement in their situation in their new career. After all, the need for pilots is great not only in Scandinavia. Large numbers of pilots are needed elsewhere in the world, as well. In the United States alone, where it is (almost) as common to fly as to drive a car, it is estimated that there will be a shortage of 4,000 pilots during the next 5 years. As a result, there will be a strong demand that must be met.

In addition, many people speak only of "fighter pilots." The fact is that the air force also has transport pilots and helicopter pilots. It should be made clear that these pilots have undergone the same training as fighter pilots, but have received additional training in flying heavy planes or helicopters. When these pilots choose to leave the air force, both fighter training and supplementary training in heavy aircraft are wasted. One example is the famous helicopter rescue service, which is presently undermanned. The situation may soon become worse, since at least six pilots are exempt from the general regulations of 1979. If they cannot receive the same compensation as their colleagues, then they obviously will not be satisfied. As a result, they may be expected to seek employment elsewhere, where their helicopter experience is valued more highly. At present, this means the expanding oil exploration activity in the North Sea. This is not because it is more exciting or more satisfying work (after all, what is more satisfying than rescuing people in need), but because the wages and working conditions are much more attractive.

For many years the conditions offered helicopter rescue personnel have resulted in much dissatisfaction, although this has not been made public. It must be remembered that these people are extremely loyal and dedicated to their work. We should not lose sight of the fact that these people need the support of the system, even when they are not involved in extraordinary rescue missions under dangerous and difficult circumstances. It appears that the system is interested in the helicopter rescue service only when the system can reap the good will of the people as a result of actions by the service, for example after rescue missions that make a favorable impression on the people. Regardless of what anyone might think, it is an objective fact that hovering over a ship that is out of control at night in a raging fire is not without its dangerous elements. Thus, even those who confess with panic in their voice that there is a shortage of F-16 pilots in the air force must not forget that there is also a shortage of pilots to fly rescue helicopters. There might even be those who believe that the latter is more difficult to live with than the former.

It will be interesting to see which course the responsible authorities choose. One thing is certain, however. A civil pilot training school will in no way improve the unsatisfactory conditions of military pilots and this is the fundamental reason why it is so easy for the civil airlines to recruit experienced pilots from the air force. This recruiting will not be stopped by the training of "inter-Scandinavian airline pilots," but only by making military pilots feel compelled to remain in the air force.

MILITARY

DENMARK

TOWN COUNCIL WELCOMES STATIONING OF IHAWK MISSILES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Jul 85 p 2

[Article: "Controversial Missiles to Small Funen Community"]

[Text] A majority of the Langeskov municipal council representatives decided at a meeting yesterday to permit the establishment of IHAWK squadrons, which later will be moved to a military exercise area in Hojstrup near Odense.

Because of opposition to a proposed local ordinance for the Odense region, where the military plans to station the missiles, it was decided that they would be deployed initially near Ronninge Sogaard in the municipality of Langeskov.

The majority of representatives at the Langeskov Municipal Council decided to grant a zoning change, so that no actual local plan for the area will be required. Outside the council meeting, about 100 people marched in protest to City Hall where the People's Movement Against the IHAWK in East Funen delivered petitions with about 800 signatures against the missiles.

There are less than 6,000 inhabitants of the municipality of Langeskov. In the municipality of Odense, the Social Democrats, the Socialist People's Party, the Left-Socialist Party, and the Communists oppose deployment of the missiles in the training area near Hojstrup, which is close to populated areas.

9336

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MILITARY

DENMARK/GREENLAND

MINISTER CRITICIZED FOR HANDLING COMPLAINTS OF THULE RESIDENTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jul 85 pp 8-9

[Op Ed Article by Jens Brosted and Mads Faegteborg, Institute for Eskimo Studies, University of Copenhagen]

[Text] It is exciting to hear people talk about our book, Thule: Trappers and Military Bases. It is especially exciting when it is the minister in charge of this area who has decided to give the public some insight into our book and, thereby, into the Thule matter. On the other hand, it is less exciting to hear the minister of Greenlandic affairs, in his comments on the book, turn certain facts upside down and insert a number of new cock-and-bull stories, thus perpetuating a long and sad tradition at the Ministry of Greenlandic Affairs in connection with the Thule issue.

During a meeting at the ministry on 24 June, Greenlandic Affairs Minister Tom Hoyem promised the people of Thule that he would treat the Thule matter seriously. In a radio statement on 28 June and in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE of 9 July, however, he cast suspicions on the motives of the book and, thus, on the entire Thule issue. The minister is a politician and, politically, he is obviously uncomfortable with the issue. As a result, he stated that the book was written for a circle of our friends, i.e. the circle of friends who belong to SF (Socialist People's Party) and VF (Left-Socialist Party) and, by definition, it is a vicious attack on the United States, American bases in Greenland, Denmark, and the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry. Of course, we also suffer from a chronic disbelief in the Greenlanders' ability to handle independence! "But nevertheless, the book is well written and sober." We fail to see the seriousness of this presentation.

In brief, Thule: Trappers and Military Bases deals with the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Thule base in 1951, the forced eviction of the people, and the state's handling of compensation claims made by the Thule Hunters Council in 1959. Based on documents from the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, local archives in Thule, proceedings of the Thule Hunters Council, and interviews with various officials and people who traveled in Thule during the time in question, we have given a somewhat different and, at the same time, much more detailed presentation of the Thule question than that given to the public by the department (later ministry). By providing prolific notes, we have given the reader the opportunity to check our statements.

The minister says it is a gross distortion when we speak of "falsified history." He writes, "The truth is that everyone was acting under the pressure of an extreme shortage of time." Here the minister points to the Korean War. But this is incorrect. The United States showed an interest in Thule long before the war broke out and the decision was made to force the people to move 2 years after the base was established and the war had been underway for 2 years. In the spring of 1953 the United States turned to the Danish government and asked for permission to annex the peninsula on which the Thule colony and the Uummanaq housing area were located. The Americans wanted to expand the defense system of the base. If, for security reasons, they chose to misinform the Danish people at that time, they have had ample opportunity to straighten out the historical facts. Instead, they have chosen to ridicule those who have come out with the truth. Now the minister is trying his hand at political mudslinging.

The minister accuses us of having dishonest motives and making undocumented statements. He says we are taking a jab at the United States and the American bases in Greenland. He points out some relationships and consequences of the American military activity in Greenland, especially in Thule. But if the minister wants to talk about jabs, then they must be directed toward the responsible Danish officials and politicians who were (are) unable to compensate the Greenlandic people for the defense of the "entire Western world." According to article VI of the 1951 agreement, the United States must "show due respect to all laws, regulations, and customs." This obligation has been ignored in Thule and excuses are of no use here. The minister must realize that if our message had been anti-American, our book would have included, for example, the story of how the United States, through its ambassador in Denmark, tried to avoid paying the bill for those who were forced to move.

On 25 June 1985 the municipality of Thule resubmitted to the Danish government its request for compensation. The book Thule: Trappers and Military Bases was included as an appendix. Perhaps the minister finds it disturbing that the municipality of Thule could use a rough draft we sent it in September 1984. The truth is that the people of Thule have been trying since 1958 to receive compensation for the loss of a rich hunting ground and the economic losses involved in the doubling of the population of Inglefield Bredning. Thule has tried repeatedly to have this demand met--without success. Small wonder, then, that Thule needed the documentation from the Danish sources, which so far has been withheld from them.

After Thule received our preliminary material, a committee of older citizens of Thule was appointed. These people had either been active in the Hunters Council in 1953 or experienced the eviction. Shortly before the book was sent for publication, a report arrived from this group of citizens. It was included as an appendix to the book. One item of interest here was that a hunter whose name had been used by the department and by the press, who had moved voluntarily before the authorities stepped in, declared that his name had been misused by the authorities.

The minister has talked about clinging to the past. But who is clinging? Since

1953 the department has used this hunter's name and the authority of the Hunters Council as a cover and as legitimacy for the forced eviction. Now Thule has finally gained some insight into its own case and the municipality has chosen, in a new and better way, to continue its old tenacious battle to obtain compensation for the loss of its large, economically significant hunting grounds. If the minister would look back at his department's dirty history in this case, could he seriously advise the people of Thule to simply seek advice and guidance from the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry? Is it not time for an independent investigation and evaluation?

The term "forced eviction" has an evil sound with unpleasant associations. The move from Thule was not a physically violent affair, but historically there has been some question as to whether or not it was a forced removal. In the book, we placed far more emphasis on objective criteria, which show that the Inughuit, the people of Thule, have been subjected to compulsory measures that are deserving of compensation.

1. Establishment of the base in the middle of the traditional hunting grounds of the Inughuits and in conflict with their customs--without authority in law and contrary to the guarantees the government had given in parliament;
2. The government's decision to expand the base in August 1953, 2.5 months after the people had moved;
3. The prohibition against the people's using their most economically important hunting grounds and against any attempt by them to return and take up residence inside the military area,

Thus, the most serious problem is not the eviction itself, but the placement and expansion of the base. Even before the eviction in 1953, hunting had been negatively affected to the extent that compensation would have been justified, according to practice established from 1941 to 1943 concerning the loss of hunting grounds as a result of military bases established in Greenland.

Tom Hoyem assumes that, in such a small society, the people had talked about the establishment of the base. He indicates that the political and judicial assembly of Thule, the Hunters Council, was informed of the eviction plan and perhaps even supported it. It is a documented fact that, when directly asked in 1952, the Hunters Council rejected plans to move the community and in 1953 demanded that an adjustment be made in its relations with the base. It is also a documented fact that the two government officials who were called home on short notice to plan the eviction had no mandate from the Hunters Council. The minister notes that by 1953 25 people had already moved and concludes that the government simply helped the rest move to a new, good hunting ground in 1953. It is true that some had already moved, but no one knows how long they planned to be away. It was customary for people to leave Thule temporarily as part of the people's overall plan for the utilization of natural resources. As we know, hunting conditions near the base in 1953 were poor.

Tom Hoyem is a politician, so we cannot blame him for wanting a political

solution to this interesting affair. In our discussion of possible solutions in our book, we point out that there may be good reason to find a solution that is more flexible than one that might be achieved through litigation. We also point out, however, that such a solution must have legal standing. After all, we are speaking of a "phase of Inuit history that must never be repeated," as Hans Pavia Rosing, president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, wrote in the introduction to our book.


As a contribution to the discussion of a solution, the book deals not only with the Greenlandic and Danish regulations that are directly applicable to the situation, but also with conditions in other countries with native populations and with the relevant points of international law. How would similar problems be dealt with elsewhere in the world and how would they be solved? Here the minister points out that the sense of community in the kingdom is based on political agreements and good will and that it would be a catastrophe for Greenland if the solution was based on laws or regulations concerning the rights of the native population, as is the case in Canada and the United States. The minister's reasoning is partly off-target and distorted, but to a certain extent he is correct. The traditional American approach has been that the native people possess the right to their land and the federal government pays the people to give up this right. This tradition is now changing, since native people no longer want to give up their land, but want to keep it.

Relinquishment or "extinction" of the native people's original and traditional right to their land is only one method of dealing with the conflicts that may arise in judicial systems between the native population and national governments that have annexed the territory of the native people. The tradition of relinquishing land has no roots in Nordic jurisprudence and it would be absurd or catastrophic to maintain that Greenlanders should begin to relinquish the right to their land. On the other hand, if we recognize that relations between Denmark and Greenland are based on a political agreement, this must not mean that the relatively weaker party becomes dependent or without rights in its relations with the other side.

Unlike the home rule arrangement, the Thule base is not a result of political negotiations between Denmark and Greenland. In addition, the Hunters Council has been left with no influence whatsoever. Establishment of the base was an encroachment on the rights of the people of Thule and, according to generally accepted Danish constitutional principles, compensation must be paid. Such an approach is firmly rooted in the Nordic judicial tradition, as shown in the book's treatment of Lapp rights in Norway.

More and more international attention is being devoted these days to the rights of native people. In Norway, Sweden, and Finland so-called Lapp committees are dealing with various aspects of the legal position of Lapps that are presently unclear. Before implementation of the Greenlandic Land Usage Law of 1977, the Greenlandic Provincial Council demanded a similar study that would lead to legal protection for existing collective trapping, hunting, and fishing rights. That was not achieved, because the government wanted to rush the law through parliament, but parliament decided that the law would be revised in

1981 or 1982, so that this study could be conducted. This decision of parliament has been ignored, however, and the study has not been made. Thus, in our book, we have proposed that this work could be done in connection with a flexible solution to the Thule matter. The minister calls this a careless error, since the Land Usage Law was transferred to home rule in 1981. But this was no careless error on our part. The study called for in 1977 was to deal, on an international basis, with the question of the Greenlandic People's right to land and with the protection of their constitutional rights in this area. Work of this type cannot be carelessly pushed aside 5 minutes before the law is to be revised. Thus, the fact that the mandate of parliament has not been carried out seems to be another indication of the historical reluctance of the Greenlandic Affairs Ministry to treat the problem seriously--a reluctance that is totally confirmed by the Thule affair.



These maps, drawn by Jan Egeberg, show the areas in question.

9336

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

IMPROVED WINTER CLOTHING, EQUIPMENT BUDGETED FOR SERVICES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Aug 85 p 4

[Text] The Bundeswehr is to receive improved clothing this year and next year for roughly 500 million marks. Particularly, the protection against cold and moisture is to be improved as a result of individual cases of slight freezing which were caused by clothing deficiencies in last year's harsh winter. After the winter a group of female delegates had taken a special interest in the topic of Bundeswehr clothing, a factor which may have influenced the acquisition decision.

As Defense Minister Woerner said in Bonn on Thursday, the improvements are scheduled to be in effect before the beginning of winter. By the end of the year some 70 million marks are to be expended. An additional 24 million marks are earmarked for improving sports clothing for soldiers, also by the end of the year. The entire special program, which was introduced by Woerner on Thursday, is valued at 485 million marks. It has been known for some time that something was wrong with the clothing in the Bundeswehr. This caused Woerner to appoint a special emissary in the middle of last year who had the task of testing the clothing used by Bundeswehr soldiers and of determining whether other armed forces, particularly the allies, have better equipment. During the inventory of clothing articles in the Bundeswehr, a total of 150 battalions and 9 squadrons of the air force and navy were examined. The resulting special program is expected to be completed by the end of 1986.

Measures to improve protection against the cold extend from the acquisition of 250,000 head-and-face protection devices to "cold protection overpants," "winter outer mittens," of which 100,000 will be ordered this year, as well as 300,000 undershirts and underpants, 80,000 pairs of combat boots and 120,000 rubber overshoes through "rainpants," an "inclement weather jacket" for the navy and fire-retardant underwear for pilots. Climbing hosiery for mountain troops, winter socks, kidney protectors for tank commanders, as well as 2 million shoe inserts and 500,000 insulated inserts for sleeping bags were thought of.

To improve sports clothing, 770,000 warmup suits with a new design are to be acquired as well as many inclement weather jackets, but also more than 1.2 million sweatshirts, 2 million pairs of athletic socks, 926,700 pairs of bathing sandals, 845,000 swimsuits, as well as 1,046,700 "outside" sports shoes and 935,000 "indoor" sports shoes.

5911

CSO: 3620/454

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SOLDIERS VOICE CONCERNS ON CAREER REGULATIONS, CONSCRIPT PAY

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 8 Jul 85 p 14

[Article by Wilhelm Hilpert: "Soldiers' Grievance Box: Bundeswehr Association Complains About Pay and Career Rights"]

[Text] The Association of Professional Soldiers and Draftees of the Bundeswehr in Bavaria (Defense Region VI) spent 4 days discussing social and socio-political questions under the slogan "German Bundeswehr Association--Securing the Future." The 280 delegates who represent more than 60,000 members in Bavaria and who meet every 4 years passed numerous resolutions. The most essential demands were: conscript pay should be adapted to increased costs of living and a legal regulation of service time should be introduced. Duty up to 56 hours per week is not subject to extra pay. Furthermore: vacancies occurring in the Bundeswehr administration should be filled with former professional soldiers. In addition, the delegates complained about "inadequate career rights."

In this connection, the assembly welcomed the armed forces personnel structure law, which makes it possible for 1,200 professional officers of the class of 1935 through 1944 to apply for retirement between 1988 and 1991 with a high pension. At a press conference on the weekend one could hear sentiments that the early retirement of professional soldiers should also be extended to other officers and noncommissioned officers.

In addition to the desire for appropriate participation in personal representation, the list of demands also contains the wish for the group to be represented with seats and voices on the radio and media council of the Free State of Bavaria as a "socially relevant group." The delegates addressed a plea to the Bavarian State Government to "depict the urgent problems of soldiers in public in such a way that they would be recognized and understood by the population."

Lt Col Horst Berg (Munich), who was reelected as Military Region VI chairman, regretted that security policy arguments were only rarely conducted with the use of specialist arguments. Selected groups within society are opposed to soldiers and officers "only in order to change the state." Frequently, matters are such that "we soldiers must not only explain our constitutional mission but must even apologize for our existence."

Frustration and Sloppiness

The demands of the delegates now will go to the main assembly of the German Bundeswehr Association. In his address, the federal chairman of this supra-party organization, Col Heinz Volland, who has headed this 300,000-member-strong organization for 18 years, cited SPD Bundestag deputy Gerstl, according to whom the Bundeswehr is short 20,000 career officers, including 15,000 non-commissioned officers. The cause is said to be: "great service time stress, frustration, inadequate training and sloppiness in service, as well as dissatisfaction among conscripts and a negative resonance within the population."

Interior Minister Karl Hillermeier, during a solemn ceremony in the former archbishop's residence in Wuerzburg, acknowledged the Bundeswehr as an instrument of peace within the armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance. He said the purpose of this alliance was to avoid a world war. "Europe must not become a second Afghanistan," said the CSU politician and he reported that currently the proposal of guidelines for total defense are being discussed at the federal and state level. What is being discussed are concepts within the federation as to how the military and civilian sides intend to jointly master their tasks in case of emergency.

5911

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28 August 1985

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

COSTLY GERMAN 'E/F' BAND IFF SYSTEM ADOPTED FOR AIR FORCE

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 22 Jul 85 p 4

[Article by Alexander Szandar: "German But Twice as Expensive: The IFF System Is Being Supplementally Equipped With the Siemens Instrument"]

[Text] Defense Minister Manfred Woerner had barely come home from Washington at the beginning of April before friend and foe were once again sawing on the same bench. He was accused of having acted like a dilettante with respect to the IFF [Identification, Friend or Foe] system for the NATO air forces, which was worth billions, and to have given away German industrial interests without being pressed and, to make matters worse, of having prevailed despite the doubts expressed by the minister of postal affairs and by the minister of transportation. Woerner had promised in America that the Bundeswehr would acquire an identification instrument which would function in the "D" frequency band.

Both the minister of postal affairs and the transport minister, who have a say in this matter, argued that this frequency band is traditionally used by civilian air traffic controllers and was overburdened. Furthermore, a "D" system was unacceptable for flight safety reasons. That is why a system developed by the Siemens firm was given preference, since it functions in the next higher frequency bands--the "E" and "F" bands, which the East cannot monitor so well and has difficulty jamming. Furthermore, the German system was the only one which met a NATO requirements catalogue which was coauthored by the Americans but with which they suddenly wanted nothing to do. They said that changing over to German technology would be too expensive.

Woerner probably had no other choice than to fall to his knees before the mighty partner. He was offered "compensation transactions" in return but only in very vague form. Thus, the repeat attempt to build a transatlantic "two-lane highway" with respect to armaments cooperation ended in a dead-end street. The then chairman of the defense committee, Alfred Biehle (CSU), groused that the "sound barrier" had now been reached with respect to relations with the Americans. The committee therefore gave Woerner guidelines on negotiating regarding technical details: Parliament would approve no system which does not fulfill German military requirements and which would endanger flight safety. However, this meant that the American system would be out.

Since then, experts from industry and from government have come up with a compromise idea which is soon to be set down on paper as a proposal for a new IFF standardizing agreement. Individual NATO countries are to be free to augment a "D"-band identification instrument, which is required as minimum equipment, by the addition of supplemental systems operating in the "E/F" band which present a "greater identification certainty." If the German Luftwaffe were to change over to the combination system and only use it in the "E/F" band, the feared overloading of the "D" frequency band would not occur. Civilian flight safety would be assured. The responsible transport minister could be satisfied; the minister of postal affairs would have no further reason to deny approval; the air force would no longer have to consider that in the event of war a good third of its pilots might be shot down by their own air defense system; German industry received substantial orders and Woerner could boast that he had succeeded in his negotiations.

The question only remains why Woerner did not immediately negotiate a compromise? However, the compromise solution is very expensive for him: the Bundeswehr must pay at least 1 billion marks for the combination system--double the amount planned thus far.

5911

CSO: 3620/454

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ARMY SEEKS ADDITIONAL 250 LEOPARD 2'S BEYOND BUDGETED 1,800

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 Jul 85 p 5

[Article by Michael Braun: "Bundeswehr Wants an Additional 250 Leopard 2 Tanks: 'The Armored Weapon of the East Is Becoming More of a Threat'"]

[Text] In addition to the 1,800 Leopard 2 combat tanks, which are already on order, the Bundeswehr is seeking an additional 250 of these tanks to be included in military planning. The Bundestag has not yet approved this project. The military authorities in the planning department of the Ministry of National Defense believe that the mission of the Bundeswehr can only be fulfilled with the assistance of these supplemental 250 Leopard 2 tanks.

This plan was announced on Sunday by Brigadier General Bernhardt, who is chief of the staff department for army planning. Bernhardt spoke on the television magazine program of the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, which is telecast on the private satellite channel SAT 1. As a reason for the purchase of additional tanks, Bernhardt cited the armaments efforts by the Warsaw Pact. There, modern tanks are placed in service more rapidly than had been anticipated by the West. Simultaneously, he said that the available tanks of the eastern military alliance were being improved with regard to their combat value. The Bundeswehr intends to deploy the additional Leopard 2 tanks in the area south of the River Main. There, according to Bernhardt, the threat has increased most.

The arming of the Bundeswehr with Leopard 2 tanks began in the fall of 1979. In November of this year the final series of Leopard 2 combat tanks for the Bundeswehr will be built. Delivery of the last of these 1,800 tanks is scheduled to last until 1987. The Krauss-Maffei AG Enterprise, which builds the majority of the Leopard 2 tanks, let it be understood in February of this year that after the Leopard 2 production is completed unemployment gaps could occur in the defense industry. The enterprise had hoped for replacement orders, which could include improvements to the Leopard 1 tank. This combat tank had been delivered to the Bundeswehr in 1965 and was to be replaced in the 1990's by the Leopard 3. However, the "conceptual phase" for this tank of the 1990's was interrupted. Army planning had to take federal finances into account on the one hand and, on the other hand, premature final planning was not to deprive the Leopard 3 of up-to-date technical developments. Military specialists primarily wish to improve protection for the crew; a requirement which is based on the threat presented by airborne target-seeking munitions. Furthermore, the Leopard 3, which is being planned under the designation "Armored Combat Vehicle 2000," is to have a higher degree of target accuracy. In any event, the Leopard 3 is likely to be delivered late, perhaps in the year 2000.

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DER SPIEGEL CRITICIZES WOERNER'S ARMY PLANNING

DW061259 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 5 Aug 85 pp 19-21

[Unattributed article: "Nobody Believes Woerner's Figures Anymore"]

[Text] Top FRG and U.S. military people doubt Defense Minister Woerner's competence. They say: The funding of his billion Deutsche mark plan for the new armament of the Bundeswehr is not ensured, nor can the personnel strength of the Army be maintained over the next few years. Woerner's answer was to have the figures rigged.

So far the defense minister dismissed critics of his personnel and arms planning with the charge that they lack expert knowledge. "The Bundeswehr," Manfred Woerner announced at every opportunity, "has a safe future."

Now, Woerner's wisdom is being called in question even in an official ministry document, the 1986 Bundeswehr plan. The author, Inspector General Wolfgang Altenburg, does not indeed refer to objections by the FRG military who time and again had warned the minister against too optimistic prognoses. The FRG's leading soldier had a witness express his skepticism, a witness whom Woerner can hardly dress down.

Altenburg states in the assessment part of the paper that NATO Supreme Commander Bernard Rogers recognizes the FRG defense contribution. Yet the U.S. general also harbors considerable doubt whether the Bundeswehr will, first, preserve the defence volume of the nineties and, second, be able to ensure the "present standard" of armament with the funds set aside and eliminate "recognized weak spots."

Altenburg's ruse has a good reason. The inspector general concluded his inventory 2 years ago, with the result that the Bundeswehr can no longer maintain its present personnel strength of 495,000 men in the nineties when the low birth-rate age groups will join the Armed Forces. Even if Bonn extends conscription from 15 to 18 months and lowers the fitness criteria the Army will at best have a strength of 420,000 soldiers. Planning chief Hans Ruehle, intimate friend of the minister and gray eminence of Hardthoehe, in surveys of his own had arrived at a similar conviction. Ruehle wrote to Woerner that "armed forces personnel strength in the nineties... of 400,000 to 420,000 soldiers should be taken as a basis of realistic planning."

But Woerner refused to listen. He did not want to go down in the Republic's history as the first defense minister who had to curtail personnel and arms. He had his military people juggle the figures around until they, thought they knew better, came up with the desired results. In a Cabinet bill of 17 October last year the minister guaranteed his chancellor 495,000 soldiers.

This promise was upheld even when Helmut Kohl at the last minute deleted an important precondition: the "voluntary service for female soldiers," as stated on page 8 of Woerner's bill. Kohl's order says that the subject of "women in the Bundeswehr" must be taboo pending the Bundestag elections in 1987.

The "minister by the chancellor's grace," as the military people have been jesting since the affair around General Guenter Kiessling, therefore was allowed to merely announced that conscription will be extended to 18 months effective 1 July 1989. Besides, people hitherto considered unfit for military service, meaning people having problems walking and seeing, as well as married men and fathers, will have to serve. This was precisely Ruehle's warning to the minister; this will elicit problematic discussions in the public: "cripples as the last levy?"

Meanwhile, General Altenburg has tried to revitalize the discussion on women in uniform, but was called to order by the minister. Still, the general insisted that the promised Bundeswehr strength in the nineties cannot be maintained without 15,000 to 20,000 female soldiers.

If only 420,000 instead of the 495,000 men can fall out, "structural adaptations" will be necessary, the Bundeswehr plan states, then the Army would have to be reorganized and some units would have to be deactivated -- measures which cost time and money.

Woerner, however, continues to act according to the principle that what should not be can never be. His critics who charge him with playing with rigged figures he recently confronted with studies which climaxed in the passages: "A Bundeswehr with a personnel strength of merely 430,000 men would call in question the coherent forward defense." With 400,000 men "forward defense would no longer be possible" -- an analysis which FRG NATO officers do not share. In the view of SPD defense expert Erwin Horn the "minister on call" merely takes his decisions true to the motto: "I do not care what happens after me."

The supreme commander's arms and procurement policy obviously is as unsound as his personnel planning. Altenburg, in his capacity as the planning commissioner, abided by the political orientation data of the minister, to be sure. Yet, time and again he indicated doubts in subordinate clauses.

According to the Bundeswehr plan the defense budget from 1986 to 1988 is to increase by DM500 million each and then, up to 1998, by "a real zero," meaning that just the annual price increases will be balanced. This, Altenburg states skeptically, seems to guarantee realization.

The budget for the research and development of new weapons, for instance, already has been "fully exploited" by now. It does not earmark a single Deutsche mark for the "star wars" program recommended by Kohl and Woerner. Neither does the concept make allowances for the fact that the development costs for high technology, as past experience tells, increase much faster than prices for foodstuffs and civilian commodities. Woerner's armament secretary Manfred Timmermann estimates the increase rate at a minimum of 8.5 percent per annum -- and this being a "rather conservative" reckoning.

At other points of the Bundeswehr paper, where billions of Deutsche marks are earmarked for new aircraft, ships, guns, missiles, and ammunition, the inspector general hints that it is hardly possible to speak of realistic planning.

According to Altenburg "mere cost estimates" are available for many procurement projects. Thus, the "predominant part" of the new types of ammunition "has not yet been developed at this time." There is a "certain risk" in the cost planning (for ammunition alone DM41.5 Billion from 1986 to 1998).

Moreover, the inspector general's assessment of the combat and performance capability of the Army differs entirely from that of the optimistic minister. While Woerner plans to celebrate the Bundeswehr as one of "the best armies of the Western world" during the festivities on the occasion of its 30th anniversary, Altenburg in his secret paper draws attention to the "weak spots" just as he did last year: Ammunition is short, there are gaps in electronic warfare, the telephone and radio installations are obsolete.

Granted, the Bundeswehr has prestige objects such as the Tornado fighter-bomber and the Leopard II tank, but it does not have any modern bombs and grenades. In case of hostilities it would have spent its ammunition with just a few days. Just a few older types of ammunition live up to the NATO demand and are sufficient for at least 30 days.

Altenburg's assessment goes on to say that "in the case of the mobile communications links of the supreme Bundeswehr leadership, the discrepancy between mission and available equipment" meanwhile has become "dangerously great."

SPD Deputy Katrin Fuchs, a member of the Defense Committee since 1983, in a letter to floor leader Hans-Jochen Vogel demanded, as a matter of principle, a closer look at the inconsistencies in Woerner's planning. After all, the SPD must ask itself how it proposes to handle in 1987 or in 1991 the mountain of military commitment authorizations and procurement contracts that the incumbent government will have left us." Vogel meanwhile had the letter forwarded to all SPD defense politicians, with positive notations on the margin.

Katrin Fuchs had attached to her letter a scientific expertise with the upshot: Woerner's armament plans can be found only if the defense budget is drastically increased in the next few years. This is only possible only through "another dismantling phases of the social state and the far-reaching renunciation of an active state role in employment and environment policies." To this, however, the SPD cannot and must not lend a hand.

According to the SPD deputy, the financial gaps between the annual 3.7 percent increases in the arms budget officially planned by Woerner and the probable development continue to grow: "Considering inflation rates of 6.8 or even 10 percent for military procurement and research and development, annual extra costs of 5.5 percent for personnel, and 4 percent for miscellaneous items, there will be finance gaps of DM94.3 and/or 193.5 billion up to 1997, compared with the cost estimate of the Federal Government."

The minister's Bundeswehr planning also appears to be risky to the top military people. An FRG general said: "In the past several weeks I have not meet one NATO officer who still believes Woerner's figures and data."

CSO: 3620/467

MILITARY

FRANCE

RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURES, MOBILIZATION MISSIONS OUTLINED

Bonn LOYAL in German May 85 pp 24-27

[Article by Jochen Koester: "No Supernumerary Role. Eleven Million Reservists Assure France's Overall Defense"]

[Text] Each year, without great enthusiasm but with the will to make the best of it, 280,000 conscripts begin their year of basic military training in France. The mere 1200 applications for conscientious objector status per year--of which circa two-thirds are approved--signify that the civilian populace and the army have no problems in getting along. No wonder: conscription was introduced in 1793 already.

Its form as generally practiced today became law on 10 June 1971. It consists of the basic service, a 4-year standby readiness period, and the subsequent service in the reserve. Reserve officers and reserve NCO's can, if they volunteer and have the personal aptitude, be programmed against mobilization assignments for up to 5 years beyond the rank-dependent special age limit; the rest of the reservists are assigned new duties in extended civil defense from their 35th to their 50th birthday.

General Boissau, as chief of staff responsible for the mobilization of the French Army reserve units, used the last congress of the European reserve NCO organization AESOR in Versailles to make basic remarks before an international audience.

Manifold Tasks

After looking back on 2000 years of French military history, he indicated his belief in the following principles:

1. A standing army is of necessity expensive; cost-saving reserve organizations offer an alternative.
2. Reservists cannot do everything; much rather, they represent the last resort. A country such as France also needs a standing army, which can be committed where needed for the defense of the national interests.

3. The motivation of the reservists is directly dependent on the will of the entire populace to defend itself.
4. Reservists must be well led, by reservists as well as by active duty personnel. The numerical balance between active duty personnel and reservists at the command level must be oriented to the mission of the unit involved.
5. Reservists must be continually trained and kept abreast of new developments, otherwise they will fail in combat.
6. In addition, consistent with their mission, reservists must be well equipped and armed; otherwise they will play only the roles of supernumeraries.

With surprising candor, he reported further that, by law, 11 million reservists are available, 4.6 million of them assigned to the "Service de Militaire" (military service) with training exercises between the ages of 20 and 35, and the other 6.4 million to the "Service de Defense" up to the age of 50, with both components administered by offices of the "Service National." The German delegation, headed by Vice President Jens Ulmer, was amazed: "military defense" and "civil defense" under one roof on the foundation of applied compulsory military service! Also serving in the "Service de Defense," the second formation of universal compulsory military service, are those who for all sorts of reasons do not take part in the "Service Militaire." The tasks are multilayered and extend from national civil defense to installation security to carrying out various specific assignments of military national defense.

Seventy-five percent of the military service reservists, i.e. 3.2 million men, received basic training during their 1-year military service tour. The other 25 percent were exempted from this training. Of this army of millions, the best suited 17 percent receive a mobilization assignment; in times of crisis, this is sufficient to double the strength of the army, to quadruple that of the gendarmerie, and triple that of the medical service.

Special Role in the Alliance?

"Our NATO--worth only half as much without its reservists," thus read an article in LOYAL 4/85. This is just as valid for France in her formal special role in the alliance as it is for the nations participating directly in the military command structure. According to the IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] figures for 1983, the active armed forces of 493,000 men are backed up by 475,000 reservists, not counting the circa 90,000 men in paramilitary organizations.

As in the active army, the French reserve forces are organized to include army, air force, navy, gendarmerie, and medical reserve units. Most of the reservists having mobilization assignments comprise reserve units of their own. Only 15 percent are needed to bring active units up to wartime strength. The disproportionately high use of reservists in the gendarmerie reserve is explained by additional operational tasks accompanying the expanded police function, which also includes, among others, the protection of rear areas,

installation and coastal defense, as well as support tasks in the employment of atomic weapons. And also the medical reserve force will grow enormously in the event of an operational necessity. The available hospital bed-count will be increased fivefold; 72 percent of the medical officers are reservists!

Reservists--Needed Everywhere

According to the publicly accessible figures, reservists, in the event of a mobilization, will comprise 47 percent of the personnel in the army, 42 percent in the air force, 24 percent in the navy, and even circa 10 percent in the Force de Frappe. Just like the active army divisions, even the newly formed rapid assistance force (Force d'Assistance Rapide) will not be able to manage entirely without reservists in an emergency. In trade parlance one speaks of a "scaled peacetime presence."

In the first of four stages, the mobilization plan (Plan de Mobilisation) for the army comprises just under 80,000 reserve ranks in vital command/subordinate command [officer/NCO] positions, in order to be able to implement the remaining mobilization measures. One could view this as a model for the concept also addressed recently in the FRG of "part-time soldiers." The defense scope of the French ground forces comprises one army consisting of three army corps, which have at their disposal a total of 15 active divisions and 14 reserve divisions.

The reserve divisions must also rely on "corset busks" from the active sector. For ten of the divisions, these are culled from the eight active armored divisions and seven infantry divisions, and for the other four they are made available from the army training sector. A French reserve sergeant, dryly: "We need these harmoniously operating mobilization cells in our active parent units."

The mobilization of the air force and the navy takes place in a decentralized manner, in the air force at circa 40 airfields and mobilization stations, in the navy in the three sectors Cherbourg (channel coast), Brest (Atlantic coast), and Toulon (Mediterranean coast).

A Worthwhile Look Across Borders

The gendarmerie reserve is structured even more elaborately. The organization of France into departments, arrondissements, and cantons creates the framework: the gendarmerie is omnipresent, even though only with a handful of men headed by one NCO. It is the gendarmerie which puts up the mobilization posters in the town when reservists are called up in an emergency! Of particular importance are their own communications links, independent of the postal network. The whole country is covered with this supplementary communications net, which during crises cannot be put out of action either by strikes or acts of sabotage. Aside from the territorial units there is in addition the "Gendarmerie Mobile," more heavily armed, barracked, and equipped with special gear. In peacetime it consists of disaster aid units, in a crisis it is restructured into a combat force.

In its long history as a nation with practically unchanged borders, France, like almost no other European country, has tried out all possible military structures. The present-day system of universal compulsory military service cannot be taken over sight unseen by other countries. However, it surely contains elements which are also worth thinking about outside of France.

For what was it that General Boissau said in Versailles? "In closing I would like to say that each time period and each nation has specific needs and that it would be rather silly to give particular emphasis only to the advantages of a system which at some time and some place was once successful. What is certain, in my opinion, is that following our critical excursion together one can establish the following principles..."

And these principles, honored readers, you have already read at the outset of this article.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

REORGANIZATION OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE, GENDARMERIE DETAILED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jul 85 pp 164-167

[Article by Jacques de la Hersiere: "Mobilization Into the Army--The Vega Exercise"]

[Text] Mobilization Into the Army

The Army has neither the need nor the means to support in peacetime, all the forces which it would absolutely need in case of conflict. It consequently resorts to mobilization and to reserve personnel to bring its strength from its peacetime level to a wartime level when the need arises.

The law stipulates that all Frenchmen who have been in active service, military service, or civil service, and those who have been exempted from active service, become "military service reservists" until they have reached the age of 35. At that age, they are normally discharged from military obligations to become "defense service reservists" until the age of 50.

Size

The reserve personnel needed by the Army has steadily dropped during the past 30 years, as follows: 1,700,000 in 1954, 1,000,000 in 1962, 715,000 in 1970, and 545,000 in 1980. This reduction in mobilization requirements is essentially the result of technologic developments which allow the establishment of a higher performance (and more costly) army, and make it possible to reduce its size. It is also the consequence of forms of combat strongly changed by the nuclear reality. By 1988, that is by the end of the military program law, the Army will mobilize 270,000 reservists.

Tasks

Part of these reservists will enter into active units to bring them up to "wartime" strength; many of them are assigned to logistic and health units, and others, fewer in number, will function at all levels and in all specialties in combat units. But a significant part of the reserve personnel now constitute regiments and large regional units which provide territorial coverage in collaboration with the gendarmerie and other armed forces. These regional forces have just undergone a thorough reorganization.

The operational territorial defense (DOT) was created in 1959, when France acquired nuclear weapons and adopted a military strategy based on deterrence. The aim was to dispose of a power capable of defending all installations indispensable for the implementation of deterrent forces (bases, command posts, communication centers, and so on). In addition to protecting military installations and primarily strategic nuclear units, the armed forces must also assure the security of various other sensitive areas against enemy action.

All the armed forces, including the gendarmerie, were thus in a position to participate in DOT. Their actions were three-pronged: information gathering, defense of sensitive military or civilian installations, and intervention designed to eliminate the enemy from the national territory.

The gendarmerie was essentially responsible for information gathering with its traffic and information squads, and its squadrons. The Army complemented this action, but its primary task was to intervene on behalf of threatened sensitive areas, or to destroy located enemy forces. For this purpose it had rapid intervention companies and infantry divisions, more than one-half of which were readied at mobilization.

Reorganization

With practice, it became apparent that this system was rather cumbersome because it was centralized. In seeking to give priority to the defense of the whole, it left a gap at the regional level, and did not provide the generals commanding military divisions with all the means they needed to fulfill their responsibilities. What is more, it had an inadequate reaction time due the fact that mobilization centers were quite seldom located near the installations to be defended. That is why a reorganization of DOT was included in the 1984-1988 military program law.

This reorganization, which will essentially be achieved in 1985, remedies the inadequacies mentioned above by decentralizing the use of intervention resources, by relieving the Army from a significant portion of its task as static guardian of sensitive areas, and by improving the selection and location of mobilized personnel.

This is implemented in two major measures:

Transfer the protection of a certain number of civilian establishments or joint service units (gasoline distribution, armed forces health services, general delegation of weapons, and so on) to the gendarmerie; this transfer of tasks is accompanied by a transfer of the necessary personnel and equipment between the two armed forces;

Disbanding of the large general reserve units, which are replaced with units specialized in DOT, such as zone brigades and divisional interservice regiments.

Each military region, defined as a defense zone, will be assigned two brigades whose composition will vary depending on the characteristics of the zone. They will include a minimum of two infantry regiments, an armored regiment, and engineer units. The brigade's personnel will be about 4000 men. Each of the territorial military divisions will have a standing interservice regiment and an engineer company. The regiment's composition, which will vary according to local needs, is one command, support, and service company, 3-5 combat companies, and a mechanized squadron. The personnel will vary from 900 to 1350 men.

All in all, these DOT forces will amount to 75,000 men, 400 light armored vehicles, 350 jeeps armed with recoilless rifles and Milan, and 600 mortars of 120 or 81 caliber. Added to these are: several regiments responsible for border surveillance, an infantry division to protect the Albion plateau, and a Rhine division responsible for maintaining crossing zones designed to maintain communications on both sides of the river.

Instruction, Training

The cohesiveness of reserve units, which always include a nucleus of active personnel, is assured through the application of derivation and localization principles. Derivation consists of assigning to some active regiments the task of training, instructing, and mobilizing a reserve regiment in their own garrison. Most of the young reserve cadre and enlisted personnel in the reserve corps will have performed their military service in the deriving corps no later than the past five years. The purpose of localization is to reduce mobilization delays. Reserve personnel are chosen among those who live closest to the location at which the regiment is placed in service.

Instruction for reserve personnel is carried out at two levels: individual and collective. On one hand the cadre undertake individual school training for upgrading their knowledge, combined with participation in active regiments, such as maneuvers or camp residencies. Enlisted personnel with specific functions are also called up for retraining and maintenance periods. On the other hand, collective unit instructions are organized, spread out over a period of several years. They include the call-up of cadre and specialists at first, followed by the complete unit for several days.

Reserve cadre, officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel are selected as a function of their qualifications and of the closeness of their residence, conditions which promote the combined efficiency, motivation, and cohesiveness of reserve units.

Vast Resources

The number of military service reservists is therefore important in applying the law. Thus, for requirements of approximately 300,000 men, the resources of French citizens with military service obligations is greater than 4 million.

This makes it possible to select most often from among volunteers who have the moral qualities and the military and technical competence needed for effective participation in combat. It should be noted in passing, that thanks to the 1983 law instituting voluntary military service for women, the latter can henceforth be included in these figures.

Added to these military service reservists, are some 6 million Frenchmen (35-40 years old) who are reservists in the defense service, and who can be assigned collectively or individually to "civil defense" or "economic defense."

The country's defense clearly goes beyond a strictly military interpretation. Created in 1965, the Permanent Civil Defense Commission was semi-lethargic. It appears that a new beginning followed a meeting chaired by the minister of the interior in March 1985.

Due to the tasks which they are assigned, and to the procedures used to select, instruct, and train them, the Army Reserves can participate actively in defense action. It is not a matter of two armies, one active and the other in reserve, but rather that of a single army, which, when a threat arises, is reinforced by the indispensable contribution of its reserve component.

Vega Exercise

During last spring, the Army conducted the Vega exercise, a national logistic exercise which is normally carried out every two years. This large exercise, organized and commanded by the Army, makes it possible to study the logistic support of the forces at a national level, and to train headquarters logistic groups in their wartime structures, meaning that they are reinforced by mobilized reserve cadre.

In 1985, the Vega exercise assumed particular importance because of the Army restructuring and the creation of the rapid action force, which have brought significant modifications to support organization and planning.

Vega involved the higher echelons of command and services, as well as all the forces and defense zones. It had recourse to the SNCF (National French Railways Company) and the Ministry of Transportation. Moreover, the participation of the territorial command of the Bundeswehr and the Bundesbahn on FRG territory, made it possible to represent through the exercise's modeling, the form that could be assumed by an interallied cooperation in case our forces are involved in Germany.

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CSO: 3519/244

ECONOMIC

CYPRUS

COMMERCIAL SHIPPING COOPERATION WITH USSR

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 14 Jun 85 p 10

/Text/ Minister of Communications and Works Khr. Mavrellis, who visited the Soviet Union between 11-13 June on the invitation of Soviet Minister of Maritime Fleet T.B. Guzhenko, returned home yesterday afternoon.

An official communique mentions the following: "During the visit, an agreement was signed dealing with maritime cooperation that regulates relations of both countries in this field. The agreement provides for mutual acceptance of the status of the most favored nation on issues dealing with maritime affairs, i.e. free entry into ports, the payment of maritime duties and taxes and the use of services that relate to maritime affairs. The agreement also provides for the establishment of a joint committee for the purpose of examining matters that could crop up during their implementation.

"During the examination of international maritime issues, the two ministers expressed themselves in favor of broadening mutually beneficial cooperation on a just basis by abiding by the principles of freedom for the merchant marine.

"The Cypriots briefed the Soviets on the existing situation of the Cypriot problem.

"The Soviets in turn confirmed the intransigent position of the Soviet Union in support of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and independent policy of the Cypriot Republic and in support of a just solution to the Cypriot problem based on UN decisions.

"Mr Mavrellis extended Mr Guzhenko an invitation to visit the Cypriot Republic, an invitation that was accepted with gratitude.

"Taking part in the talks was Mr Sierifis, Cypriot ambassador to the USSR."

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CSO: 3521/282

ECONOMIC

CYPRUS

LIBYANS SEEN DRIVING HARD BARGAIN

Libyan Commercial Delegation

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 11 Jun 85 p 10

/Excerpt/ According to an announcement sent to our newspaper, a Libyan delegation has arrived in Nicosia to continue contacts relative to the export of Cypriot clothing goods to Libya in accordance with orders that Cypriot businessmen had secured at the beginning of the year. The delegation will also have contacts relative to the signing of new contracts for the import of other Cypriot clothing goods.

Unsettled Issues

Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 13 Jun 85 p 12

/Text/ The two Libyan officials who have been in Cyprus for the past few days have completed their personal contacts and negotiations with Greek Cypriot exporters of clothing goods and are leaving today or tomorrow. As we have been informed, these officials have concluded definite agreements with 10-12 of our exporters for exports to Libya of goods amounting to some millions of dollars.

This is considered a "temporary arrangement" because their budget --as was announced-- has been exhausted.

Certain of our industrialists who "concluded" agreements with the Libyan officials will begin loading their first shipment of goods in the next few days.

It is to be noted that for dozens of other industrialists who had moved ahead and prepared their goods but who did not get a final approval from the two Libyan officials (one is from the Libyan Ministry of Economy) the situation is tragic.

Negotiations between our industrialists and the Libyan officials were very tough because the latter asked for up to a 20 percent discount. Finally, the discount that was granted was between 10-15 percent.

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CSO: 5521/282

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

FINANCE MINISTER SIMONSEN DOUBTS BUDGET COMPROMISE WITH SDP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "The Government and Social Democrats Cannot Agree"]

[Text] The Minister of Finance and Radical Liberal Fiscal policy spokesman Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen agree that the two parties can reach a compromise on the 1986 budget. Palle Simonsen maintains that a compromise with the Social Democrats is too expensive.

The government and the Social Democrats cannot reach a fiscal compromise. The Social Democrats have made it clear that they want social and labor legislation that will result in increased expenditures that cannot be afforded at the present time.

Therefore Minister of Finance Palle Simonsen (Conservative) clearly rejects the offer by the Social Democratic Chairman and former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen to debate the budget, which is already being printed and will be presented on August 15.

"I cannot imagine that a fiscal agreement could be entered into with the Social Democrats. The budget will be debated in the finance committee in the usual way and the political distinctions can be taken up there," says the Minister of Finance to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

Yesterday, Radical Liberal fiscal policy spokesman Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen suggested that in light of the tax compromise the Social Democrats now be invited to debate the budget...to which former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen immediately agreed but added that "the Radical Liberals should have come up with that idea long ago."

"If the government really extends an invitation, then we will be course attend. We are of the opinion that a number of social cuts need to be corrected," said Anker Jorgensen.

The Finance Minister and the Radical Liberal negotiators will meet right after the budget is set forth on August 15, and Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen is convinced that the two parties will reach an agreement even without the Social Democrats. The budget must be passed by the Christmas holidays.

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

SIMONSEN EXPECTS INCREASED EXPORT EARNINGS TO AID BUDGET

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jul 85 p 1

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Exports Should Prevent Economic Tightening"]

[Text] Minister of Finance Palle Simonsen maintains that the government's goal of equalizing the balance of payments in 1988 will remain. He points out that the government awaits the export-stimulating results of this spring's comprehensive plan and wants to see the results before there can be any change in fiscal policy.

"The chance to export our way out of the balance of payments deficit lies at our feet. Business must increase production and especially exports and thereby avoid forcing the government to enact fiscal restrictions at a later time. That would be a pity."

So says Minister of Finance Palle Simonsen to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE after the stock exchange reacted with advances anticipating that the government is waiting in the wings to intervene this fall against the continued large deficits in the balance of payments.

"The government is taking things coolly and calmly. The budget is first presented in August, and then we have a few months to see how the trade figures develop," continues Palle Simonsen.

"We do not wish to deviate from the government's goal of equalizing the balance of payments by 1988, and if business makes a go of it and if exports increase steadily as a result of the increased competitiveness due to the comprehensive plan and of the purely politically stabilizing effect of the tax reform, then a fiscal intervention will not be necessary.

Only if at some point there are clear indications that the goal of equalizing the balance of payments by 1988 will not be met could the government be forced to carry out other limiting arrangements," says Palle Simonsen. He continues:

"The government has always been aware that the improved competitiveness from this spring's comprehensive plan would first be felt in 1986 and only really

in 1987. The government naturally believes that we should await the results," says Minister of Finance Palle Simonsen. He further points out that the effect of limiting consumption by forced savings will take effect this fall.

"When we passed the measure this spring we knew that it was the only part that would work this year. The rest will benefit us in 1986 and beyond," believes Finance Minister Palle Simonsen.

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ECONOMIC

DENMARK

INDUSTRY COUNCIL FORESEES INCREASED EXPORTS WITH LOWER DOLLAR

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Henrik Skov: "Hope for Exports"]

[Text] The Export Council's export analysis indicates wide differences in the development of various categories of goods and markets in the first five months of 1985. Exports to the OPEC countries have plunged 35 percent while rising a modest 6.7 percent to the EEC countries. Within the separate categories of goods, the export of semi-manufactured goods in particular has failed considerably.

"In the first 5 months of the year, Danish exports have been hard hit by the weak market development of our export markets which was followed by inventory reductions," says Industry Council department head Verner Puggard.

This is one of the main conclusions of the export analysis undertaken by the Industry Council for BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

In particular, the result has been inventory reductions in semi-manufactured goods, which has had serious effects on part of the Danish export industry. This is the main reason for very weak growth in export expansion in the accompanying table's third column. The export of semi-manufactured goods pulls down the final growth figure.

"In the first half of 1984, there was growth in world economies, and this resulted in considerable growth in inventories that lasted through the summer. One wanted to ensure inventories sufficient to meet the growth. These assumptions crumbled when signals came from the American economy indicating a change in market conditions. It slowly became clear to most that inventories were too large. This resulted in adjustments to inventory resulting in repercussions that could be felt through May of this year," says Verner Puggard.

"The strengthening of the dollar through March meant, as well, a worsening of the Western European countries' balance of trade. This pressed inflation upward and thereby reduced real income and buying power. This could be felt in exports," stresses Puggard, who today detects the opposite reaction.

"The adjustment to inventories is about finished---inventories have bottomed out, the dollar is losing strength, and more of our close markets are facing a more favorable economic development. West Germany is an obvious example. They had a weak beginning in 1985, but now are clearly taking off. This will strengthen Danish exports in the second half of the year."

A survey taken of the members of the Industry Council supports these positive trends. It is surprising that the firms from the beginning of May on estimate that exports in current prices for 1985 will be a good 12-13 percent over the 1984 level. The estimate was made with the first months' bleak export figures behind them. This suggests that for the rest of the year Danish industry has quite high expectations for exports. Thus the amount of export orders at the end of May is a good 14 percent over that of May 1984, figured in constant prices.

The table shows the development in exports to select countries and markets divided according to the different categories of goods. Behind the weak growth in the export figures in the third column is the weak growth in the export of semi-manufactured goods. A drop of 34.9 percent in exports to the OPEC countries is striking as well. According to the Industry Council, the reason is the fall in exports of feta cheese, in particular, which comes through in the figure in the first column. It is also worthwhile to note that exports to the EEC area grew by only 6.7 percent, which is thus much less than the growth in exports to ASEAN countries.

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ECONOMIC

DENMARK

BRIEFS

IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT FIGURES EXPECTED--The country's 14 labor market boards expect growing employment in practically all areas. Unchanged employment is expected only within areas such as agriculture and fishing. The boards believe that increasing employment is expected especially within the iron and metal industries, the food and alcohol and tobacco industries, the textile and clothing industries, and within the area of trade. This follows from an assessment of growth in the July-October quarter issued by the Labor Ministry. It is estimated that almost 230,000 workers were without jobs in the July quarter, while the figure for the October quarter operates with about 240,000 unemployed. This is a reduction in relation to the same quarters last year--for July, a reduction of about eight percent or about 20,000. Women's share of the unemployment is expected to increase somewhat, from 53.4 percent in the July quarter of last year to 57 percent in this year's July quarter. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Jul 85 Sect III p 3/ 12819

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ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

COUNCIL CHANGES IN INCOME, SOCIAL SECURITY URGED

Interview with Council Chairman

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 18 Jun 85 p 13

[Report on interview with Professor N. Douben, chairman of a Scientific Council for Government Policy committee, by Jose Toirkens and Ton Van Zweeden: "WRR Report Puts New 'Main Lines' in Social System"; date and place not given]

[Text] "There will undoubtedly be people who say: it cannot be implemented in the short term, thus we reject it. But we didn't want to develop a social security system for tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. It is specifically designed for the long term. The current system and the system being presented now by the administration are not for the long term and consequently, it is certain that they will soon run onto the rocks. They have a negative impact on economic growth and employment."

Professor Douben, whose statement this is, has for years been noted for conceiving unorthodox solutions to the problems the social security system in the Netherlands has struggled with.

They can also be found in the report "Guarantees for Security," issued for the Scientific Council for Government Policy [WRR] by a committee chaired by Douben.

The WRR proposal is a combination of basic income, limitation of compulsory social security to the level of the social minimum and a shift in its financing. While other proposals are adding a small subsidiary line to the existing main line, the WRR tries to "build a completely new main line." Douben can see some administration proposals as an intermediary step toward achievement of the WRR plan, which should get under way in the early nineties. As examples he mentioned the WW [Unemployment Law], WWV [expansion unknown] and WAO [Law on Labor Disability], the limitation of above-minimal payments and the coupling of payment period to past labor history in the government's proposals.

"However, each time we take a step further based on the idea that social risks and not professional risks must be ensured via compulsory social security.

Simplification

The first goal is simplification. And it starts with the replacement of AOW [General Old Age Insurance Act], AWW [General Widows and Orphans Act], AKW [General Children's Allowance Act], AAW [expansion unknown], WAO, the Health Insurance Act and unemployment laws by a Partial Basic Income Law [GBI] and a General Income Loss Insurance Law [AIV]. Douben: "In addition to that, the government's proposed Allowance Bill is superfluous. Furthermore, the partial basic income law would cause households to reach the social minimum more often without having to rely on assistance. Hence, the simplicity of our system also makes sure that fewer tests of other incomes and reviews are necessary."

The level of the partial basic income of 450 guilders net per month has not been chosen haphazardly. "We determined it on the basis of the difference between the social minimum for a couple and for a single individual. That provides you with a very simple system to guarantee a minimum income. An unemployed individual, for example, will receive the partial basic income of 450 guilders plus an allowance up to the social minimum for a single individual. If he has a non-working partner, then the latter will automatically get a basic income of 450 guilders. Together then they always have the social minimum for a married couple. Extra allocations are not necessary then."

Limit

In the WRR proposal, an additional payment beyond the minimum would not be deducted from a possible assistance allocation. "Consequently it does make sense, in contrast with the government proposal, to insure yourself more, but you do have to draw a limit. It would be too crazy to let someone with a supplementary allocation also keep the assistance payment. However, he does always retain the right to the partial basic income."

[Question] You also want to incorporate the Health Insurance Law into the system. In case of illness the workers would immediately fall to the social minimum then. The unions will certainly have problems with that.

[Answer] The system does not have its own history and its own development. It is too closely related to social and economic development for that. Hence, there are no acquired rights and it is nonsense to talk about an historic rift.

[Question] Therefore the legal minimum wage can also be abolished?

[Answer] If you want the labor market to function well again you will have to once again turn labor wages into market wages. That means that you need to take the need element out of labor wages via the partial basic income. The legal minimum wage came into being as a family income guarantee. But the composition of households is so varied now that it is no longer an effective instrument to insure that families will have an income which will in any case provide for the minimum necessary costs of living. Because the GBI provides a uniform base for incomes, the major wage differentiation which would be the result of the elimination of the legal minimum wage, produces smaller differences in net incomes including GBI than would be the case if minimum wages were

eliminated under the present circumstances. As a matter of fact, our system does not prevent employers and workers from setting minimum wages through CAO's [Collective Labor Agreements].

Social Minimum

[Question] Employers and workers will soon no longer have anything to do with the partial basic income. Isn't there a danger that for reasons of economy the government will soon lower it?

[Answer] It comes down to the fact that politics will soon have to make a decision about the level of the social minimum, but it does that now too.

[Question] The WRR itself does not provide a definition of social minimum.

[Answer] No, that level is a relative matter which depends on economic development. In our country that minimum is relatively high compared to other countries. You cannot simply reverse that.

[Question] The insurance of payments beyond the minimum will become a private matter. Isn't that just a shifting of costs?

[Answer] I deny that. What is involved is a different preference for income spending.

[Question] But let us assume that CAO's force everyone to insure themselves against above minimal income reductions.

[Answer] Then all the advantages of the system would have disappeared. The personal freedom of the workers must continue to exist. I can very well imagine a CAO with agreements concerning additional insurance whereby individual participation is possible.

Moonlighting

[Question] According to the report, the WRR proposal will discourage moonlighting. But doesn't it remain advantageous for someone with a basic income to moonlight?

[Answer] Because labor costs are going down and services become less expensive, a number of people will be able to do certain jobs openly again. Then quality and guarantee will play a role again. Furthermore, this also discourages the hiring of moonlighting workers because for every worker in their employ the enterprises can deduct the gross basic income from their tax payment. Then you may well be willing to moonlight but you will no longer find any clients or employers who want to take your services.

[Question] Your proposal puts a heavier tax burden on profitable enterprises which are supposed to pull the economy along.

[Answer] But, of course, those enterprises have in part become so profitable because they have contributed relatively little so far to the financing of social security. We are not proposing to tax capital more but to straighten out the relationship between capital and labor which has historically grown crooked. A large part of the social security contributions no longer have anything to do with the functioning of a company. Hence they are not operating costs. Then you cannot, either in principle or economically, largely tax a single production factor -- labor -- for it.

[Question] But then technological development will be in danger.

[Answer] That development is increasingly determined by other factors, for example flexibility and product quality. Moreover: if labor costs were to go down all kinds of research and development work, which is now prohibitive, would become possible. If in addition you mean that stimulants are necessary for high tech, then you have to bring capital subsidies, which have nothing to do with the introduction of new technologies, into the discussion.

Ten Billion Guilders

[Question] You figured in your report that introduction of the partial basic income for everyone above 18 years of age would lead to 10 billion guilders in extra public expenses.

[Answer] Maximally, yes. It is understandable that costs will go up if everyone who doesn't have an income now then has a basic income. However, if it is not your intention to alter the existing income relationships, then you could finance the basic income of the non-wage earning partner by taxing the sole wage earning partner more heavily. This is why our system also requires the integration of social security and taxation. Another possibility is to divide the costs among all wage and income tax payers. Then you would get a shift in the income relationships. If you want such a shift then you can also think about financing in part by eliminating a number of capital subsidies to enterprises, such as investment credits for the WIR [Investment Account Act]. Besides, that amount of 10 billion guilders in extra costs could turn out substantially better than anticipated. If you assume that parttime work will increase, then the figure will turn out lower because more people will be going to work. It cannot be precisely figured out because nobody can calculate the behavioral reactions to a new system. But if you could have a guess at it then you could think in terms of an increase in public costs of 1 percent of the national income.

[Question] Aren't you afraid that, due to a lack of financial responsibility, politicians will put your plan in a drawer?

[Answer] That would be very shortsighted.

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 18 Jun 85 p 3

[Article: "What Would Change for the Enterprises?"]

[Text] Enterprises:

Enterprises with numerous workers are better off in the WRR proposal than in the current situation. Douben gave as an example two companies with the same turnover and profit. The first company has 50 workers, the second 10. Under the current system the first company carries a much larger share of the cost of social security than the second because the rate of the contribution is coupled to wages. Soon there will be a shift in this because a significant part of social security will be financed from tax receipts. Furthermore, the company with 50 workers will be able to deduct 50 times the gross amount of basic income from its taxes. The company with 10 workers will be able to deduct that amount only 10 times.

Workers:

All workers will receive a basic income of 450 guilders net per month. This will be deducted from the gross wages. That means that new hourly wages will be set on the basis of the current gross wages minus the basic income. In balance, this net amount should not make any difference for a worker who currently holds a fulltime job. According to Douben, the new system is more favorable for parttime workers however. They will in any case receive the basic income. In addition they will get the -- reduced -- hourly wages. On balance they will come off better in net amounts. The net difference between fulltime workers and parttime workers will become smaller. Douben expects that the WRR proposal will promote shorter working hours.

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ENERGY

DENMARK

PRIVATE FIRMS, GOVERNMENT JOIN IN FORMING OIL DRILLING UNIT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Jul 85 Sect III p 1

[Article by Erik Bendt Rasmussen: "New Danish Oil Drilling Unit Ready to Go into Action"]

[Text] Large private firms and the state have formed the Danish Operator Company to manage the construction of oil fields just as the second round of exploration is announced by the Ministry of Energy.

The second round of exploration for oil and gas in the Danish underground will be announced by the Ministry of Energy next month. This is the background for the formation yesterday of the Danish Operator Company, or DANOP, by seven of the largest Danish companies, including the East Asia Company. It will be the operator in the exploration and recovery of oil and natural gas in the Danish underground. Other Danish firms are invited to participate.

The chairman of the board is the former Shell director and civil engineer Einar N. Moller, 57. Niels Peter Dahl, 39, presently director of the Danish-owned construction company, DANAC, USA, will become the new company's director.

The forthcoming formation of the Danish Operator Company has been discussed in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. The reasons for the formation have only now been made available and are as follows:

A number of larger Danish firms have formed the Danish Operator Company I/S together with the state-controlled company Danish Oil and Gas Production (DOPAS). DOPAS owns half of DANOP, and the Danish Energy Consortium K/S (DENENERCO), a company newly formed for the purpose, owns the other half.

DANOP starts doing business next month. The company is set up so that there is room for yet a number of other companies in the private half of the company (DENENERCO). Thus other companies can come forward as partners in DANOP through DENENERCO and gain board positions in the latter. DENENERCO will invite participation through advertising.

The private firms behind DENERCO are EAC Energy A/S (East Asia Company owned), J. Lauritzen Holding and Danish Petroleum Enterprise I/S, which consists of Christiani and Nielsen, Hojgaard and Schultz Oil, Kampmann, Kierulff and Saxild and Monberg and Thorsen. The other partner, state-controlled Danish Oil and Gas Production (DOPAS), is owned by Danish Oil and Natural Gas (DONG).

The operator---for example, a company like DANOP---has a central role in oil consortiums. The operator conducts business for the consortium, manages the practical work, and thereby influences the placement of orders in connection with the exploratory drilling and---if anything is found---the development and production of oil or gas from the fields. Among the Danish partners in DANOP, Monberg and Thorsen, for example, have experience in delivering equipment to the North Sea oil production.

The point of a Danish operator company is that it will presumably create the best conditions for competitive Danish industries to get a meaningful part of the coming years' investments in oil and natural gas.

12819

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OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

ITALY

TEXT OF BILL ON NATIONAL RESEARCH PLAN FOR ANTARCTIC

Rome NOTIZIARIO DELL'ENEA in Italian Mar 85 pp 81-84

[Text] Bill on the National Program for Research in the Antarctic. (This bill was introduced in the Senate by the government on 4 March and was assigned, at the committee stage, on 22 March to the 7th Committee on Public Education, Arts and Scientific Research).

Article 1. (National Program for Research in the Antarctic)

In order to ensure Italy's participation in the Treaty of the Antarctic signed in Washington on 1 December 1959, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty, a program of scientific and technological research is authorized for the year 1985-1991.

Article 2. (Duties of the minister for the coordination of the undertaking of the scientific and technological research).

The minister for the coordination of the undertaking of the scientific and technological research, with the exception of the responsibilities of the minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the observance of the provisions of an international nature as provided by the Treaty of the Antarctic, is assigned the duties of:

1. Formulating the program authorized in Article 1, using for said purpose the Commission mentioned in Article 4 below;
2. Presenting the program provided for in Article 1 above to CIPE [Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning] for approval, after having heard the opinion of the Committee provided for in Article 3 below;
3. Approving the annual executive programs planned by the commission provided for in Article 4 below;
4. Overseeing the implementation of the national research program in the Antarctic in the context of the rules provided for in the Treaty on the Antarctic;
5. Presenting during the month of July of each year a report to CIPE and to Parliament on the status of progress of the program.

Article 3. (Interministerial Consultative Committee for the Antarctic)

1. There is created, within the minister's office, the Interministerial Consultative Committee for the Antarctic to coordinate the undertakings for scientific and technological research, with the duties of:

- a. Expressing its opinions on the national program and the related executive programs;
- b. Expressing its opinion for the purpose of authorizing and overseeing all national undertakings that are entered upon outside the program;
- c. Formulating proposals and expressing opinions for the purpose of coordinating the national program with the programs of the other countries that operate in the Antarctic;
- d. Providing criteria for the implementation of the provisions of Article III of the Treaty on the Antarctic.

2. The Committee is created by a decree of the minister for the Coordination of Undertakings for the Scientific and Technological Research who chairs it and is composed of a representative and a substitute, designated by each of the following agencies: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning; Ministry of the Treasury; Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Crafts; Ministry of Merchant Marine; Ministry of Government Holdings; Ministry of Health; Office of the Minister for the Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research Undertakings.

3. Also members of the committee are the vice president of the National Scientific Commission for the Antarctic and the person in charge of the implementation of the program.

4. Representatives of other agencies of the government involved, as the occasion arises, as well as experts designated by the agencies participating in the program may be invited to participate in the committee's meetings.

Article 4. (National Scientific Commission for the Antarctic)

1. There is created within the Office of the Minister for Scientific and Technological Research the National Scientific Commission for the Antarctic with the duties of:

- a. Cooperating in the preparation of the national program and the related annual executive programs;
- b. Ensuring the liaison with the scientific agencies of the Treaty;
- c. Coordinating Italian research activities with those carried out by the other countries operating in the Antarctic;
- d. Ensuring the coordination between the program and all national research undertakings that are entered upon outside the program itself;

e. Collecting all the necessary data for the purpose of preparing the minister's annual report on the coordination of the scientific and technological research undertakings provided for in Article 2 above;

f. Collecting the documentary evidence related to the results of the scientific activities carried out in the Antarctic.

2. The Commission is appointed by a decree of the minister for Scientific and Technological Research, who chairs it, and is composed of:

a. A vice chairman designated by CNR [National Research Council];

b. A representative of the Office of the Minister for Scientific and Technological Research;

c. Three experts designated by the minister of education;

d. One expert designated by the minister of merchant marine;

e. One expert designated by the minister of health;

f. Six experts designated by the CNR;

g. Two experts designated by ENEA [National Atomic Energy Agency];

h. One expert designated by the National Geophysical Institute (ING);

i. One expert designated by the Experimental Geophysical Observatory of Trieste (OGS).

3. There may be invited to the meetings of the Commission experts from government agencies and from other agencies, as the occasion arises.

Article 5. (Authorization for Scientific Undertakings in the Antarctic)

1. All expeditions or activities, outside the national program, undertaken around the Antarctic or its interior must have previous authorization by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Ministry of Scientific and Technological Research.

2. The authorization is subordinated to the verification of the observance of the principles of the Treaty on the Antarctic, of the scientific purposes of the undertaking, of the existence of a suitable logistical and support organization and has the necessary guide lines to exercise oversight of the authorized activities.

Article 6. (Implementation of the Program)

1. The ENEA, taking into account its own agency duties, as defined by the long-range plans approved by CIPE together with the CNR as regards the scientific aspects of the program provides for the implementation of the program as outlined in Article 1 in accordance with the operational formalities defined by the

rules of the law in force by decree of the minister for scientific and technological Research together with the minister of industry, commerce and crafts.

2. The minister of defense, within the limits of availability, provides a quota of military personnel for the logistical needs.

3. The minister of scientific and technological research together with the minister of defense regulates the manner and terms in which the participation of said military personnel is carried out.

4. The expenditures related to the personnel of agencies or institutions participating in the activities are to be charged to the budgets of each such agency or institution with the exception of the expenditures related to TDY in Italy or abroad, which are to be charged to the funds approved by this law. The expenditures related to ENEA's personnel are to be charged to the ordinary quota of the State as provided by Law No 1240 of 15 December 1971, as amended by Law 84 of 5 March 1982, excluding the expenditures related to TDY in Italy and abroad, which are to be charged to the funds approved by this law.

5. The minister for scientific and technological research issues, together with the ministers of the treasury and public administration, and with the prior consensus of the agencies involved, standards with special regulations regarding legal, funding and insurance matters of the personnel engaged in the activities in the territory of the Antarctic, even with the exemption of existing regulations.

Article 7. (Temporary Rule)

In implementing the decision of CIPE of 22 November 1984, a first expedition for the period November 1985-April 1986 is authorized in accordance with the rules set forth in Article 6 above.

Article 8. (Financial Coverage)

For the implementation of the present law, a total of 230 billion lire is authorized for the period 1985-1991, to appear in a special chapter as an item in the budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers entitled "Contribution to ENEA for the National Program of Research in Antarctica." ENEA will administer the funds, applying its own regulations for financial and property management.

2. The burden resulting from the implementation of this law, estimated to be 5 billion lire for the year 1985, 15 billion lire for the year 1986 and 30 billion lire for the year 1987, is met via a corresponding reduction in the appropriations set forth for the 3-year 1985-87 budget, Chapter 9001 of the budget of the Ministry of the Treasury for the fiscal year 1985, using for this purpose the specific item the term "Scientific Research in Antarctica."

3. The minister of the treasury is authorized to effect, by his own decrees, the required variances in the budget.

ENEA's Commitment for the Antarctic Expedition

The Antarctic continent is of ever-increasing importance and interest because of the opportunities it affords to conduct scientific operations under unique environmental conditions.

However, the importance of the Antarctic is not limited to the scientific sector, but it also, and above all, embraces the economic one, as is demonstrated by the interest that all technologically advanced countries show in those areas, which are potentially rich in energy, mineral and biological resources.

These conditions form the basis for Italy's adherence to the Treaty on the Antarctic, signed in Washington on 1 November 1959. This occurred under Law No. 963 of 29 November 1980, which authorized our country's adherence to the treaty and provided for its full implementation as soon as the law became effective.

The Antarctic Treaty, signed by Italy in March 1981, binds the signatory countries to use the Antarctic for peaceful purposes, ruling out any possibility of establishing military bases on it or carrying out nuclear experiments and, furthermore, of establishing radioactive waste dumps. The treaty, setting aside the problem of territorial sovereignty claims, guarantees to the signatory countries the freedom to carry out scientific research programs and aims at promoting cooperation in the area through periodic meetings, consultations, exchanges of information and data. This explains the great importance the treaty has had, and continues to have, in safe-guarding the territorial integrity of Antarctica, its natural resources and its entire ecological system.

Italy's adherence to the treaty does not constitute a mere diplomatic formality, but shows our country's interest in contributing effectively, together with the other signatory countries, to the study and scientific exploration of that continent.

The reasons that justify a serious and immediate undertaking by our country aimed at initiating a program of research with an expedition on that continent--to be effected during the Antarctic summer that corresponds to the period from November 1985 to April 1986--are considered to be well-founded and diverse.

The Antarctic Treaty expires in 1991 and it is absolutely necessary for Italy to comply with certain clauses contained in the treaty prior to that date in order to place herself in a favorable position when the treaty comes up for renegotiation and the new order of Antarctica will be set up.

It should be emphasized, as a matter of fact, that the mere adherence of Italy to the treaty does not automatically grant her the rank of "consultative member," which gives her the right to participate, with decision-making powers, in the plenary sessions.

With regard to this, it must also be kept in mind that the 28 signatory countries of the treaty, of which 16 are members of the Consultative Committee--they are, as a matter of fact, designated as consultative and non-consultative members. The title of consultative member, with the inherent right to participate in the biennial sessions of the Consultative Committee (the next session will be held in November 1985) and in the meetings of the SCAR [Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research] work groups, is acquired through the provisions of an article of the

treaty itself, if substantial research activities are carried out in that territory. If our country carries out said activities, it will be in a privileged position vis-a-vis those countries that, not being consultative members, do not take part in the decision-making phases, although they are bound to abide by the determinations deriving from the treaty.

Presently, the objective of the meetings is to define the criteria for the renewal of the treaty and to perfect the system for an eventual future exploitation of mineral and natural resources.

Aware of the strategic importance of our presence in Antarctica, the minister for Scientific and Technological Research has set in motion, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the participation of other interested agencies, the necessary process to arrive at the creation of a "National Research Program in Antarctica" capable of satisfying the conditions required by the treaty to acquire the title of "consultative member." The proposal to set said program in motion was studied by CIPE (Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning), which, by a resolution of 22 November 1984, took cognizance of the general objectives, formulated for the scientific aspect by the CNR, and the carrying out of a first expedition to Antarctica, to take place within the period from November 1985 to April 1986, was approved. In addition, CIPE resolved to entrust ENEA, in agreement with the CNR, and on a temporary basis, with the management of the above-mentioned expedition in accordance with the operational rules set forth by the minister for Scientific and Technological Research in agreement with the agencies and institutions most directly involved.

The choice of ENEA as the operational management agency was determined by the greater administrative operational streamlining that the agency's structure affords when compared to the more complex procedures requiring more time in other agencies.

On the other hand, ENEA's participation will not be limited to the general areas of the undertaking in view of the fact that the agency will also contribute to the planning stages and to the carrying out of both scientific and technological activities.

At the same time, the Parliament is in the process of examining legislation providing for a program of scientific and technological research in Antarctica with the relative organizations and procedures for the period the treaty is in effect until 1991.

The bill defines the duties devolving to the minister of scientific and technological research among which those of adopting a program of scientific and technological research and its presentation to the CIPE for approval stand out.

The bill provides for the creation of an Interministerial Consultative Committee for Antarctica to which is assigned the task of formulating proposals and opinions for coordinating the program with those of the other countries operating in the Antarctic. The Committee is formed by a decree of the minister of scientific and technological research, who chairs it, and is composed of a representative and a substitute designated by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Budget and Economic Planning, Treasury, Defense, Education, Industry, Merchant Marine, Government

Holdings, and Scientific Research, in addition to the chairman of the National Scientific Commission for Antarctica, who is responsible for the program's implementation.

The National Scientific Commission for Antarctica has, among others, the task of making proposals for the formulation of the national program and the annual scientific programs to ensure the liaison with the scientific organizations provided by the treaty, to collect the necessary data for the preparation of the report that the minister for scientific and technological research must submit to CIPE and the Parliament during the month of July each year.

The Commission, appointed by a decree of the minister of scientific and technological research, is composed of the minister himself or by a delegate from the Office of the Minister for Research and by 14 experts designated by the minister of Education, by the CNR, by ENEA, by the Institute of Applied Scientific and Technological Research for Fisheries, by the National Geophysical Institute and by the Experimental Geophysical Observatory.

The expeditions and activities undertaken in Antarctica must be previously authorized by the minister of foreign affairs together with the minister for scientific and technological research. The bill provides that the implementation of the program be carried out by ENEA together with the CNR and with the allocation of personnel provided by the Ministry of Defense for the logistical aspects in accordance with the ways and means decreed by the minister for scientific and technological research together with the minister of defense. There is, in addition, provision for rules to regulate the aspect of the legal, funding and insurance matters of the personnel engaged in Antarctica with the exemption of current provisions.

In implementing CIPE's resolution of 22 November 1984, the bill provides for carrying out the initial expedition in Antarctica, whose cost is estimated to be 9.6 billion lire, to be of a planning and exploratory nature to provide orientation criteria for all of the activities of the program.

The financial commitment of the legislation would be 230 billion lire for the 1985-1991 period, to be entered in the proposed budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

The amount of the allocated funds relates to the need to carry out continuing research activities in Antarctica that presuppose the establishment in that territory of a permanent base capable of accommodating up to 40 research personnel with the necessary services allowing them to carry out both research activities and maintenance operations, particularly of air and ground transportation means with which the base must be equipped in order to guarantee movement and ensure communications with the other bases in Antarctica; the building (in order not to depend on foreign equipment) of an oceanographic vessel equipped for polar sailing to be used as a support unit of the base on land. This will allow our country to introduce in international markets the products and manufacturing capabilities deriving from the undertaking.

The research program provides a wide range of subjects, both scientific and technological.

The main fields are identified as: geology, geophysics, meteorology and biology. To these could be added such others as glaciology, human biology and medicine and atmospheric physics.

In another sector there are pointed studies related to experiments on materials, components and systems that must be used in a hostile environment and in extreme climatic conditions as well as the study of the related systems of automation and control. Special attention will be given to the field of prospecting and drilling.

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